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In a global environment where terrorist organisations based in a poor country target a rich nation, this paper aims to study the properties of a dynamically incentive compatible contract designed by the target nation that involves joint counter-terror tasks with costly participation by each country. The counter-terror operations are however subject to ex post moral hazard, so that to incentivise counter-terror, the rich country supplies developmental aid. Development aid also helps avoid unrest arising from counter-terror activities in the target nation. However, aid itself can be diverted to non-developmental projects, generating a novel interlinked moral hazard problem spanning both tasks and rewards.

The authors use a dynamic model where the aid giving countries and aid receiving countries behave strategically. Then they solve for the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.

The authors characterise the optimal contract, showing that the dynamic structure of counter-terror resembles the shock-and-awe discussed by military strategists. The authors then prove that it is not necessarily the case that a more hawkish (resp. altruistic) donor is less pro-development (resp. softer on terror). In addition, the authors show that it may be easier to contract for higher counter-terror inputs when the recipient is more sympathetic to terrorists. The authors also discuss other problems faced by developing nations where this model can be readily adopted and the results can endorse appealing policy implications.

The authors characterise the optimal contract, showing that the dynamic structure of counter-terror resembles the shock-and-awe discussed by military strategists. It is proved that it is not necessarily the case that a more hawkish (resp. altruistic) donor is less pro-development (resp. softer on terror). In addition, the authors show that it may be easier to contract for higher counter-terror inputs when the recipient is more sympathetic to terrorists. Other problems faced by developing nations are also discussed where this model can be readily adopted, and the results can endorse appealing policy implications. These results have important policy implications, in particular in today’s world.

General Management/Strategy.

Post-graduate/MBA.

Case A: Mr Grandhi Mallikarjuna Rao, founding chairman of GMR, was considering a proposal to bid for an upcoming international airport in Hyderabad, India. The strategic move would have marked GMR’s foray into the Indian airport infrastructure sector. GMR had been involved in the development and operation of power plants and had thrived on public–private partnerships for all its projects. Mr Rao is thinking: Should GMR make another major investment in infrastructure development by bidding to build the airport in Hyderabad, India? Further, how should the organization prepare itself for this strategic move? Case B: On April 4, 2013, the meeting of GMR’s Group Executive Council (GEC) was scheduled to take place. Srinivivas Bommidala, G.M. Rao’s son-in-law and Chairman of GMR’s airports business, was gearing up for the meeting. The meeting was called to discuss a proposal for bidding for an upcoming airport project in the Philippines. It had been more than a decade since GMR entered the airport infrastructure sector. The organization had built substantial airport operating expertise during that period. It adopted a joint venture (JV) model for expanding in the airport infrastructure business. Until now, the organization had always formed JVs for all its airport projects. JVs with existing airport operators were necessitated by the bid conditions that required a certain minimum airport operating experience for qualifying as a bidder for various projects. In some cases, a JV with a local player helped GMR with market knowledge for functioning in a foreign market. GMR also used JVs to access the capabilities it lacked for operating in this sector and gradually learnt from its partners for building capabilities in-house. The group now had the required operating expertise in the sector to qualify as a bidder. One of the key issues the GEC was contemplating was: Whether GMR should continue to form JV for bidding for the upcoming project or should it go solo? Further, if it had to form a JV then, in which areas should it seek a partner?

Case A: To understand the relationship between key concepts in strategic management, including diversification, capabilities and core competence. To help students understand the various factors managers consider when deciding on the diversification strategy of an organization. To create an understanding of the organizational processes required to facilitate diversification into a new segment. To teach students how to evaluate a potential market opportunity that may require a firm to take on a diversification strategy. Case B: To help students understand how companies use alliances as growth strategies. To understand the rationale for formation of various alliances. To explore various factors managers consider when deciding on alliance strategy of an organization. To understand the challenges associated with using alliances as a strategic option. To understand the pros and cons of internal development (i.e. going solo) vis-à-vis strategic alliances.

CSS 11: Strategy.

In the mid-2000s, the operator of New York City’s mass transit network committed more than a half-billion dollars to military contractor Lockheed Martin for a security technology capable, in part, of inferring threats based on analysis of data streams, of developing response strategies, and taking automated action toward alerts and calamities in light of evolving circumstances. The project was a failure. This chapter explores the conceptualization and development of this technology – rooted in cybernetics – and compares its conceptual underpinnings with some situated problems of awareness, communication, coordination, and action in emergencies as they unfold in one of the busiest transport systems in the world, the New York subway. The author shows how the technology, with all the theatrical trappings of a “legitimate” security solution, was apparently conceived without a grounded understanding of actual use-cases, and the degree to which the complex interactions which give rise to subway emergency can be anticipated in – and therefore managed through – a technological system. As a case-study, the chapter illustrates the pitfalls of deploying technology against problems which are not well-defined in the first place, to the neglect of investments against much more fundamental problems – such as inadequate communication systems, and unstable relationships with emergency response agencies – which might offer guaranteed benefits, and indeed lay a firm groundwork for future deployment of more ambitious technology.

Under scrutiny in light of the growing threat of international terrorism, Qatar faces pressure and accusations that it is not doing enough to counter terror financing and clamp down money laundering. The issue is not that Qatar is avoiding positive action, but that by the time measures are implemented, they become outdated because the international community has by then tightened its regulatory requirements. Qatar’s slow pace has led to a case of cat-and-mouse chase with respect to updating its standards, with a revised set of rules being required by the time Qatar implements the last set of international standards. This study aims to draw on lessons from the past to help Qatar avoid findings of it falling below international standards in the upcoming 2017 mutual evaluation.

The primary purpose of this article is to catalogue Qatar’s efforts to comply with international anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terror finance standards. It demonstrates the real legislative progress post-2008 recorded by Qatar to minimize money laundering and terrorist financing. The paper also contests the view that Qatari law is insufficient.

The paper explains Qatar’s efforts to comply with the recommendations made by each evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It also highlights the potential for Qatar to be caught out again by the evolution of international expectations in an upcoming review, which, it is understood, is likely to take place in 2017.

No article exists specifically on this research field. As Qatar prepares for its 2017 FATF evaluation, it should be reminded of the need to comply with all new standards.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategic intelligence oversights with regards to the funding of terrorism.

The paper considers the modus operandi of terrorist financing, and how and how speedily or otherwise they were identified, and the international and national anti‐terrorist financing measure implemented post 9/11.

The paper concludes that there were (and still are) strategic oversights, delays and distractions by government law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies in combating terrorist financing.

The paper suggests there should be more proactive exchange of intelligence by law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies in combating financing of terrorism.

The added value is lessons learned in international efforts against financing of terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is to offer critical analysis of how public relations (PR) were used to justify the use of drones by the UK Government, through the promotion of a distinct strategic culture. The paper locates governmental PR discourse on drones in the UK since 2013 within the strategic culture associated with the global war on terror.

The project was based upon critical discourse analysis of the UK governmental PR on drones since 2013, examining press releases, opinion articles by ministers, media relations content, parliamentary statements, news content and other related materials.

The analysis led to five discursive themes of persuasive intent in relation to drones being identified, most of which were notably similar to the US governmental discourse on drone policy and deployment.

The project contributes a novel interdisciplinary synthesis of the communicative aspects of international relations as theorised in the field of strategic culture with the cultural aspects of the state-level PR in order to explain how PR was used to promote and diffuse a strategic culture in which drones are assumed to be the counter-terrorism measure of choice. The conclusion is that governmental PR discourse combines aspects of colonialism with focus on superior technology, remote control and precision of weapons, generating a military and communicative logic that overwhelms the voices of victims and impedes meaningful discussion on the reality of suffering caused by drone deployments.

The purpose of this study is to apply the regulatory dialectic to describe the evolution of trade-based money laundering (TBML) schemes, to describe three recent TBML innovations uncovered by a large bank in the important global trade jurisdiction of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to provide recommendations for an effective regulatory response.

The methodology used is a caselet approach with three examples of TBML schemes recently foiled in the UAE as well as an application of the regulatory dialectic literature to TBML.

The implications of the regulatory dialectic for research regarding TBML and associated regulation and compliance will enable regulators, the financial services sector and academics to understand TBML and the ever-evolving steps criminals are taking to circumvent the changing landscape of regulation and controls implemented by the financial services sector and customs tasked with mitigating such behaviour. This paper will bring awareness of the evolution of TBML, the controls and frameworks that may be used to prevent, detect and investigate some of the complex schemes of TBML.

The regulatory dialectic theory provides insights into the evolution of TBML schemes as well as why compliance activities tend to be reactive, rather than proactive. The cases covered in this paper provide insights into the nature of this circular process between financial crime and regulation, which is useful for anti-financial crime professionals and regulators focusing on deterrence.

The UAE is a small, rapidly developing trade and finance center in the Middle East, surrounded by nations that are sanctioned, in active conflicts, politically unstable and/or highly corrupt. TBLM undermines the security of the UAE; the authors provide insights into criminal innovations and regulatory responses.

To promote the safety and stability of the ten million residents of the UAE, and others in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, it is important to understand the process of innovation in TBML schemes and regulatory response.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to apply the regulatory dialectic theory to TBML to describe innovation in TBML schemes and to provide cases describing contemporary TBML innovations in the MENA region.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (the Act), in particular, the sections of the Act that establish the serious organised crime agency (SOCA) and to anticipate the effectiveness of the Act against organised and serious crime in the UK.

The methodology employed is to examine Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, in light of the response of concerned professionals to the Act's passage through Parliament, concerns expressed both in the press and in legal journals, and to critically examine the novel features of the Act from the perspective of a professional who has worked in this same field (organised and serious crime) in Hong Kong for more than 20 years.

The Act is to be welcomed, in particular, gathering the investigative and intelligence functions of the police, customs and immigration service in one body SOCA, an elite limit to assist other UK police forces and law enforcement agencies. The introduction of statutory mechanisms to promote the co‐operation of defendants as potential witnesses is also to be welcomed. However, it is feared that the investigative powers created will be ineffective as the judiciary are not directly involved and the powers that are given to SOCA will be easily evaded by ruthless or experienced criminals.

It is hoped, the paper will promote interest in SOCA when it is “rolled out” operationally in April 2006. It is also hoped that SOCA will be appreciated from the outset as only a half‐hearted adoption of the US organised crime “model”. The UK has decided not to use telephone taps as a source of evidence, nor has it granted effective investigative powers to SOCA. Furthermore, there has been no comprehensive clean‐up of the present confusion of objectives that is so obvious in the sentencing policy as it concerns offenders who commit serious crime or are involved in organised criminal behaviour in the UK.