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Among the many perspectives to analyze war, such as rational actor, organizational process, governmental politics and ethics, the perspective that actually incorporates the costs and benefits into a systematic theoretical structure has hardly been analyzed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the costs and benefits perspective.
Three kinds of value are distinguished, i.e. human, economic and influence. Different actors (politicians, populations, stakeholders, etc). assign different weights to the three kinds of value. Six gradually more complicated models are developed. The first subtracts losses from gains for the three kinds of value. Thereafter, the paper accounts for multiple periods, time discounting, attitude towards risk, multiple stakeholders, subcategories for the three kinds of value, sequential decision-making and game theory.
The rich theoretical structure enables assessing costs and benefits more systematically and illuminatingly. The cost benefit analysis is illustrated with the 2003-2011 Iraq War. The paper estimates gained and lost value of human lives, economic value and influence value, and show how different weights impact the decision of whether to initiate war differently.
The paper provides scientists and policy makers with a theoretical structure within which to evaluate the costs and benefits of war, accounting for how different actors estimate weights, the future, risk and a variety of parameter values differently.
Extant and newly developing techniques and technologies generated by research in brain sciences are characteristically employed in clinical medicine. However, the…
Extant and newly developing techniques and technologies generated by research in brain sciences are characteristically employed in clinical medicine. However, the increasing capabilities conferred by these approaches to access, assess and affect cognition, emotion and behavior render them viable and attractive for engagement beyond the clinical realm, in what are referred to as “dual-use” applications. Definitions of what constitutes dual-use research and applications can vary so as to include utilization in the public sector for lifestyle or wellness purposes – with growing participation of a do-it-yourself (i.e., biohacking) community, and an iterative interest and use in military and warfare operations. Such uses can pose risks to public safety, and challenge research ethics’ principled imperative for non-harm (although while complete avoidance of any harm may be in reality impossible, certainly any/all harms incurred should be minimized). Thus, it is important to both clarify the construct of dual-use brain research and address the ethical issues that such research fosters. This chapter provides a review and clarification of the concept of dual-use brain science, and describes how current and emerging tools and techniques of brain research are actually or potentially employed in settings that threaten public health and incur ethical concerns. Key ethical issues are addressed, and recommendations for ethical guidance of potentially dual-use research are proposed.
This chapter presents reflections and considerations regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and contemporary and future warfare. As “an evolving collection of…
This chapter presents reflections and considerations regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and contemporary and future warfare. As “an evolving collection of computational techniques for solving problems,” AI holds great potential for national defense endeavors (Rubin, Stafford, Mertoguno, & Lukos, 2018). Though decades old, AI is becoming an integral instrument of war for contemporary warfighters. But there are also challenges and uncertainties. Johannsen, Solka, and Rigsby (2018), scientists who work with AI and national defense, ask, “are we moving too quickly with a technology we still don't fully understand?” Their concern is not if AI should be used, but, if research and development of it and pursuit of its usage are following a course that will reap the rewards desired. Although they have long-term optimism, they ask: “Until theory can catch up with practice, is a system whose outputs we can neither predict nor explain really all that desirable?” 1 Time (speed of development) is a factor, but so too are research and development priorities, guidelines, and strong accountability mechanisms. 2
In asymmetrical wars the asymmetry does not refer to a quantitative difference in belligerants’ strength or power, but to the qualitative differences in means, behavioral…
In asymmetrical wars the asymmetry does not refer to a quantitative difference in belligerants’ strength or power, but to the qualitative differences in means, behavioral standards, goals, and values of conflicting parties. In the asymmetrical conflicts it seems that war functions have changed.
The purpose of this paper is to put in evidence the various expertises and skills that a soldier must have to operate in such a changed context.
In order to reach this purpose, the diversity model has been applied to the new conflicts, as already used to analyze the difference between CROs and the traditional soldiers’ job. To these respect, the definition of the further evolution of the role of a soldier called upon to intervene in the new operational environments can be considered as a preliminary finding: such a soldier must always be flexible and able to operate in a Constabulary context, but with more points in common with the warrior ideal type than with the peacekeeper one. A soldier who has to be able to gear his action in terms not of “dissymmetry” but of asymmetry as defined above. This implies a perception of the qualitative as well as quantitative differences in their own characteristics and in those of the adversary. In particular behavioral style, values, and strategic culture. However, there is no question of a return to the past, but the latest evolution in the range of flexible soldier that is so important in the asymmetric conflicts.
Practical implications of this analysis are bound to offer a deeper understanding of the events concerning asymmetrical conflicts, in the education as well as training of soldiers deployed in these kinds of conflict theaters.
During the four years of preliminary meetings that led to the 1977 Protocols Additional I and II governing internal armed conflict, the prohibitions against superfluous…
During the four years of preliminary meetings that led to the 1977 Protocols Additional I and II governing internal armed conflict, the prohibitions against superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering – two concepts that gird the regulation and moderation of war and limit the use of certain means and methods of warfare – were invoked as a means of calling into account the actions of imperial states. These meetings took place in the context of the conflicts in Southeast Asia, following the wars of decolonization and national liberation in the 1950s and 1960s. The participants in these meetings were freedom fighters and liberation movements who used this forum, which was open to them for the first time, to push for a wider understanding of the concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Their intention was to hold imperialism and imperial states accountable for suffering and injury beyond that of physical death or wounding and to recognize the violence of colonization and the social and cultural devastation it brought. These interventions were a critical attempt to broaden and deepen the meaning of the laws of war, to make them responsive to more than established sovereign state violence, and to ensure that they reflected the experience of colonization/decolonization. This episode matters because the prohibitions against unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury are two elements that detail the general prohibition first codified in 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 22, namely that the “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” However, the history and formulation of these two concepts has yet to be fully explored, the meaning of each is debated, and taken together the two are among “the most unclear and controversial rules of warfare.”
Harnessing the power and potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues a centuries-old trajectory of the application of science and knowledge for the benefit of…
Harnessing the power and potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues a centuries-old trajectory of the application of science and knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Such an endeavor has great promise, but also the possibility of creating conflict and disorder. This chapter draws upon the strengths of the previous chapters to provide readers with a purposeful assessment of the current AI security landscape, concluding with four key considerations for a globally secure future.
The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing…
The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing the States’ need to effectively protect themselves against these attacks. The existing legal framework seem inadequate to deal effectively with cyber operations and, from a strictly legal standpoint, it indicates that addressing cyber attacks does not fall within the jurisdiction of just one legal branch. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of cyber warfare itself is open to many different interpretations, ranging from cyber operations performed by the States within the context of armed conflict, under International Humanitarian Law, to illicit activities of all kinds performed by non-State actors including cybercriminals and terrorist groups. The paper initially presents major cyber-attack incidents and their impact on the States. On this basis, it examines the existing legal framework at the European and international levels. Furthermore, it approaches “cyber warfare” from the perspective of international law and focuses on two major issues relating to cyber operations, i.e. “jurisdiction” and “attribution”. The multi-layered process of attribution in combination with a variety of jurisdictional bases in international law makes the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. The paper aims to identify technical, legal and, last but not least, political difficulties and emphasize the complexity in applying international law rules in cyber operations.
The paper focuses on the globalization of the “cyber warfare phenomenon” by observing its evolutionary process from the early stages of its appearance until today. It examines the scope, duration and intensity of major cyber-attacks throughout the years in relation to the reactions of the States that were the victims. Having this as the base of discussion, it expands further by exemplifying “cyber warfare” from the perspective of the existing European and International legal framework. The main aim of this part is to identify and analyze major obstacles that arise, for instance in terms of “jurisdiction” and “attribution” in applying international law rules to “cyber warfare”.
The absence of a widely accepted legal framework to regulate jurisdictional issues of cyber warfare and the technical difficulties in identifying, with absolute certainty, the perpetrators of an attack, make the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult.
The paper fulfills the need to identify difficulties in applying international law rules in cyber warfare and constitutes the basis for the creation of a method that will attempt to categorize and rank cyber operations in terms of their intensity and seriousness.
Syria and international norms of war.