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Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This study investigates the presence of a productivity–quality trade-off in judicial decisions from an organisational standpoint, focusing on the courts as bureaucracies. Applied to the Italian context and focusing on criminal courts, the main question addressed is whether or not increasing productivity diminishes decision quality.

Directional distance function (DDF) models were utilised to assess productivity. Two-sample t-tests are then used to compare the quality of efficient and inefficient units in first instance and appeal, with the aim to determine whether a productivity–quality trade-off exists.

The study’s approach yields results that differ from previous studies. (1) The Italian judicial system is found less efficient. (2) The efficiency of the courts of first instance is relatively uniform. In contrast, there is a difference in efficiency between northern and southern courts of appeal, with northern courts on average being more efficient. (3) The analysis reveals a statistically significant productivity–quality trade-off when the courts of appeal are considered.

New evidence of a judicial system is presented, suggesting reforms regarding “reasonable time” as the optimal balance between quality and productivity.

The organisational framework leads to evaluating the efficiency of the courts by considering the various types of proceedings based on the gravity/complexity of the cases. In light of the pyramidal structure of the justice system, the quality is then defined in terms of hierarchical control expressed as review rate.

This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforming Chinese arbitration judicial review process and supplement the corresponding suggestions and analyze the practical trends of Chinese arbitration.

This paper presents considerable evidence that includes the latest empirical data and iconic cases to demonstrate the Chinese judicial system’s acts of internationalizing Chinese arbitration. This paper then elaborates the Chinese Supreme People’s Court (hereinafter SPC) recent reforms of the mechanisms of arbitration judicial review.

The SPC’s efforts to coordinate Chinese arbitration practice with international standards are effective and fruitful. However, even after recent reforms, there are still inherent deficiencies and important omissions that hinder the efficiency of Chinese arbitration.

The major contributions of this paper are providing latest empirical data to evaluate effectiveness of current Chinese arbitration judicial review and analyzing latest SPC’s legal interpretations.

Under the doctrine of judicial review established by Marbury v. Madison (1803) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts retain the power and authority to review legislative and executive actions and rule on their constitutionality or legality. Courts may also review actions of judges and lower court decisions. This is an important and necessary action to maintain the checks and balances and separation of powers in the United States (U.S.) political system. It is also critical for providing legal oversight and accountability. This chapter will first look at judicial review historically including relevant statutes and cases, actions by the executive branch, and efforts by Congress.

Additionally, the chapter will examine the relationship between judicial review and public policy. Through laws passed by Congress or regulations enacted by federal agencies, these branches of government draft policies with the expectation the judicial branch will enforce them. The courts, however, are to uphold the Constitution first and foremost, and rule on the constitutionality of the laws and regulations. Judicial opinions can have the effect of creating policy, which is a different purpose than the Founding Fathers intended. After reviewing the court system, the chapter will examine several issue areas where the court has been shaped by and in turn influenced public policy.

Attempts to analyse the role of the judge in interpreting statute law. Looks at the traditional British rules of interpretation, presumptions and jurisprudential policy in the construction of statutes. Examines the dramatics change of attitude by British judges necessitated by European law and provides some thoughts on the interpretation and construction of enactments by judges. Continues by covering the judge’s interpretation of common law through the doctrine of judicial precedent, with regard to the hierarchy of the courts and persuasive precedents. Cites a number of case examples.

The purpose of this paper is to present a “manifesto” exploring a methodological approach to legal analysis, relying upon a morphological understanding of ideology.

The authors explore ideology within law and legal culture. They examine one such ideology – rule of law – and consider how this can shape judicial decision-making. They suggest techniques by which such influences can be identified.

The authors make four findings. First, following Freeden, ideology can be understood as a ubiquitous form of political thinking which seeks to fix the meanings of essentially contested concepts. Second, ideology in this sense forms an important part, but is distinguishable from the wider notion of legal culture. Considering ideology in law as a sub-system of legal culture can therefore be fruitful in providing a rich understanding of interpretive disagreements among the judiciary. Third, rule of law as an ideal is itself ideological, as it comprises contested concepts such as certainty, equality, stability and legality. It can be considered to constitute an internal ideology of law and it can be analysed how the concepts are de-contested in individual decisions. Finally, understanding this can help in the analysis of judgments in areas with high levels of administrative discretion and political contestation, such as planning and environmental law, as it helps us to understand how any particular judge sees the role of the court in its wider political context.

The originality of the authors’ approach lies in the drawing together of methodological techniques and understandings of ideology in, and in relation to, law.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the role of judicial activism as a golden mean approach of judiciary in protecting and promoting human rights from illegitimate interferences of government. With this aim, several case studies have been done on verdicts of higher judiciary in Bangladesh.

This paper is an exploratory case study focused on Bangladesh. The paper is qualitative in nature and based on secondary sources of published facts like books, journal articles and Dhaka Law Reports. Information also gathered through Internet browsing.

Though judiciary is very effective to protect and promote human rights and rule of law in a country through judicial activism or public interest litigation, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are crucial in Bangladesh. Delay and disposal of cases is one of the great impediments in the process of ensuring human rights in Bangladesh. Besides, negligence in implement the verdict of judiciary and interferences of executive over judiciary is another finding of this paper. Apart from these shortcomings, judicial activism is a very important potential instrument of judiciary to protect and promote human rights and the rule of law in Bangladesh.

The major limitation of this paper is it is based on secondary sources of information. It would have more rich if periodical data can be used for comparing theory and practice.

This paper would be helpful for making a policy for overcoming limitations of judicial activism in Bangladesh to protect and promote human rights.

Social awareness can be build-up through NGOs and readers by disseminating and penetrating information of this paper’s findings and recommendations.

This paper would an unique and add new knowledge in the literature of public interest litigation and Human Rights Law in the context of Bangladesh.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.