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Among the many perspectives to analyze war, such as rational actor, organizational process, governmental politics and ethics, the perspective that actually incorporates the costs and benefits into a systematic theoretical structure has hardly been analyzed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the costs and benefits perspective.

Three kinds of value are distinguished, i.e. human, economic and influence. Different actors (politicians, populations, stakeholders, etc). assign different weights to the three kinds of value. Six gradually more complicated models are developed. The first subtracts losses from gains for the three kinds of value. Thereafter, the paper accounts for multiple periods, time discounting, attitude towards risk, multiple stakeholders, subcategories for the three kinds of value, sequential decision-making and game theory.

The rich theoretical structure enables assessing costs and benefits more systematically and illuminatingly. The cost benefit analysis is illustrated with the 2003-2011 Iraq War. The paper estimates gained and lost value of human lives, economic value and influence value, and show how different weights impact the decision of whether to initiate war differently.

The paper provides scientists and policy makers with a theoretical structure within which to evaluate the costs and benefits of war, accounting for how different actors estimate weights, the future, risk and a variety of parameter values differently.

The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing the States’ need to effectively protect themselves against these attacks. The existing legal framework seem inadequate to deal effectively with cyber operations and, from a strictly legal standpoint, it indicates that addressing cyber attacks does not fall within the jurisdiction of just one legal branch. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of cyber warfare itself is open to many different interpretations, ranging from cyber operations performed by the States within the context of armed conflict, under International Humanitarian Law, to illicit activities of all kinds performed by non-State actors including cybercriminals and terrorist groups. The paper initially presents major cyber-attack incidents and their impact on the States. On this basis, it examines the existing legal framework at the European and international levels. Furthermore, it approaches “cyber warfare” from the perspective of international law and focuses on two major issues relating to cyber operations, i.e. “jurisdiction” and “attribution”. The multi-layered process of attribution in combination with a variety of jurisdictional bases in international law makes the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. The paper aims to identify technical, legal and, last but not least, political difficulties and emphasize the complexity in applying international law rules in cyber operations.

The paper focuses on the globalization of the “cyber warfare phenomenon” by observing its evolutionary process from the early stages of its appearance until today. It examines the scope, duration and intensity of major cyber-attacks throughout the years in relation to the reactions of the States that were the victims. Having this as the base of discussion, it expands further by exemplifying “cyber warfare” from the perspective of the existing European and International legal framework. The main aim of this part is to identify and analyze major obstacles that arise, for instance in terms of “jurisdiction” and “attribution” in applying international law rules to “cyber warfare”.

The absence of a widely accepted legal framework to regulate jurisdictional issues of cyber warfare and the technical difficulties in identifying, with absolute certainty, the perpetrators of an attack, make the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult.

The paper fulfills the need to identify difficulties in applying international law rules in cyber warfare and constitutes the basis for the creation of a method that will attempt to categorize and rank cyber operations in terms of their intensity and seriousness.

Property is considered paramount to one’s existence, as a natural, absolute and inalienable right. Occupancy is required for man to secure what his thoughts have already made his. Property is realized in use but the right of occupancy and the status of res nullius are not established by the absence of use only, but in addition there must be also the absence of will of original owners. Arguing that appropriation precedes production dismisses the assertion that property is the fruit of labour. In contrast to the followers of the “state of nature” point of view, it is argued that common property is not natural and as such it is only transitory. Private property is at the root of man’s universality because it is common to all and individuals recognize each other only as owners. To base the origin of property in a social contract is erroneous because any contract must be based on the mutual recognition of parties involved who are already property owners. It is necessary that everybody have property not only in his or her persons but also to provide for subsistence. This would be regarded by natural law as just. Justice does not require the equality of property. Perpetual inequalities in property rights are not natural but the result of man‐made institutions which would not in themselves be right and would not have the obligatory power in virtue of their rightness. As such they would not be morally binding. Society that systematically consigns whole classes to conditions of poverty undermines the rationality of the ethical order and as such heads towards self‐destruction. Today, people are generally convinced that a person’s happiness depends on the satisfaction of that person’s actual desires. Property in things and enjoyment of one’s possessions, is often perceived as prerequisites for happiness. Individual happiness as an outcome derived from the distribution of property rights should be demoted from its status as the final good in preference to freedom.

The purpose of this paper is to offer critical analysis of how public relations (PR) were used to justify the use of drones by the UK Government, through the promotion of a distinct strategic culture. The paper locates governmental PR discourse on drones in the UK since 2013 within the strategic culture associated with the global war on terror.

The project was based upon critical discourse analysis of the UK governmental PR on drones since 2013, examining press releases, opinion articles by ministers, media relations content, parliamentary statements, news content and other related materials.

The analysis led to five discursive themes of persuasive intent in relation to drones being identified, most of which were notably similar to the US governmental discourse on drone policy and deployment.

The project contributes a novel interdisciplinary synthesis of the communicative aspects of international relations as theorised in the field of strategic culture with the cultural aspects of the state-level PR in order to explain how PR was used to promote and diffuse a strategic culture in which drones are assumed to be the counter-terrorism measure of choice. The conclusion is that governmental PR discourse combines aspects of colonialism with focus on superior technology, remote control and precision of weapons, generating a military and communicative logic that overwhelms the voices of victims and impedes meaningful discussion on the reality of suffering caused by drone deployments.

In previous efforts the author has examined the various “men” of economics or human‐nature assumptions of “economic thinkers” as a way of treating the history and philosophy of the discipline. Here, under the thematic penumbra of “Man as the Centre of the Social Economy”, and hoping to incorporate the fruits of further inquiry into the matter, those “creatures” and their fashioners are critically reconsidered with a view towards arriving at a more adequate conception of a truly human “economiser” and – accordingly – science of human economy. In Part II, having presented homo oeconomicus in both his/her “impudent” and “honourable” versions, we shall attempt to transcend homo socioeconomicus and even our own (former) homo oeconomicus humanus as well.