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Violence against the police represents an ongoing and serious problem in the USA. In 2014, over 48,000 law enforcement officers assaulted while on duty. Although over one…
Violence against the police represents an ongoing and serious problem in the USA. In 2014, over 48,000 law enforcement officers assaulted while on duty. Although over one in four of these resulted in injury, little is known about the conditions under which injury is likely to occur. The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the individual and situational factors that predict injurious assaults against law enforcement.
Using logistic regression, the current study analyzes data from the 2012 National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) on all assaults against the police (n=8,987) in order to understand, within a routine activities theoretical framework, how individual-level characteristics (i.e. officer and offender characteristics) and situational influences (i.e. assignment type, activity type, and location) predict the likelihood that an assault will result in injury.
Overall, findings suggest support for a routine activities theory of violence against the police. Initiating an arrest, one-officer vehicle type, and incidents occurring on highways/roads were all more likely to result in injurious assaults against the police. Other predictors of injury include officer and offender demographics as well as the time the incident took place.
This research was unable to control for some factors that may influence the likelihood of injury such as wearing body armor. Additionally, NIBRS data are not nationally representative, which limits the generalizability of the findings.
This is one of the first papers to use national data to examine the individual and situational factors that predict injurious assaults against law enforcement.
Reviews previous research on the effects of CEO compensation structure, outlines the criteria for relative performance evaluation (RPE) and notes the paucity of empirical…
Reviews previous research on the effects of CEO compensation structure, outlines the criteria for relative performance evaluation (RPE) and notes the paucity of empirical evidence to support it. Reports a study of the use of RPE for US bank CEO compensation 1976‐1988; and its relationship to shareholder, market and industry returns. Explains the methodology and presents the results, which suggest that CEO pay is positively linked to firm performance, but negatively linked to market/industry performance; and that performance is positively linked to CEO option wealth. Adds that both the pay/performance link and the use of RPE increased after bank deregulation in the early 1980s. Considers consistency with other research and concludes that the reduction in compensation risk offered by RPE should reduce compensation cost and thus provide a good reason for the banking industry to increase its use.
Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex‐ante, i.e., before uncertain ties…
Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex‐ante, i.e., before uncertain ties are resolved, cash bonuses are valued ex‐post, i.e., by discounting the realized cash grants. Such a lack of consistency can, potentially, distort empirical results. A related, yet mostly overlooked, problem is that when ex‐post valuation is used pay‐performance measures cannot be well defined. Consistent use of ex‐ante valuation for all components of a compensation package would simultaneously resolve both of these problems and provide a natural framework for the analysis of agency problems. In this paper, we perform ex‐ante valuation of cash bonus contracts as if the executive’s performance were measured by the company stock price, demonstrate how the shape of the bonus contract influences the executive’s attitude toward risk, and study the pay‐performance sensitiv ty of such contracts. We commence by demonstrating that a typical executive bonus contract with a linear incentive zone has a pay off structure equivalent to a portfolio of standard and binary European call options so that the ex‐ante contract value is given by the linear combination of Black and Scholes call and binary call prices, with the strike prices at the boundary points of the incentive zone. Assuming that a risk neutral executive can choose the level of stock price volatility by selecting a set of projects at origination, we show that bonus contract terms can dramatically affect the executive’s risk taking behavior and pay performance incentives. Our results are extended to bonus contracts with non‐linear incentive zones, and performance share contracts with vesting risk.