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Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are created by a group of specialists to pool funds for financing future acquisitions within a specified time limit. SPACs are basically “shell” companies with no operations and business, assets or liabilities but they acquire the status of public corporations through initial public offerings (IPOs). The SPAC founders use the IPO funds to acquire a potential target. They are generally found to be successful to close an mergers & acquisitions (M&A) deal but they may not bother to ensure perpetual success of the acquired entity for a long time. In many countries, “shell” companies are characterized as the “bad boys” of the corporate world but they can be used for long-lasting successful M&As due to their inherent strengths, if they play the role of protagonists and “good guys” as SPACs. This chapter examines how SPACs can be used as special vehicles to ensure worthy and successful acquisitions to create sustainable corporations.

A corporate takeover (with major stake in equity) gives the acquirer the right to appoint majority of directors in the target’s board to control its management and policy decisions. When such acquisition is unsolicited and unwelcome, it becomes a “hostile takeover.” In such cases, the acquirer is said to be a “raider” and the raider’s management team may act under the influence of “hubris” implying that they seek to acquire the target for their own personal motives ignoring pure economic gains for the owners of both the companies. The hostile bidder makes all possible efforts to justify the takeover by paying handsome premium over the target’s fairly valued share price. In a hostile takeover, the target management or target promoters resist and fight tooth and nail against the raider to convey to the world that the bidder’s acts are not in the best interest of all their stakeholders. Any unsolicited and hostile takeover offer is generally viewed as oppression, domination or coercion by the bidding company against the target and its management. In a hostile bid, the existing target management always believes that whatever they do is in best interest of everyone. They feel complacent and assume that their standards of corporate governance are of highest order. Therefore, they are unwilling to succumb to the aggression and hostility of another corporate entity for takeover. The “so-called” victimized target resorts to all means to gain sympathy from peers, press, common shareholders, employees and general public. In today’s regulated market for corporate control, an intelligent hostile bidder would probably not acquire a business unless it has good strategic or financial reasons to do so. Hence, “stewardship” on the part of bidder’s management is very important in case of any hostile takeover. This chapter derives motivation from a three-and-half-decade-old abortive hostile takeover bid in India by Caparo Group of the UK and also the recently completed hostile takeover in India of a famous mid-sized information technology company, Mindtree by Larsen & Toubro, a major conglomerate. This research aims at developing a distinctive model to demonstrate that unsolicited hostile takeover may not be a good mechanism for a successful business combination.

Management buyout (MBO) is a specialized form of acquisition with different motives. Sometimes, there are initiatives taken by the senior management to bailout the firm from sickness. The predominant agency theory focuses only on the governance issues in the MBO firms and this theory can be applied to understand how managerial discretion can play vital roles in mitigating value destruction in the post-MBO firm. A CEO-led MBO is presumed to be greed-driven (Bebchuk, L., Cremers, M., & Peyer, U. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 199–221.). But a senior management team-led MBO is said to be a socialistic move. By default, MBOs are debt-driven, unless the buying management team is financially affluent, which may be rare, considering the price for the buyout. Private equity (PE) players play a dominant role in providing and or arranging funds in the form of equity and or debt. There is a notion that the PE investors help promote entrepreneurial and modern management practices. The MBO target firm has to ensure returning the entire money back to the sponsors within the shortest possible time out of the operational cash flow. Therefore, various issues like identifying a target firm, sourcing mix of finance, MBO price determination, value creation and value delivery to all stakeholders are all important for understanding the subject. This chapter attempts to construct a robust model for structuring MBO to ensure value fairness to all parties involved in the transaction.

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are now the fundamental mechanisms of globalization and considered as prime vehicles for business engagement across the countries through the foreign direct investment route. Significant amounts of foreign funds are crossing the country borders for acquisitions with the objectives of earning super normal returns. But realizing super normal returns from foreign acquisitions are far more difficult than that of foreign greenfield projects or domestic M&As or greenfield projects. The super normal profit itself is “synergy” which is the main driving force for any M&A including the cross-border one. Even though foreign policies of individual countries affect cross-border M&A decisions, corporate and market-driven financial numbers significantly influence the synergy estimation. Synergy should bring in all round greater efficiency and value addition to all stakeholders. But if the cross-border deal is not financially crafted properly, it may fall flat causing more distress to the acquirer compared to domestic acquisition. The theory of synergy is well developed which mostly applies to the domestic M&As. But due to inherent differences between cross-border and domestic M&As, the same synergy theory may not apply equally to the cross-border ones. Therefore, a different connotation of synergy is propounded in this work for cross-border M&As, which can be a corollary to the conventional theory of synergy. This alternative theory of synergy aims at helping the companies in developing their own financial strategies before making their strategic decisions for cross-border M&A deals.

This chapter of the book aims to introduce multiobjective linear programming (MLP) as an optimum tool to find the best quality engineering techniques (QET) in the main domains of supply chain management (SCM). The importance of finding the best quality techniques in SCM elements in the shortest possible time and at the least cost allows all organizations to increase the power of experts’ analysis in supply chain network (SCN) data under cost-effective conditions. In other words, this chapter aims to introduce an operations research model by presenting MLP for obtaining the best QET in the main domains of SCM. MLP is one of the most determinative tools in this chapter that can provide a competitive advantage. Under goal and system constraints, the most challenging task for decision-makers (DMs) is to decide which components to fund and at what levels. The definition of a comprehensive target value among the required goals and determining system constraints is the strength of this chapter. Therefore, this chapter can guide the readers to extract the best statistical and non-statistical techniques with the application of an operations research model through MLP in supply chain elements and shows a new innovation of the effective application of operations research approach in this field. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a supplemental tool in this chapter to facilitate the relevant decision-making process.