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This paper compares two approaches to the moral justifications for killing in war: the forfeiture approach, which sees killing as justified when the victim has forfeited…
This paper compares two approaches to the moral justifications for killing in war: the forfeiture approach, which sees killing as justified when the victim has forfeited his or her right not to be killed, and the double-effect approach, which argues that even if intentional killing is absolutely prohibited, that killing can still be morally acceptable under certain conditions, most notably if it is not the intended, desired outcome of a person’s chosen action. The double-effect approach is considered out of fashion in contemporary military ethical literate. I argue that it warrants equal attention as an internally viable and coherent account of the morality of killing, and is preferable in at least one way: that it protects combatants from being necessarily culpable of killing merely by serving in active combat positions.
By defending an alternate framework to the forfeiture approach to killing which is most popular in today’s military ethical literature, I provide an opportunity for new and increased philosophical reflection and discourse on the ethics of killing, as well as new opportunity for defenders of double-effect to make a substantive contribution to the field. This paper demonstrates the internal consistency of arguments that seek to utilise DDE, including its relevance to individual self-defence and individual killing in war.
Property is considered paramount to one’s existence, as a natural, absolute and inalienable right. Occupancy is required for man to secure what his thoughts have already made his. Property is realized in use but the right of occupancy and the status of res nullius are not established by the absence of use only, but in addition there must be also the absence of will of original owners. Arguing that appropriation precedes production dismisses the assertion that property is the fruit of labour. In contrast to the followers of the “state of nature” point of view, it is argued that common property is not natural and as such it is only transitory. Private property is at the root of man’s universality because it is common to all and individuals recognize each other only as owners. To base the origin of property in a social contract is erroneous because any contract must be based on the mutual recognition of parties involved who are already property owners. It is necessary that everybody have property not only in his or her persons but also to provide for subsistence. This would be regarded by natural law as just. Justice does not require the equality of property. Perpetual inequalities in property rights are not natural but the result of man‐made institutions which would not in themselves be right and would not have the obligatory power in virtue of their rightness. As such they would not be morally binding. Society that systematically consigns whole classes to conditions of poverty undermines the rationality of the ethical order and as such heads towards self‐destruction. Today, people are generally convinced that a person’s happiness depends on the satisfaction of that person’s actual desires. Property in things and enjoyment of one’s possessions, is often perceived as prerequisites for happiness. Individual happiness as an outcome derived from the distribution of property rights should be demoted from its status as the final good in preference to freedom.
The purpose of this paper is to offer critical analysis of how public relations (PR) were used to justify the use of drones by the UK Government, through the promotion of…
The purpose of this paper is to offer critical analysis of how public relations (PR) were used to justify the use of drones by the UK Government, through the promotion of a distinct strategic culture. The paper locates governmental PR discourse on drones in the UK since 2013 within the strategic culture associated with the global war on terror.
The project was based upon critical discourse analysis of the UK governmental PR on drones since 2013, examining press releases, opinion articles by ministers, media relations content, parliamentary statements, news content and other related materials.
The analysis led to five discursive themes of persuasive intent in relation to drones being identified, most of which were notably similar to the US governmental discourse on drone policy and deployment.
The project contributes a novel interdisciplinary synthesis of the communicative aspects of international relations as theorised in the field of strategic culture with the cultural aspects of the state-level PR in order to explain how PR was used to promote and diffuse a strategic culture in which drones are assumed to be the counter-terrorism measure of choice. The conclusion is that governmental PR discourse combines aspects of colonialism with focus on superior technology, remote control and precision of weapons, generating a military and communicative logic that overwhelms the voices of victims and impedes meaningful discussion on the reality of suffering caused by drone deployments.
In previous efforts the author has examined the various“men” of economics or human‐nature assumptions of“economic thinkers” as a way of treating the history andphilosophy…
In previous efforts the author has examined the various “men” of economics or human‐nature assumptions of “economic thinkers” as a way of treating the history and philosophy of the discipline. Here, under the thematic penumbra of “Man as the Centre of the Social Economy”, and hoping to incorporate the fruits of further inquiry into the matter, those “creatures” and their fashioners are critically reconsidered with a view towards arriving at a more adequate conception of a truly human “economiser” and – accordingly – science of human economy. In Part II, having presented homo oeconomicus in both his/her “impudent” and “honourable” versions, we shall attempt to transcend homo socioeconomicus and even our own (former) homo oeconomicus humanus as well.