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Academic research has intensively analyzed the relationship between market concentration or market power and banking stability but provides ambiguous results, which are summarized under the concentration-stability/fragility view. We provide empirical evidence that the mixed results are due to the difficulty of identifying reliable variables to measure concentration and market power.

Using data from 3,943 banks operating in the European Union (EU)-15 between 2013 and 2020, we employ linear regression models on panel data. Banking market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and market power is estimated by the product-specific Lerner Indices for the loan and deposit market, respectively.

Our analysis reveals a significantly stability-decreasing impact of market concentration (HHI) and a significantly stability-increasing effect of market power (Lerner Indices). In addition, we provide evidence for a weak (or even absent) empirical relationship between the (non)structural measures, challenging the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Our baseline findings remain robust, especially when controlling for a likely reverse causality.

Our results suggest that the HHI may reflect other factors beyond market power that influence banking stability. Thus, banking supervisors and competition authorities should investigate market concentration and market power simultaneously while considering their joint impact on banking stability.

The purpose of this study is to explore the possible impact of banking market structure on the idiosyncratic risk of financially dependent firms in China.

The study analyzes firm-level data for China from 1999 to 2018 using a two-step dynamic panel system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The findings imply that bank competition lowers corporate risk, particularly among firms that are highly dependent on external funding for their financing needs. The findings are consistent with alternative indicators of competition, corporate risk, and financial dependence. The analysis of the transmission mechanism – the channel through which competition affects corporate risk – reveals that bank competition reduces corporate risk by curtailing financing constraints faced by firms.

The competition-enhancing policy should consider the optimum level of bank competition for financial and economic stability. Further research is necessary to define the “desirable” or “optimum” level of bank competition.

In China, where the banking sector is still highly concentrated, the findings of this study call for policies aimed at encouraging healthy competition among banks. Nevertheless, such a policy must also consider the extent of bank competition that is optimal for the economy, particularly for financial and economic stability.

The paper provides the first evidence of the possible linkage between bank competition and corporate risk in China.