Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine the international standards for establishing national jurisdiction over the transnational crimes of money laundering and bribery and identify challenges to the adoption of those standards by different states in practice.

This paper, first, defines transnational money laundering and transnational bribery; then, it examines the legal bases and principles on which a state can claim criminal jurisdiction over these offences. This paper also discusses the application of jurisdictional conditions in a transnational context and how to deal with the problems arising from national claim of jurisdiction over these offences, for example, jurisdictional concurrence.

This paper argues that when the jurisdictional concurrence occurs, the involved states should consult one another by taking into account a number of relevant factors and take the “centre of gravity” approach to deciding which state or forum should prosecute eventually. States less able to establish jurisdiction over the offences are often those which have a weak legal basis and/or insufficient resources.

To the authors’ knowledge, this article would be the good guidance on how a state could claim jurisdiction over the offences of transnational money laundering and transnational bribery.

The issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes has become common in a globalizing world, while the rigid compliance with territoriality and active personality jurisdiction has created a legal vacuum for cross-border crimes in many situations. The jurisdiction dispute between mainland China and Taiwan over cross-border telecom fraud crimes is a good example. In recent years, the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China cracked down a series of cross-border telecom fraud crimes against mainland residents and extradited suspects to mainland China. Given a certain proportion of Taiwan residents in criminal gangs, the Taiwan side raised jurisdiction objections, arguing that mainland China had no right to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwanese criminals. The essence of the jurisdiction dispute between two sides is the concurrence of Taiwan’s right to exercise active personality jurisdiction and the mainland’s right to exercise passive personality jurisdiction. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the connotation of different jurisdiction principles (namely, territorial, active personality, protective and passive personality jurisdiction) and reinterpret their prioritization of applicability from a jurisprudential perspective, and thus, enhance the theoretical basis for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes.

By reviewing the historical trajectory of major jurisdiction principles since the 1920s, and studying the specificities of the case in this context, this paper argues that territorial jurisdiction and active personality jurisdiction have presumed priority but not an absolute priority for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction. The applicability of protective and passive personality jurisdiction could precede the former provided the jurisdictions of territoriality or active personality are inadequate, incompetent or lack of motivation to combat crimes, which harm other jurisdictions.

The developmental trajectory and contemporary connotation of major jurisdiction principles suggests that the legitimacy of the mainland’s exercise of passive personality jurisdiction over Taiwan criminal suspects lies in the urgent need to recover mainland victims’ significant property loss, the incompetence of Taiwan in detecting and prosecuting telecom fraud crimes committed by Taiwanese residents and targeting mainland victims and that the mainland has guaranteed the Taiwan side’s right to be timely informed and fully participate in its exercise of criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Taiwan suspects.

Current literature on jurisdiction doctrines mainly uses a historical or descriptive approach to reveal the attitudes of different countries toward jurisdiction principles, which helps little in resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes in an era of globalization. This paper uses an interpretative approach, reinterprets the contemporary connotation of different jurisdiction principles and redefines the criteria for determining their prioritization in the context of the specificities of a case. It is expected to update the academic literature for resolving concurrent jurisdiction, fill the legal vacuum for combating cross-border crimes created by rigid compliance with territorial jurisdiction, and meanwhile relieve concerns about abuse of extraterritorial jurisdiction as it provides concrete standards for weighting the applicability of jurisdiction principles.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the impact of the incentives of competition authorities concerning antitrust enforcement on the structure of enforcement and understanding of the substantive norms and welfare standards in Russia using case-level evidence.

The study is based on a unique data set of appeals to infringement decisions in 2008-2012. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied to derive an understanding of the targets of competition policy in the practice of enforcement.

The analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under conventional understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement. It is also shown that antitrust authorities tend to investigate cases that require less input but result in infringement decisions with lower probability of being annulled and lower cost to proceed. Structure of enforcement is skewed toward cases where harm serves as independent and sufficient evidence of competition law violation.

The results show that it is dangerous to motivate authority and public servants based either on number of tasks completed or completeness of tasks when they are heterogeneous in terms of difficulty and where easier ones provide lower positive effects on welfare. Judicial reviews may poorly contribute to performance measurement under a discretionary choice of enforcement targets.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the various means available to US authorities for obtaining foreign evidence and other types of international assistance in money laundering cases. The means analysed here include mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and similar processes; multilateral treaties; tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and tax treaties (for a narrow range of money laundering offences); court‐sponsored procedures for taking foreign depositions, including letters rogatory; the use of unilateral compulsory measures, such as subpoenas, for obtaining foreign evidence, and the use of FinCEN and Interpol resources. The initiatives of the G7, the Financial Action Task Force and the OECD regarding international cooperation in money laundering matters are also briefly treated.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Does the classical liberal emphasis on freedom of association provide an intellectual cover for bigotry? We formulate this question in economic terms using James Buchanan’s economic approach to ethics, according to which moral values can be understood as preferences about other people’s behaviors. We discuss two possible market failures associated with freedom of association: inter-group externalities and Schelling-type emergent segregation. We show that the classical liberal position about freedom of association, as elaborated in Buchanan and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent, is fully equipped to deal with the first one, but not with the second. The progressive view that some preferences are so offensive that they should be dismissed rather than engaged or negotiated with can be reframed as an attempt to solve the emergent segregation problem, but it is vulnerable to political economy problems of its own, in particular to an inherent tendency to over-expand the meaning of “bigotry.”

This essay explores a radical shift in how the relationship between the power to punish and sovereignty has been conceived in modern American law; specifically focusing on the quiet death of comity as an operative principle in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. While this essay attends to certain legal issues arising from historical intersections of federal, state and Indian sovereignty in the field of criminal law, this essay is not an attempt to directly evaluate the history of federal policies applied to Indian tribes or tribal lands. Nor is this essay in any strict sense a legal history of federal-tribal relations, or federal penal policy in relation to Indian tribes. Rather, I am concerned here with a series of liminal moments in the American legal tradition in which the power to punish came to be understood ever more one-sidedly, as an atomizing attribute of sovereignty rather than an identifying feature of community within a pluralistic legal framework.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the June 24, 2010 decision of the US Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd concerning the territorial scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).

The paper describes the complaint, the reasoning of the earlier lower court decision, the reasoning of the Supreme Court decision, and the practical effects of the Supreme Court decision.

Addressing the territorial scope of the Exchange Act for the first time, the Court rejected the widely applied “conduct” and “effects” tests and instead prescribed a new “transactional” test. Finding no affirmative indication that §10(b) of the Act applies extraterritorially; the Court found that its application depends on whether the purchases and sales of securities were made specifically in the USA, and not upon the place where a deception may have originated.

The paper provides expert guidance from financial services lawyers.