Search results

This chapter examines jury nullification, through which American juries refuse to convict criminal defendants in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt to express disapproval of specific criminal laws or of their application to particular defendants, through the political theory of Carl Schmitt. It distinguishes liberal components of American jurisprudence, especially the rule of law, from democratic sovereignty, and shows how the two are in deep tension with one another. In light of this tension it argues that jury nullification amounts to democratic sovereignty applied counter to the liberal state in a way that paradoxically upholds individual liberty.

This chapter examines whether the view of the jury in cases involving forensic evidence can be changed from that of “naïve automatons” to that of “sophisticated decision makers”; whether the defense and prosecution must provide the jurors with information to help them develop a schema upon which to evaluate the forensic evidence; and whether to remove decision making from the expert forensic scientist and return it to the jury. The chapter uses secondary sources of information collected from criminal cases, the current federal law, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with expert testimony, studies of how to enable juries confronted with forensic evidence, as well as a framework of learning theory and persuasion games. I argue that expert forensic scientists make errors. Juries are capable of making decisions based on complex forensic evidence if provided the knowledge within which to develop schema to evaluate that evidence. Competition between the defense and prosecution in presenting interpretations of scientifically valid evidence, as well as providing schema to enable the jury to evaluate the information, provides juries with the ability to arrive at a full information decision. Expert nullification of jury decision making should be halted and decision making returned to the jury. The value of this chapter is to integrate learning theory from cognitive psychology with one-shot and extended persuasion games to evaluate the roles of the jury and the expert forensic scientists within the criminal justice system.

It is commonly claimed that the entrapment defense has never succeeded in a terrorism case. Yet that is not precisely true. In several post-9/11 cases, entrapment claims have contributed to full or partial acquittals, hung juries, and unexpectedly lenient sentences. Prosecutors have also dropped charges, setting convicted defendants free, to prevent successful entrapment defenses upon retrial. This chapter concludes that, despite the fragility and ambiguity of the right not to be entrapped, entrapment claims can achieve partial victories even in terrorism cases, due to the multiple discretion points at which entrapment can inform strategic or normative judgments.

This chapter analyzes the ways in which jurors use everyday storytelling techniques in their deliberations. It begins by reviewing the literature on how jurors receive and process evidence, emphasizing narrative and storytelling. It then presents some new, qualitative linguistic data drawn from actual jury deliberations, which shed light on jurors' standards of evidence and proof, as well as on the persuasive tactics they use in dealing with each other. Although these data are limited, they provide an interesting basis for assessing existing ideas about jurors evidence-processing and thinking more broadly about the strengths and weaknesses of the jury system.

Purpose – This chapter discusses two puzzles emerging from the literature on race and the jury. First, although changes in laws and institutional practices have dramatically expanded jury participation, it is far from clear what additional changes would create more racially representative juries. Second, the push for racial diversity on juries stems, in part, from a belief that composition is related to decision making; nonetheless, empirical research typically fails to link jury composition and case outcomes.Methodology/approach – Through a review of recent research, I identify the bases for these puzzles, and I consider ways to advance the body of work on race and the jury.Findings – Studies on jury representativeness should simultaneously consider both institution-level and individual-level predictors of participation, examining in particular whether and how attitudes toward jury service differ across racial and ethnic groups. The literature would benefit most from longitudinal and multi-jurisdictional studies. Researchers on race and jury decision making should examine the reason why racial differences in attitudes and individual verdicts may not have an impact on case outcomes. By studying deliberating groups, scholars should consider whether any racial differences in viewpoints are substantively small, whether differences observed are ultimately irrelevant to group discussions, or whether group dynamics limit the participation and influence of racial minorities on mixed-race juries.Originality/value – This chapter advances the literature on race and the jury by considering both questions of representativeness and decision making and by critically examining a number of assumptions and accepted wisdom.

In this chapter, I address a number of the difficult questions surrounding the current decline of the American trial. I begin with a compressed and evaluative account of what the contemporary trial is for us. This involves both an account of what we do at trial and a more global account of its significance. I discuss some of the theoretical issues that such an account poses. I then provide a short account of how we have gotten to where we are (“the past”). I provide a summary of recent social scientific findings that suggest that the trial is in current decline and some preliminary speculations as to the explanations for that decline (“the future”). Finally, I suggest the happy possibility that explanation of the future may be quite limited in this matter.

Immigration enforcement along the Southwest border between United States and Mexico has long channeled migrants into perilous desert corridors, where many thousands have died, out of general public view. In response to this humanitarian crisis, activists from organizations such as No More Deaths (NMD) trek deep into the treacherous desert, hoping to save lives, honor the remains of those who did not survive, and influence public opinion about border enforcement policies. NMD’s activism is not merely utilitarian but also deeply expressive; ultimately, they hope to convey the message that all lives – including those of unauthorized migrants – are worth saving. The Trump Administration has escalated repressive tactics intended to silence these forms of border-policy dissent. Some federal land managers now blacklist NMD, preemptively denying requests for access permits. Meanwhile, the US Attorney’s office has aggressively prosecuted members for humanitarian activities. This chapter explains the expressive components of humanitarian activism in this context and of the government’s attempt to suppress it, suggesting the need for constitutional scrutiny and legal change.

This chapter examines the 1999 trial of Aaron McKinney for the murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay student at the University of Wyoming whose death propelled forward an incipient movement to legislate against hate crimes. It explores the competing ways in which Aaron McKinney was conjured as a legal persona, defined through the opposing lenses of gay panic and of homophobic hate. It situates those personae in conflicting narratives of criminal culpability emerging out of indeterminate legal doctrines and definitions (the unwritten law; the meaning of ‘malice’), and argues that in conjuring them, adversarial criminal trials necessarily destabilise the ‘default legal person’. In doing so, trials performatively reconstruct the past in ways that both mark and mask a past events. In the McKinney case, contests over his culpability emerged against a backdrop of loss, both epistemological and affective, generating a projective reckoning with Shepard’s death in ways that enabled a politically transformational mourning process.