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The great stimulus to macroeconomic theory provided by Keynes is well recognised, but much less is said about his views on scientific methodology and his influence there. There is a widespread belief among economists that Keynes was an a priori thinker who dealt with “facts” and empirical material in a cavalier and high‐handed manner. We question the validity of this interpretation and give evidence to show that Keynes' methodology was not hostile to empiricism.

The controversy between Hayek and Keynes in the 1930s is probably one of the best‐known disputes in economics and several comments have been made on this episode (Hicks, 1967; Machlup, 1977; Fletcher, 1987). In the assessments little attention has been paid to the development of the ideas of the two economists, to the views they had in common and to the influence they had on each other. These aspects will be taken into consideration in this contribution with the aim of extending our knowledge of the fundamental points of disagreement between them. The crucial question is how it came about that Hayek and Keynes, who for some time studied very similar monetary problems, ended as such fierce opponents on the question of how a modern capitalist system works. Keynes went as far as denying that the market system is self‐adjusting, whereas Hayek, especially in his later writings, propounded the view that markets constitute an efficient mechanism for the satisfaction of human needs.

Based on Geoffrey Harcourt's Palgrave volumes, this review article attempts to picture how, in a Cambridge environment, Keynes's fragmentary monetary theory of production grew organically out of Marshall's equally fragmentary monetary theory of exchange. The dangers associated with Keynes's close links with Marshall are alluded to. Indeed, without taking account of the classical spirit of Sraffa's work, Keynes's monetary theory may quite easily be integrated into the Marshallian‐neoclassical framework of analysis. However, theorising, not literally, but in the spirit of Keynes and Sraffa, within a Ricardian‐Pasinettian framework of vertical integration, opens the way to a Classical‐Keynesian monetary theory of production.

The Bretton Woods agreements set up the post‐war monetary order on the basis of fixed exchange rates and autonomous national economic policy. Changes in parity were allowed in the case of fundamental disequilibrium, but this concept was not defined, promoting a lengthy but sterile debate. This paper, after reviewing the main features of the discussion, analyzes Keynes's overlooked contribution, which helps to clarify the issue at stake.

Kendall P. Cochran has claimed that John Maynard Keynes “developed a theory that would try ‘to account for things as they are’. In so doing he became another important social economist.

A review article of Pasinetti and Schefold’s edition of the papers at a conference in Marseilles, 1997, on the impact of Keynes in the twentieth century. The book itself is in three parts – theory; Keynesianism in European countries; and institutional discussions of Keynesian policies. The essay concentrates on the issues raised in the first part by Pasinetti, Leijonhufvud and Skidelsky. Pasinetti uses his vital distinction between principle and theory to examine why the Keynesian revolution may not have succeeded. Leijonhufvud identifies Keynes as the last of the classics, contrasting his approach with those he calls the moderns. Skidelsky asks what policies Keynes would advocate today, had he remained ageless with us.

Introduction In addition to his economic analysis, a key component of Keynes's intellectual legacy is his methodology, derived from the fusion of social philosophy and vision with politics, public policy concerns and economic analysis, which he employed to offer a solution to the most fundamental and pressing problems of his time. In effect, such a methodology constitutes, in spite of Keynes's opposition to classical economics, a rediscovery, and adaptation of the one used by the classical school of political economy, which had been abandoned as a consequence of the onslaught of the “neo‐classical” revolution in the late 1800s with its strict focus on “scientific” or positive economics.

Discusses the heritage of John Maynard Keynes in terms of application and results of his new economic philosophy over the last four decades. Compares the Keynesian school of thought with other classical and contemporary economists in relation to foundations of monetary and economic analysis, the economics of stable equilibrium, and the economics of disequilibrium. Comments on Keynes’ concept of economic stability, his view on the instability of money and monetary reform, his concept of monetary policy and of the pure theory of money, and his misjudgement of the mixed nature of the modern gold standard. Examines the provisions of the US Federal Reserve Act (1913), focusing on the Federal reserve systems’ nature and functioning, cited by Keynes as a prototype of a modern gold standard. Concludes with an examination of the international aspect of the modern gold standard.

Keynes' criticisms of Tinbergen's pioneering econometric work are traced back to Keynes' concept of “inductive probability logic”. Induction had already been rejected by Popper as the basis of scientific method. He argued that theories could be corroborated but not proved by the failure of attempts to falsify them by observation and experiment. Economic theory is proto‐theory, which is not fully falsifiable, but which yields falsifiable results if appropriate econometric methods, or a method‐theory is applied to it. A useful method‐theory needs to go beyond description and forecasting to policy optimisation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine two (accidental and inevitable) reasons why W.H. Beveridge, who in 1936/1937 had rejected all of the elements of Keynes’s General Theory, came to accept it enthusiastically in the 1940s.

The paper answers this question in three steps. First, it distinguishes apparently changeable factors in Beveridge’s views, from consistent ones. Second, it looks for factors of the latter type in his three goals for economics. Third, it compares his goals with those of Keynes.

Beveridge’s three goals overlapped with Keynes’s ideals for economics and economists, and this is not historically accidental: economics should be useful as a basis for verification by fresh observations (as an exact science); economic knowledge should be useful in business and policy-making processes (for new kinds of educated professions); and economic studies requires a wide range of related subjects (a liberal education).

This paper attempts to clarify the cognitive assumptions of the two economists. This clarification can contribute to understanding the process and reasons behind Beveridge’s acceptance of Keynesian economic theory and policies on a theoretical level.

This paper examines previously ignored reasons for Beveridge’s acceptance of Keynesian economics. Moreover, it suggests certain pre-analytic assumptions concerning the co-existence of social insurance and full employment policies. This perspective will be useful for historians of economics and the welfare state.