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Using recent literature, examines developments in seven macroeconomic schools of thought: orthodox Keynesian, monetarist, new classical, real business cycle theory, new Keynesian, Austrian and post‐Keynesian. Describes all of these and classifies them as orthodox, new or radical. After setting out the differences, discusses the degree of agreement between the schools of thought. Concludes that macroeconomics is constantly evolving, resulting in new disagreements requiring a new consensus.

In this article we shall argue that the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in the sense of Kuhn and that Kuhn's conceptual framework provides a better understanding of the convulsive changes that took place in macro‐economics in the twenties and thirties than alternative growth of knowledge theories that are being discussed in the economics literature at the present time. In the last ten years or so economists have become increasingly interested in the various growth of knowledge theories that have been developed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and others. This heightened interest on the part of economists is to be explained by the fact that these new theories are based on the actual behaviour of scientists. The new philosophers of science devote their attention not to “correct scientific method” but to the actual behaviour of scientists. It is because of this revolution in the historiography of science that economists have been able to relate these new theories to their own work and to the development of economic theories in the past.

During times of economic crises, the public policy response is to abandon basic economic thinking and engage in “emergency economic” policies. We explore how the current financial crisis was in part caused by previous emergency economic measures. We then investigate the theoretical limitations of emergency economic responses. We argue that these responses fail to take into consideration the practical conditions of politics, thereby making them unsuitable to remedy the problems of a crisis. Lastly, we provide a preliminary analysis of the consequences resulting from emergency economic policies initiated in response to the 2008 financial crisis.

The editorials of the then-new Business Week during the 1929–1933 contraction offered sophisticated Keynesian policy prescriptions: against a laissez-faire response, against deflation, against balanced-budget fetishism, for monetary expansion. These editorials, which seem to have been largely forgotten, likely played a considerable role in the dissemination of Keynesian economics in the United States in the 1930s. This chapter reviews the editorials and their congruence with Keynes’s writings. The magazine’s archives, including surveys of their readers, suggest that the editorials were among the most read and most valued parts of the magazine. The magazine cultivated an elite executive readership at that time, so the editorials may well have been important in gaining business support for Keynesian policies in the early New Deal.

Based on Geoffrey Harcourt's Palgrave volumes, this review article attempts to picture how, in a Cambridge environment, Keynes's fragmentary monetary theory of production grew organically out of Marshall's equally fragmentary monetary theory of exchange. The dangers associated with Keynes's close links with Marshall are alluded to. Indeed, without taking account of the classical spirit of Sraffa's work, Keynes's monetary theory may quite easily be integrated into the Marshallian‐neoclassical framework of analysis. However, theorising, not literally, but in the spirit of Keynes and Sraffa, within a Ricardian‐Pasinettian framework of vertical integration, opens the way to a Classical‐Keynesian monetary theory of production.

The purpose of this study is to investigate why “financial fragility” carries different definitions in the economic literature. This is a useful task as the detection of “financial fragility” depends, in part, upon how one defines it. According to Post Keynesian economists, financial fragility is a process that can culminate in financial instability (an event). For mainstream or New Keynesian economists, financial fragility has been traditionally defined as a state in which a shock can trigger instability. More recently, however, mainstream economists have recast their definition as a particular form of financial instability – an event. Each definition of financial fragility is intimately linked to the theoretical foundation upon which it rests. This carries important implications for the ability of policymakers to assess and manage the health of an economy.

The different approaches to the definition and detection of financial fragility are compared using corresponding sets of indicators. Indicators for the Post Keynesian approach are derived from a simple cash‐flow accounting framework, in the spirit of Hyman Minsky. The economy selected for study is New Zealand.

According to the Post Keynesian approach, New Zealand has been in a financially fragile state for over three years, a period during which policymakers could have been creating ways to make New Zealand more resilient to the onset of instability. According to the New Keynesian approach, New Zealand may just now be experiencing fragility, giving policymakers much less time to react.

This study traces the definitions of financial fragility to their underlying theoretical frameworks and draws the implications for the methods of detecting financial fragility.