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1 – 10 of 21John T. Jost, Cheryl J. Wakslak and Tom R. Tyler
In addition to serving a hegemonic function, system-justifying ideologies serve the palliative function of enabling people to feel better about inequality. We summarize three…
Abstract
In addition to serving a hegemonic function, system-justifying ideologies serve the palliative function of enabling people to feel better about inequality. We summarize three studies supporting this proposition. In the first study, an arbitrary hierarchy was created using the “Star Power” simulation. Results reveal that system justification is associated with increased positive affect, satisfaction, and decreased negative affect, guilt, and frustration. Two additional studies demonstrate that the dampening effect of system justification on support for the redistribution of resources is mediated by reduced moral outrage but not guilt or negative affect. Implications for social change and social justice are discussed.
Frank R.C. de Wit, Karen A. Jehn and Daan Scheepers
Purpose – Negotiations can be stressful, yet are unavoidable in many organizations. Members of organizational workgroups for instance need to negotiate about issues such as task…
Abstract
Purpose – Negotiations can be stressful, yet are unavoidable in many organizations. Members of organizational workgroups for instance need to negotiate about issues such as task division and different ideas on how to complete a project. Until recently little research effort has been directed to understanding negotiators' stress responses. Similarly, little is known about the consequences that these stress responses may have on negotiation outcomes. In this chapter we argue that group members' physiological stress responses are a key determinant of the outcomes of intragroup negotiations.
Design/Methodology/Approach – We focus on two distinct physiological responses (i.e., threat and challenge) and argue that relative to threat responses, challenge responses will be related to superior information sharing, information processing, and decision-making quality. Moving beyond a uniform relationship between physiological reactions and negotiators' behaviors and outcomes, we also focus on two moderating characteristics: the relative power of group members, and whether the negotiation is purely task related, or co-occurs with relationship issues. We discuss effects on both the individual and the group level, extend our ideas to other forms of negotiations, and end with practical and theoretical implications.
Originality/Value – A better understanding of psychophysiological processes during intragroup negotiations may help to explain when intragroup disagreements help or hinder group outcomes and, therefore, may help to solve the paradox of intragroup conflict.
In this paper, I compare Theodore Schatzki’s practice theory, the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger upon whom Schatzki drew in its formation, and my own theory of…
Abstract
In this paper, I compare Theodore Schatzki’s practice theory, the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger upon whom Schatzki drew in its formation, and my own theory of institutional logics which I have sought to develop as a religious sociology of institution. I examine how Schatzki and I both differently locate our thinking at the level of practice. In this essay I also explore the possibility of appropriating Heidegger’s religious ontology of worldhood, which Schatzki rejects, in that project. My institutional logical position is an atheological religious one, poly-onto-teleological. Institutional logics are grounded in ultimate goods which are praiseworthy “objects” of striving and practice, signifieds to which elements of an institutional logic have a non-arbitrary relation, sources of and references for practical norms about how one should have, make, do or be that good, and a basis of knowing the world of practice as ordered around such goods. Institutional logics are constellations co-constituted by substances, not fields animated by values, interests or powers.
Because we are speaking against “values,” people are horrified at a philosophy that ostensibly dares to despise humanity’s best qualities. For what is more “logical” than that a thinking that denies values must necessarily pronounce everything valueless? Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” (2008a, p. 249).