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This paper aims to trace the evolution of the theory and practice of valuation of real estate interests. Using a historical perspective, especially in the context of recent events, it identifies an emerging unification of thought and application that has important implications for the future.

The paper identifies and synthesizes the contributory literature to the philosophical underpinnings of value theory and practice as applied to real estate. From pre‐history to the present, it traces classical concepts and the way these are related to the recent innovations in economic and financial valuation theory.

Recent contributions to value theory hold the promise of unifying and transforming the practice of real estate appraisal to one that is state‐of‐the‐art in terms of its contemporary relevance. However, numerous issues remain as obstacles, including insufficient recognition of the “real” nature (as opposed to “capital” nature) of real estate; a lag in educational standards to bring the profession up to date; an excessive reliance on models and data rather than judgment and common sense; and “silo‐ization” of specialties. Promising directions for future research are identified.

The task of valuation of interests in real property has taken on an increasingly important role, as the market for real estate has grown and become more liquid and complete. This paper provides a perspective on where it has come from and where it must go in the future in terms necessary changes in theory and practice to remain viable and relevant.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the basis of the complaints against banks which sold private label securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the financial crisis. The examination shows that all but one of the cases was settled out of court. Nomura and RBS went to court, but the case against them was based on dubious evidence and on strict liability which only enabled the judge to set aside relevant evidence. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s evidence against senior executives of Fannie and Freddie shows that they deliberately purchased PLSs based on subprime loans to meet the government’s housing targets.

The research was based on publicly available documents, including details of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) complaints against the banks in question, the settlement agreements published by the DoJ, FHFA and SEC. Furthermore, it includes documentary evidence from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee and Senate Committees, the full transcript of the trial, opinions of the judge for the trial and the judgement.

The findings are that many have concluded that settlements out of court fail to satisfy the demand for justice. They have been criticised as a trade-off between the prosecutor and the bank, with a view that the imposition of large fines is to pay back taxpayers’ money spent on rescuing the banks, rather than punishing those responsible. Such fines do little, if anything, to change the behaviour of banks. As a result, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum on 9 September to focus on individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. It remains to be seen how many cases against senior executives will result from the change in direction.

The implications of the research are that it is important even in the aftermath of such a serious if not devastating financial crisis to ensure that the laws are properly applied and can stand up to any challenge that it has been stretched to obtain the results the administration of the day wants to see. In addition, care must be taken over both the imposition of large fines and the use to which the monies should be put. All the parties involved in bringing about the crisis should be held to account. The major cases against the banks have almost all been “resolved”. A change in direction has now taken place.

The practical implications of holding individuals to account should now be tackled. It requires a careful examination of the laws and regulations already in place to ensure that it is clear within a bank as to who is responsible for what. It will only be possible to hold senior individuals to account if the laws are clear and if all the evidence is not hidden. It may also require a review of the contracts under which senior executives are employed, because to remove a person from his post and then find that he still has a large pension pot and bonuses due may not result in justice either. A delicate balancing act is required because banks require highly competent and motivated individuals to run them.

If a very large fine is imposed on a bank, the shareholders and customers pay. The shareholders will mostly own the shares through their pensions and their savings in mutual funds.

There have been few studies of all the cases against the banks brought by the DoJ and FHFA and still fewer have recognized the fact that government housing policy was the source of the extent of the subprime mortgages.