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The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic forced the world to rapidly translate our face-to-face interactions to remote, often computer-mediated ones. Many of us struggled to adapt since many instructors have built careers on in-person relationships. How would we maintain the humanity of an emergency remote classroom? How would we support our students’ growth when a rapid venue change was demanded? Our small, liberal arts college, like so many others, took up this challenge. In this chapter, we attempt to answer these questions using our reflections and student perceptions of successful and unsuccessful experiences. Following the switch to remote learning, we scrambled to develop and gain Institutional Review Board’s approval for a protocol which surveyed a rolling sample of our student population daily. The brief window of opportunity prevented piloting the protocol which was based primarily upon our team’s collective knowledge and experience as scholars and educators. The following fall, we followed up with a survey (aligned with the prior survey) and focus groups. We found that empathy within the classroom in this time of stress made all the difference. We relate what we’ve learned with respect to compassionate communications, course design, and adaptation. In each section, we offer a set of specific recommendations.

Amidst the backdrop of a wide array of structural developments that have revolutionized the competitive landscape of Indian commercial banking, this paper aims to empirically examine the role of two external monitoring mechanisms – competition and concentration on financial stability and further highlights the significance of bank-level heterogeneity in the nexus.

The study uses the Lerner index, defined through a translog specification, as a measure of market power. A system generalized method of moments technique accounts for the dynamic associations among the competition-concentration-stability nexus. The study further examines the moderating effect of ownership, size and capitalization on the nexus. The study also uses the Boone indicator and comments on the competition-bank stability relationship after controlling for bank governance.

The findings indicate that banks are less stable in a more competitive and higher concentrated environment. Exploring bank-level heterogeneity, first, the authors report that as competition increases, state-owned banks have greater incentives to undertake risky activities than private and foreign banks, which point to implicit sovereign guarantees that characterize the former. Second, the authors document an adverse influence of competition on the soundness of larger banks consistent with the “too-big-to-fail” assertion. Third, results corroborate the disciplinary role of regulatory capital and lend support to stricter capital norms under Basel III in a more competitive environment.

This paper is perhaps the first to capture competition and concentration in a single model; to reconcile conflicting evidence on competition-risk nexus; to shed light on the joint effect of competition and Basel accords for Indian banks.

In a bid to enhance the stability of banks, supervisory authorities in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) have also adopted international bank regulatory standards based on the Basel core principles. This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of these regulations in mitigating Bank risk (instability) in SSA. The focus of empirical analysis is on examining the implications of four regulations (capital, activity restrictions, supervisory power and market discipline) on risk-taking behaviour of banks.

This paper uses two dimensions of financial stability in relation to two different sources of bank risk: solvency risk and liquidity risk. This paper uses information from the World Bank Regulatory Survey database to construct regulation indices on activity restrictions and the three regulations pertaining to the three pillars of Basel II, i.e. capital, supervisory power and market discipline. The paper then uses a two-step system generalised method of moments estimator to estimate the impact of each regulation on solvency and liquidity risk.

The overall results show that: regulations pertaining to capital (Pillar 1) and market discipline (Pillar 3) are effective in reducing solvency risk; and regulations pertaining to supervisory power (Pillar 2) and activity restrictions increase liquidity risk (i.e. reduce bank stability).

Given some evidence from other studies which show that market power (competition) tends to condition the effect of regulations on bank stability, it would have been more informative to examine whether this is really the case in SSA, given the low levels of competition in some countries. This study is limited in this regard.

The key policy implications from the study findings are three-fold: bank supervisory agencies in SSA should prioritise the adoption of Pillars 1 and 3 of the Basel II framework as an effective policy response to enhance the stability of the banking system; a universal banking model is more stability enhancing; and there is a trade-off between stronger supervisory power and liquidity stability that needs to be properly managed every time regulatory agencies increase their supervisory mandate.

This paper provides new evidence on which Pillars of the Basel II regulatory framework are more effective in reducing bank risk in SSA. This paper also shows that the way regulations affect solvency risk is different from that of liquidity risk – an approach that allows for case specific policy interventions based on the type of bank risk under consideration. Ignoring this dual dimension of bank stability can thus lead to erroneous policy inferences.

Academic research has intensively analyzed the relationship between market concentration or market power and banking stability but provides ambiguous results, which are summarized under the concentration-stability/fragility view. We provide empirical evidence that the mixed results are due to the difficulty of identifying reliable variables to measure concentration and market power.

Using data from 3,943 banks operating in the European Union (EU)-15 between 2013 and 2020, we employ linear regression models on panel data. Banking market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and market power is estimated by the product-specific Lerner Indices for the loan and deposit market, respectively.

Our analysis reveals a significantly stability-decreasing impact of market concentration (HHI) and a significantly stability-increasing effect of market power (Lerner Indices). In addition, we provide evidence for a weak (or even absent) empirical relationship between the (non)structural measures, challenging the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Our baseline findings remain robust, especially when controlling for a likely reverse causality.

Our results suggest that the HHI may reflect other factors beyond market power that influence banking stability. Thus, banking supervisors and competition authorities should investigate market concentration and market power simultaneously while considering their joint impact on banking stability.

The purpose of this study is to explore the possible impact of banking market structure on the idiosyncratic risk of financially dependent firms in China.

The study analyzes firm-level data for China from 1999 to 2018 using a two-step dynamic panel system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The findings imply that bank competition lowers corporate risk, particularly among firms that are highly dependent on external funding for their financing needs. The findings are consistent with alternative indicators of competition, corporate risk, and financial dependence. The analysis of the transmission mechanism – the channel through which competition affects corporate risk – reveals that bank competition reduces corporate risk by curtailing financing constraints faced by firms.

The competition-enhancing policy should consider the optimum level of bank competition for financial and economic stability. Further research is necessary to define the “desirable” or “optimum” level of bank competition.

In China, where the banking sector is still highly concentrated, the findings of this study call for policies aimed at encouraging healthy competition among banks. Nevertheless, such a policy must also consider the extent of bank competition that is optimal for the economy, particularly for financial and economic stability.

The paper provides the first evidence of the possible linkage between bank competition and corporate risk in China.

Motivated by recent financial liberalization policies in emerging markets, this study investigates whether bank competition and regulatory capital affect bank risk taking in an international banking context.

Bank competition is regressed, using GLS regression, on various measures of bank risk, to reflect regulatory, accounting and market-based risk-taking. The authors use a sample of publicly traded banks operating in Africa during 2004–2019.

Results show that higher level of bank competition increases bank risk taking and results in greater financial fragility in the absence of banking capital regulations. Furthermore, larger capital adequacy ratios control the risk-taking incentives of managers and guard banks against the risk of default. Further tests confirm the significance of market-based risk measures over accounting and regulatory measures.

Findings are relevant to bank managers and regulators in their sustained effort of finding an optimal balance between bank competition and financial stability. Increased competition should be balanced with capital regulations to curtail bank excessive risky behavior and derive the social benefits of greater competition in the market while sustaining overall economic growth.

This study provides novel evidence in an international context. First, it uses regulatory, accounting and market-based measures of bank risk taking to reflect regulators', management and market participants' emphasis. Another original contribution is the investigation of bank competition across African economies characterized by financial liberalization, stringent banking system and interesting socio-economic challenges.

This paper aims to analyse the character and strength of the claims made in an emerging literature offering a sociology of financial reporting principles.

The analysis evaluates exemplary works in the literature against the characteristics of the paranoid style first identified by Richard Hofstadter: overheated claims of a far-reaching, malign and collusive machinery of influence; a reductive, rationalistic and dualistic reading of events; weak empirics; and weak theorisation.

A significant stream within the literature is coming to be constructed in the paranoid style. Paranoid stylistics, used as a diagnostic tool, alerts us here to distorted judgement.

Alternative ways of avoiding the dangers of paranoid-style readings are suggested, ranging from resisting the temptations towards such readings to a radical re-working of the epistemics of “socio-accounting”.

The danger of allowing the conclusions advanced in the literature to go unchallenged is that they may influence society’s attitude to accounting, public policy-making and scholars’ willingness to contribute to the crafting of reporting principles and standards.

Although paranoid style analysis has been widely used to examine narratives in other academic fields, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to apply it to scholarly accounting.

Using bank-level data over the 1994–2015 period, the authors aim to investigate the role of bank-specific factors on credit risk in Italy by considering two different groups of banks, namely, cooperative and non-cooperative (commercial and popular), in different local markets.

Relying on highly territorially disaggregated data at labour market areas’ level, the authors estimate the impact of the role of bank-specific factors on credit risk in Italy from the estimation of a fixed-effect estimator. Non-performing loans to total loans has been used as a proxy of credit risk; the bank-specific factors are as follows: growth of loans, reflecting credit policy; log of total assets, controlling for banks’ size; loans to total assets, reflecting the volume of credit market; equity to total assets, capturing the solvency of banks and reflecting their capital strength; return on assets, reflecting the profitability of banks; deposits to loans, reflecting the intermediation cost; cost of total assets, reflecting the banks’ efficiency or volume of intermediation cost.

The empirical findings suggest that regulatory credit policy, capitalisation, volume of credit and volume of intermediation costs are the main bank-specific factors affecting non-performing loans. Nevertheless, the present analysis suggests that the behaviour of cooperative banks’ behaviour seems to be in line with that of commercial rather than popular banks, casting doubts about the feasibility of their credit policies. It turns out that recent reforms involving popular and cooperative banks represent the first step toward the enhancement of the stability and efficiency of the Italian banking system. While the present study’s benchmark results are not particularly affected by the degree of competition in the banking sector and by banks’ size, it shows that both cooperative and non-cooperative banks have undertaken more prudent credit policies after the advent of the financial crisis and the introduction of the Basel regulation.

The relationship between bank-specific factors and credit risk has been analysed using a rich sample of cooperative, commercial and popular banks in Italy over the 1994–2015 period. The authors rely on labour market areas being sub-regional geographical areas where the bulk of the labour force lives and works. The contribution is motivated by the financial distress experienced after the 2008 financial crisis, which has significantly hit the Italian banking system and cooperative banks in particular.

This study explores the interconnectedness and complexity of risk-varied climate initiatives such as green bonds (GBs), emissions trading systems (ETS) and socially responsible investments (SRI). The analysis covers the period from September 2011 to August 2022, using six indices: three representing climate initiatives and three indicating uncertainty.

To achieve this, the study first examines dynamic lead-lag relations and correlation patterns in the time-frequency domain to analyse the returns of the series. Additionally, it applies an innovative approach to investigate the predictability of uncertainty measurements of climate initiatives across various market conditions and frequency spillovers in the short, medium and long run.

The findings indicate changing relationships between the series, increased linkages during turbulent market periods and strong co-movements within the network. The ETS is recommended for diversification and hedging against uncertainty indices, whereas the GB may be suitable for long-term diversification.

This study highlights the role of climate initiatives as potential hedges and contagion amplifiers during crises, with implications for policy recommendations and the asymmetric effects on market connectedness.

The paper answers questions that previous studies have not and contributes to the literature regarding financial risk management and social responsibility.