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This note presents new archival evidence about John Maynard Keynes’ attitudes toward Jews. The relevant material is composed of two letters sent by Robert G. Wertheimer to Bertrand Russell and Richard F. Kahn along with their replies. Between 1963 and 1964, Wertheimer – an Austrian-born Jewish immigrant then professor of economics at Babson College – wrote to Russell and Kahn asking for their personal reminiscences concerning Keynes’ anti-Semitic utterances. In their brief but still significant responses, both Russell and Kahn firmly denied any hint of anti-Semitism in Keynes, thereby providing significant first-hand testimonies from two of his closest acquaintances.

The first Principia Mathematica (1686) by Sir Isaac Newton with reference to natural philosophy and his system of the world has largely contributed to the first revolution in scientific thinking in modern times. It has created the conceptual basis of modern science in the classical tradition by providing the tools of analysis and the technique of reasoning in terms of stability—from—within or, as we would say today, the model of stable equilibrium conditions.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Explores the life of Paul A. Samuelson, of whom it is said, that he is the ‘last generalist in economics’, from his early days in the USA. Gives great detail from his lecture, particularly for his provision of a rich, unknown source of new problems in economic science.

In 1933, Lionel Robbins asked Frank Knight if he could republish Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP) in order for students at the London School of Economics to continue to have access to the book. He also asked Knight to write a preface to provide an update on Knight’s changing economic views. Between 1933 and 1957, Knight wrote four new prefaces for reprint editions of RUP outlining changes in his views. In the prefaces, he identified four aspects of the theory expounded in RUP that he came to reject: (a) the method of successive approximation; (b) the separation of production from distribution; (c) the tri-partite division of the factors of production; and (d) any notion of a period of production. These rejections placed him squarely in opposition to F. A. Hayek’s theoretical work. He also identified the key features he had sought to develop in a monetary theory that would oppose J. M. Keynes and John Hicks. At the same time, he sought to identify the new theoretical ideas he was developing, including an enterprise-based theory of market exchange, and the adoption of a unitary resource, called capital. He also pointed to the work in social philosophy that he had begun in the 1940s, especially the need for a combined approach to social science using economic theory, ethics and social philosophy. The prefaces came to serve as a bridge between Knight’s original theory and what he would argue at the conclusion of his career.

According to the Keynesian income determination model, as the level of expenditures is instantaneously increased through government or private investment a portion of that amount (b), the marginal propensity to consume, is immediately respent. This precipitates a perpetual turnover of each fractional amount throughout time such that the level of expenditures eventually amounts to (1/1‐b) times the initial increase in investment. The total impact on the level of income resulting from an increase in investment or government expenditures is called the multiplier. As derived in the macro‐economic models no leakages from the system to reduce the total impact are assumed, so that in reality the multiplier is considered to fall short of (1/1‐b).

The authors of this book (hereafter BLS) reject the notion that the term “capitalism” denotes a unique type of economic system and distinguish instead among four forms it can take: state-guided capitalism, oligarchic capitalism, big-firm capitalism, and entrepreneurial capitalism. As suggested by the terms “good capitalism, bad capitalism” in the title, they examine both the positive and the normative implications of each type of capitalism and how consistent each type has been, in the various economies that adopted it, with the overall objective of promoting growth and prosperity. This book is thus about economic systems, the principles on which they are built, and economic growth. There are occasional references to authors of the classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian eras such as Richard Cantillon, John M. Keynes, T. Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say, Joseph Schumpeter, Adam Smith, and Max Weber. Some of these are accompanied by brief quotations, but (as is to be expected from the very different interests of the authors of this book) no textual analysis of them or speculations about their influence on the history of economic thought. Given the authors’ emphasis on the effects of capitalism on economic growth, they also briefly discuss early theorists of economic growth such as Roy Harrod, Evsey Domar, Nicholas Kaldor, Robert Solow, and Trevor Swan and – in much greater detail – the theoretical, empirical, and historical work on growth theory that followed them, up to and including the “new growth theory” of Arrow, Romer, Lucas, and others. Chapters 2 and 3, titled “Why economic growth matters” and “What drives economic growth?,” introduce the general reader to the importance of economic growth to both developed and developing economies and the essentials of modern growth theory. While these are valuable supplements to the book for readers not familiar with them, these chapters are not discussed here since their main features are found in textbooks on economic development, macroeconomics, and growth theory.

The critical dimension and the one that can unify knowledge through systemic interrelationships, is unification of the purely a priori with the purely a posteriori parts of total reality into a congruous whole. This is a circular cause and effect interrelationship between premises. The emerging kind of world view may also be substantively called the epistemic‐ontic circular causation and continuity model of unified reality. The essence of this order is to ground philosophy of science in both the natural and social sciences, in a perpetually interactive and integrative mould of deriving, evolving and enhancing or revising change. Knowledge is then defined as the output of every such interaction. Interaction arises first from purely epistemological roots to form ontological reality. This is the passage from the a priori to the a posteriori realms in the traditions of Kant and Heidegger. Conversely, the passage from the a posteriori to a priori reality is the approach to knowledge in the natural sciences proferred by Cartesian meditations, David Hume, A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, as examples. Yet the continuity and renewal of knowledge by interaction and integration of these two premises are not rooted in the philosophy of western science. Husserl tried for it through his critique of western civilization and philosophical methods in the Crisis of Western Civilization. The unified field theory of Relativity‐Quantum physics is being tried for. A theory of everything has been imagined. Yet after all is done, scientific research program remains in a limbo. Unification of knowledge appears to be methodologically impossible in occidental philosophy of science.

Introduction Economics has been defined and re‐defined several times in the past, and even within the dominant scientific orientation of the discipline, there are currently a number of alternative definitions. One of the definitions, which has been gaining increasing popularity in recent years is “economics as the science of choices.” This definition focuses on the fundamental objective of the discipline as currently formulated, namely, the optimum allocation of resources through appropriate choices, or in other words, the development of economic engineering based on science. We will use the concept of choices as the convenient point of entry into the exploration of the nature of economic reality, or its ontology.