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Goal 16 of the SDGs concerns ‘Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’. Specifically, Goal 16 states ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Among the targets of this goal (Target 16.5) is to ‘Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms’. Undoubtedly, the recognition and inclusion of corruption and bribery among other relevant governance aspects is laudable and necessary. This chapter examines and analyses the relationship between corruption and sustainable development, assesses regional performance through the indicators for achieving Target 16.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals and proposes other indicators and policy frameworks for improved performance toward substantially reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms.

Opinion polls show that contributions to judicial candidates create an appearance of corruption. This perception damages the institutional legitimacy of the courts. This chapter explores the relationship between integrity ratings of Illinois trial judges and campaign contributions. Specifically, it examines the Illinois State Bar Association judicial poll integrity scores of 253 elected judges seated in 101 Illinois counties during 1994–2012. Regression analysis reveals that judicial candidates’ integrity scores declined as (a) the amount of attorney contributions increased; (b) the number of reported attorney contributors enlarged; and (c) the number of large attorney contributors grew. This chapter also discusses the efficacy and limitations of four policies meant to diminish the appearance of corruption: recusal and disqualification rules; anonymous contributions; public financing; and the elimination of the election of judges. Although a radical solution, the policy of abolishing judicial elections is more likely to overcome the appearance of corruption than the other reforms.

Stephanie McPhail's description above of the difficult living conditions of the judges in Mongolia in 1995 underscores their vulnerability to corrupt practices and their negative perception by the public. Judicial salaries during that year were comparable to those of civil servants but lower than those of lawyers in private practice and ranged from US$33 to US$51 per month (Quah, 2003a, p. 43). More importantly, the living conditions of judges were difficult, especially in the countryside, where one-third of the judges did not own an apartment, and were forced to live in their offices. Consequently, McPhail (1995, p. 45) concluded that the “relatively low salaries and mediocre working conditions” of the judges were “an impediment to attracting highly qualified candidates to the profession.”

In this chapter I discuss judicial contributions to Italian penality. I look at the penal incentives produced by interactions between judicial and political classes, and ask whether judges and prosecutors have been forces for punitiveness or moderation. I discuss the relevance of the Italian case for broader analyses of Western penality.

My chapter offers a political-sociological account of judicial contributions to punishment. I analyse the penal incentives created by different national institutional set-ups, specifically addressing judicial contributions to penality using a framework developed by Joachim Savelsberg and Nicola Lacey. The framework examines judicial structure in the institutional context looking at the penal implications of bureaucratisation of the judiciary and the capacity for co-ordination between judges and politicians. I include judicial legitimacy as an additional dimension in this framework.

I conclude that the Italian judiciary have been forces for punitiveness and moderation. Their contributions can be systematised by looking at the waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy, and the consequent expansion and contraction of judicial powers. I claim that judicial legitimacy is also relevant to other (‘non-Italian’) analyses of judicial contributions to contemporary Western penality.

By adding legitimacy to investigations of judicial contributions to penality I provide an organising principle with which to analyse the penal role of Italian judicial actors. I thus allow Italy to be kept in conversation with existing comparative models, without assuming that it either conforms to the models entirely, or that the models should otherwise be eschewed. I use the Italian case to demonstrate the relevance of legitimacy when analysing judicial contributions to Western penality, arguing that changing legitimacy affects the terms and effect of interaction between judicial and political classes.

Are public officials held accountable for political scandals? Existing scholarship typically focuses on voters' response to scandals showing politicians are often punished at the polls for scandals. Specifically, they are more likely to be punished for the abuse of public office for personal gain than for scandals involving personal affairs. That said, not all politicians implicated in scandals seek reelection. Although difficult to observe, many politicians may be pushed out of office by their political party before they have an opportunity to stand for reelection – resigning or retiring before the next election. Others are appointed and consequently never stand for election. We collect a new dataset to understand how scandals affect politicians' careers and whether public officials are held accountable at other junctures. We trace the pathways of politicians implicated in scandals. We document the type and onset of scandals, individuals' reactions to scandals, and whether and when they leave office. Our novel data contribution provides rich descriptive statistics on corruption in the US Congress over time, with new insights into the conditions under which scandals end politicians' careers. The common patterns and significant differences revealed in these data suggest that the impact of scandals on public officials' careers may have less to do with the nature of the scandal or the specific actions undertaken by those implicated and may depend more on the actions of political parties.

In his autobiography, Chen Shui-bian (1999, p. 40) condemned the Koumintang's (KMT's) corruption and praised the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for being free from money politics and corruption. The DPP fought the 1992 Legislative Yuan election campaign effectively on an anticorruption platform and used the same strategy in subsequent elections. If Chen Shui-bian had criticized the KMT for its involvement with “black gold” politics and had won the 2000 presidential election on his anticorruption platform, why was he and his family found guilty of corruption after his second term of office? The short answer is that even though he had promised to curb corruption, President Chen himself had succumbed to corruption after assuming office. In June 2002, Keesing's Contemporary Archives cited a poll in Taiwan that indicated that more respondents had perceived the DPP to be more corrupt than the KMT (Copper, 2006, p. 14).

This chapter proposes moving beyond relying on the dominant logic of multiple regression analysis (MRA) toward thinking and using algorithms in advancing and testing theory in accounting, consumer research, finance, management, and marketing. The chapter includes an example of testing an MRA model for fit and predictive validity. The same data used for the MRA is used to conduct a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The chapter reviews a number of insights by prominent scholars including Gerd Gigerenzer’s treatise that “Scientists’ tools are not neutral.” Tools impact thinking and theory crafting as well theory testing. The discussion may be helpful for early career scholars unfamiliar with David C. McClelland’s brilliance in data analysis and in introducing business research scholars to fsQCA as an alternative tool for theory development and data analysis.