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The March 2000 Budget in the UK introduced tax incentives to encourage employee shareholding. The theory is that if employees feel that they have a stake in the enterprise or organisation in which they work, they will be more motivated and committed, with positive outcomes in terms of productivity and organisational performance. This theory has received support from research currently being conducted within the School of Management and Organizational Psychology at Birkbeck, University of London, which has found significant positive links between “progressive” human resource practices that promote participation and involvement on the one hand, and corporate performance and organisational outcomes on the other. This is in line with other recent research in the UK and internationally. The question both for business and government is how to engender such participation and involvement and, specifically, whether this can be brought about through employee shareholding, when such individual shareholdings, taken separately, are insignificant in terms of the overall share capital of the corporation. By pooling the voting rights – although not necessarily the actual ownership – of their shares, an employee shareholder trust could represent a significant voice. However, some mechanism is needed to translate individual employee shareholding stakes into a collective voice that can deliver results, both in terms of representing the interests of employees and in convincing employees that their shareholding gives them a stake in the enterprise. Such a move could have important beneficial effects for corporate performance and hence economic growth. It could also have significant welfare effects in terms of enriching the experience of working life.

The mutualisation of two English third division football clubs in 2001 and the creation of a large number of supporters' trusts make it timely to consider whether there is a case for mutualisation of football clubs. This paper assesses whether mutuality would be of economic benefit for clubs, drawing heavily on the experience of mutuals in the financial sector. Our conclusions are mixed. The economic case rests on the distinctive feature of customer loyalty to a club, presuming this to be much stronger than loyalty to a financial institution. However, club members in a mutual must expect to be called upon to provide financial support.

Professional football clubs in England face serious financial and operational difficulties and challenges. Our survey reveals that less than a quarter of football clubs responding had an internal audit committee. Even where clubs had an audit committee, almost one third of those clubs report there being no regular board review of risk assessment reports. The need to undertake risk assessment is now accepted as part of good corporate governance. The collapse of the ITV Digital agreement, which led to Football League clubs losing significant revenue, forcing some into administration, simply illustrates the reasoning behind the practice (following the Turnbull Report). Football clubs (and the companies that own them) need improved corporate governance practice, financial planning and risk assessment procedures; 76 percent of clubs responded that they would benefit from a guide to good corporate governance and 80 percent that they would find advice on Company Law useful.

There has been considerable debate over the causes and consequences of ‘deindustrialisation’. The relative decline of manufacturing, and particularly of manufacturing employment, and the corresponding relative growth of services, is prevalent in both slow and fast growing economies. This has led many to argue that the process is one of historical evolution such that the advanced stage of economic development is characterised by a modern tertiary sector with growing preferences for service products. This paper argues that this view is an oversimplification: dein‐dustrialisation may result from economic success; however, it may also reflect economic weaknesses. In particular, a declining manufacturer sector may have adverse impacts on a trading nation's ability to generate sufficient exports to pay for necessary imports, and hence also on the growth of productivity, national income and living standards.

The purpose of this paper is to critically reflect upon the use of the term accountability in the twenty‐first century and its role in “remaking the world in favour of the most powerful” using the theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Lacan.

The paper examines the notion of accountability by analyzing a case study of the hostile takeover of Manchester United Football Club by the Glazer family. The field of football presents an interesting arena in which to study accountability because of its extremely interested and active fans who search for information on every aspect of their clubs. Lacanian theory is drawn upon to add to understanding of the psychopathology which the demands for accountability and transparency place on individuals. Bourdieu's work on illusio is drawn upon to understand the motivations of the field of football.

The paper finds that calls to “hold the most powerful to account” in practice lack political force. Thus the case study demonstrates the common (mis)recognition of the term of accountability. The ability to correct the abuses of the most powerful requires power.

The conflation of Bourdieu and Lacan adds to understanding of accountability as an empty cipher with performative power.