Search results

The procedures and rules the insurance industry writes in the polices it sells amount to a form of private legislation enforced by the state. Such authority creates a powerful lever for social change, from easing the diffusion to new technologies to slowing climate change. What maintains a sense of fairness in the way insurance firms shape society is an informal but stable network that interconnects them around the globe. A handful of specialist firms occupy key notes in maintaining this network. While these specialists aggressively compete over market share and profits, they also prioritize long-term relationships with their clients and competitors.

This research investigates the effect of imposing a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) on the likelihood of purchasing SSBs. We design and test an experimental framework that examines this and the effects of providing an explanation about the presence of an SSB tax and information about the negative health effects of consuming SSBs. Consistent with Elbel, Taksler, Mijanovich, Abrams, and Dixon (2013) and Taylor, Kaplan, Villas-Boas, and Jung (2019), we find that imposing a tax, in addition to increasing the conspicuousness of the tax by explaining the presence of a tax (and in some cases, the negative health effects) reduces the likelihood of purchasing an SSB anywhere from 8.39% to 18.15%. We contribute to the public health and tax policy literature by testing consumer choice in a controlled experimental setting and considering the effect of individual differences on the choice to purchase SSBs. Imposing a tax on SSBs may be an effective tool for decreasing SSB consumption that is made more effective when the tax is conspicuous.

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the signaling value of the General Educational Development certificate (GED) credential. The model illustrates necessary assumptions for a difference-in-differences estimator that uses a change in the GED passing standard to yield unbiased estimates of the signaling value of the GED for marginal passers. We apply the model to the national 1997 passing standard increase, which affected GED test takers in Texas. We utilize unique data from the Texas Schools Micro Data Panel (TSMP) that contain demographic and GED test score information from the Texas Education Agency linked to pre- and post-test-taking Unemployment Insurance quarterly wage records from the Texas Workforce Commission. Comparing Texas dropouts who acquired a GED before the passing standard was raised in 1997 to dropouts with the same test scores who failed the GED exams after the passing standard hike, we find no evidence of a positive GED signaling effect on earnings. However, we find some evidence suggesting that our finding may be due to the low GED passing threshold that existed in Texas for an extended period.