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Most setup management techniques associated with electronic assembly operations focus on component similarity in grouping boards for batch processing. These process planning techniques often minimize setup times. On the contrary, grouping with respect to component geometry and frequency has been proved to further minimize assembly time. Thus, we propose the Placement Location Metric (PLM) algorithm to recognize and measure the similarity between printed circuit board (PCB) patterns. Grouping PCBs based on the geometric and frequency patterns of components in boards will form clusters of locations and, if these clusters are common between boards, similarity among layouts can be recognized. Hence, placement time will decrease if boards are grouped together with respect to the geometric similarity because the machine head will travel less. Given these notions, this study develops a new technique to group PCBs based on the essences of both component commonality and the PLM. The proposed pattern recognition method in conjunction with the Improved Group Setup (IGS) technique can be viewed as an extended enhancement to the existing Group Setup (GS) technique, which groups PCBs solely according to component similarity. Our analysis indicates that the IGS performs relatively well with respect to an array of existing setup management strategies. Experimental results also show that the IGS produces a better makespan than its counterparts over a low range of machine changeover times. These results are especially important to operations that need to manufacture quickly batches of relatively standardized products in moderate to larger volumes or in flexible cell environments. Moreover, the study provides justification to adopt different group management paradigms by electronic suppliers under a variety of processing conditions.

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to examine the hypothesized effects of board characteristics and performance on directors’ compensation in the Spanish corporations, whose corporate governance is a special example of a unitary board system.

Methodology/approach – In order to test the influence of a set of factors on directors’ compensation levels, we have developed several models based on linear panel data regression. The sample included 76 listed companies on the Spanish computerized trading system or Continuous Market for the period 2004–2009.

Findings – The control mechanisms, like board characteristics and performance and their effect on the level of directors’ compensation, depend on the types of director (executive, independent and proprietary).

Research limitations/implications (if applicable) – This study has certain limitations mainly related to problems associated with obtaining information. The methodology should be complemented by other types of analyses, such as the influence of the characteristics of the board on the remuneration structure in a greater level of disaggregation.

Practical implications (if applicable) – The results of this research chapter give reasons to regulators and investors to be aware of the importance of the board's characteristics as corporate control mechanisms over the directors’ remuneration and the necessity of connection between directors’ compensation and the firm's performance.

Originality/value of paper – Firstly, descriptive empirical evidence on the level of directors’ compensation is provided within a unitary board system for different types of directors. Secondly, an ample panel data set enables the examination of a set of determinants using panel data methods which control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Finally, the perspective is extended from executive director compensation to other types of directors, such as proprietary or independent, which are very important features of the Spanish board structure.

Many organizations around the world currently are facing board diversity issues and challenges. Hence, this empirical paper investigates the relationship between board diversity and firm’s financial performance. We use a sample of 35 companies from five countries in Southeast Europe (Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Greece) for the period between 2008 and 2012 to find that, on average, companies with well-educated board members are more profitable and overvalued on the market. When running the regression again to test the levels of heterogeneity, we also find that the companies with more women on board tend to be overvalued on the market, while those with more foreigners on board are subject of undervaluation. The paper mostly contributes to the literature on corporate governance and board diversity. First, we postulate the impact of each of the board diversity variables on the financial performance and then show the extent of this impact and its economic interpretation. Our findings have important practitioners’ implications for corporate regulators and policy-makers since the demonstrated positive impact of the well-educated board members on firm’s financial performance gives a new impetus in building a corporate strategy that will intend to engage more people holding PhD on board.

This chapter aims to evaluate the relationship between the representation of women on corporate boards of directors and its impact on firm financial performance.

This study utilized both a systematic review and a meta-analysis, using a sample of 40 published studies, which gleaned financial indicator and observation data from 28 different countries.

As indicated in previous studies, while positive, there was no significant correlation found between the number of women serving on the boards of directors and firm financial performance.

The heterogeneity between the various studies analyzed may present difficulties in making general conclusions. The chapter could also be subject to publication bias, as the selection criteria included may indicate a need for further peer review. Future meta-analyses should include data associated with other financial indicators.

This study shows how composition ratios of men/women serving on corporate boards should be addressed in terms of proving for a greater diversity of leadership perspectives.

Previous systematic reviews and meta-analyses have analyzed country environments as moderators for the relationship between the representation of women on corporate boards and firm financial performance. The present study evaluates possible differences between the impact of the number of women serving on the board of directors on a variety of financial indicators (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q).

As there is inclusive evidence on relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the Thai context, and mixed findings of this relationship are usually reported from previous studies, this study tries to clarify a reason for the mixed finding by determining the impact of board structures on different quantile levels of firm performance. Building on extant literature and using a developed econometric technique, the Quantile Analysis, on a sample of 446 listed firms in Thailand for a 15-year period ranging from 2000 to 2014, empirical evidence is provided which is consistent with prior studies that some characteristics of the board as the core mechanisms of corporate governance, i.e., board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, and dual role leadership on board, have significant influence on performance of Thai firms. In particular, when considering different quantile levels of firm performance, board structures are found to have different effects across quantile of performance distribution. Board independence and dual role leadership on board are found to have a significant influence on only moderate-performing firms, while board size and board meeting frequency are revealed as having significant impact on only firms with high-performance which need more effectiveness of the board in overseeing and supervising decision-making of the executives. Thus, these findings indicate that considering different quantile levels of firm performance for the board structures and performance relationship should be a reason of previous mixed findings. Moreover, the findings should be important information in encouraging better understanding an optimal governance system in Thailand for related stakeholders such as policymakers, corporate firms, and investors.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.