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This chapter starts from the issue of debt in the context of a national economy by contrasting two opposed views: policy prescriptions based on the Washington Consensus prioritize low public debt and a limited role of the government in the development process whereas a more heterodox view considers debt as logical, necessary, and helpful in order to allow the government to pursue an ambitious growth and development strategy. However, things change when the economy is considered in its international context: foreign debt is different from domestic debt and while the same heterodox analysis still rejects the Washington Consensus' demand for trade and financial liberalization, its own ambitious development strategies for the domestic economy get constrained by trade deficits, the threat of capital flight, and exchange rate instability. The question arises how the government can still significantly contribute to economic development beyond the limits of a purely private sector–driven approach. This is why this chapter reviews proposals to relax or overcome the balance-of-payments constraint. Finally, it considers a reform of international payments, which can be implemented by a single country unilaterally, and which enables it to stabilize its current account, avoid foreign debt accumulation, and support domestic development strategies.

In this paper, we study financial foundations of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). By doing this, we (1) clarify ambiguous and controversial concepts like roundaboutness and average period of production, (2) we show that the ABCT has strong financial foundations (consistent with its microeconomic foundations), and (3) we offer examples of how to use the flexibility of this approach to apply ABCT to different contexts and scenarios.

William Baumol famously introduced the “cost disease” according to which the relative price of services vis-á-vis manufactured goods keeps rising because of a negative productivity differential between services and manufacturing industries. Empirical evidence strongly supports the predictions of Baumol’s model of “unbalanced growth” as we show in this article. Baumol was convinced that the cost disease need not have fatal consequences for growing economies as they can afford to earmark ever-higher shares of GDP to pay for services like healthcare and education if the overall “pie” keeps growing. Then, consumption of goods may rise as well even if its share in GDP steadily declines. However, income inequality has surged since the 1980s; and the rising price of vital services means that lower-income strata may be increasingly unable to pay for them. In this article, we develop the nexus between the cost disease and rising income inequality and sketch the ensuing challenges for social policy.

Purpose – This chapter presents a close examination of how manufacturing managers respond to environmental pressures by formulating and implementing operational strategy.

Methodology – The analysis is based on interviews and observations in 31 manufacturing firms in the US Midwest.

Findings – The study reveals that competitive market pressure is only so effective at penetrating the institutional layers of inter- and intra-firm relations. Even in the highly competitive manufacturing sector, operational strategy is consistently implemented in suboptimal ways. Relatively inefficient routines are commonly institutionalized and inefficient arrangements appear to be able to persist for an indefinite period of time. To the extent that firms with variable capabilities and internal socio-technical systems must process, interpret, and react to complex external pressures and often-ambiguous signals, the sociology of work provides essential insights for the sociology of markets.

Originality – While the findings are subject to the standard caveats regarding nonrandom qualitative samples, the rich data produced and the in-depth analysis of real-world organizational pressures and managerial decision-making provide distinctive insights into how managers must balance external market pressures with internal labor process problems. Individual motivation appears to be at least as important in true organizational innovation as market discipline. While adaptation and learning certainly occur in organizations (and selection also operates through the death of extreme laggards) there exists sufficient institutional space within markets for a range of variation in organizational performance. The findings suggest that the analysis of internal organizational dynamics provides an essential part of a realistic theory of markets.