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Provides an overall assessment of problems and prospects for socialism (at a time of the abolition of the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and creation of a new “Commonwealth of Independent States”) by examination of three central themes. First, it is shown that because the old Soviet regime departed substantially from the classic conceptualizations of socialism, its demise does not demonstrate a “failure” of socialism or a “victory” of capitalism. Second, dissolution of the old regime does demonstrate serious problems in the actual, over‐centralized, authoritarian, state‐directed Soviet economy. Third, partly because of the confusion between an authentic socialism and the actual Soviet regime, prospects for socialism seem very slim. But socialist ideals of democracy and equality are deeply embedded in the popular psyche and will continue to affect the character and pace of social change.

There are two sides to the lending of money: the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’. The microeconomic side comprises various routines performed by bankers in assessing the profitability of an investment. The macroeconomic side reflects the impact of such institutional banking routines on the rest of the economy. This chapter examines the repercussions of a few generally accepted bank precepts on the overall dynamics of the economic system by unearthing the monetary theory of Silvio Gesell and applying it to three important ‘macro’ scenarios: Schumpeterian innovation, Veblen's absentee ownership and technically productive investment, and Malthus's theory of market gluts.

In contrast to liberal, orthodox Marxist and structural interpretations which attribute government policy in capitalist society to exogenous forces, the state regularly possesses a significant area of autonomy within which decisions are effectively determined by the political‐administrative elite (PAE). The majority of the economic projects emanating therefrom can be categorized as either aggrandizing populist or economistic. Postulates the choice of orientation depends upon PAE interests. Concludes that a purely aggrandizing project can be expected only in an environment of decisive underdevelopment while a populist one is almost inevitably a temporary response to conjunctural factors; most common, both in the advanced capitalist countries and the majority of Third World countries is a strong predisposition to an economistic project.

Makes and attempts to substantiate, the following claims: It was Marshall′s objective to show how poverty could be ameliorated. He located the causes of poverty in the institutions of the state, education, monopoloid business enterprise, and the working‐class family. He viewed institutions as structures and as organized social behaviour. He explained that the latter is conditioned by customs. Some of these are rooted in the legend‐enshrouded past and hence change‐resisting. Other customs are change‐promoting by virtue of being engendered in scientific, technological, and educational processes. Marshall recommended that the state be reformed through a strengthening of democratic processes and that this be followed by state‐engineered reform of monopoloid institutions and of educational institutions. These reforms would result in increased institutionalization of dynamic behaviour and accelerated deinstitutionalization of static behaviour. The outcome would be an increase in welfare. Because of his recommendations. Marshall considered himself a socialist.

I. Introduction On January 1, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), who has been described by Andrei Gromyko as a man who “has a nice smile, but he has iron teeth,” (Goldman, 1) gave an address to the people of the United States in which he informed them that the “Soviet people are dedicated to peace — that supreme value equal to the gift of life.” (Gorbachev, 1986(a),5). Gorbachev appealed to all that is good in the American people when he said:

Essays a conceptural clarification and theory of the process of economic evolution. Using the Veblenian matrix, conceptualizes the economic process in the framework of culture and its evolution. Economic evolution, as a gestalt, comprises the processes of both economic growth (quantitative statics) and development (qualitative dynamics). The dynamics of culture evolution is founded on the advance of technology which constitutes the “core of culture”. The essence of the process of culture evolution is contained in the dichotomy of useful knowledge. The advance of useful knowledge appears in its application as technology and in its store as culture. The process of economic evolution increases the capacity of culture and thereby enables humankind to take bigger and bigger bites of the infinity of knowledge. Culture evolution, fed by the dynamics of the economic process, offers the potential for an enhanced “consciousness of the cosmos” and as such a conception of human progress.

The passionate debate, among policy makers and theorists, over the appropriateness of protecting infant industries in developing countries was one of greatest interest in the economic literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On one side of the argument are the British advocates of free trade, concocting subtle arguments to neutralize the boisterous aspirations of insubordinate colonies (and former colonies) yearning for independence; on the other, the standard‐bearers of Economic Nationalism, responding fiercely to the incessant firing of classical contentions. Such reaction to laissez‐faire economics gave birth to a corpus of ideas which was to form the core intellectual bulwark of commercial protectionism and cultural freedom. Discusses and comments on the conflicting views which animated the confrontation through examination of the major works of the most illustrious exponents of both factions.

Examines the role of institutional change in post‐Communist transition, notably in the sequence of transformations. Explains the reasons for the strategic role of institutional change, the major elements of such change, a rationale explaining why, to create maximum effect, these changes should occur early in the sequencing process, prior to liberalization, marketization, stabilization or economic restructuring and substantial privatization. Theoretical analysis is employed with supporting empirical illustrations.

This paper examines the origins and the institutions, strategies, and policies of the shift to transition toward capitalism and democracy as the aspired system of political economy of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters in Russia in the early 1990s. The paper argues that this process of radical change is very “rocky”, and that its outcome is not yet clear. The shift from socialist democratization under Gorbachev to capitalist transformation under Yeltsin had multiple origins; but a core element in the process was the very likely abandonment of the ancien régime by party, state, and industrial élites themselves. Key factors in the transition in the early 1990s were: continuity amid change in political leadership and governance institutions; the absence of a developed political party system that could have united Yeltsin and the new Russian parliament; and the underlying socioeconomic conditions and attitudes of the Russian population.

Examines Gorbachev′s (1985‐1991) period of Soviet development as an exemplar of a self‐declared movement towards a more democratic and humane socialism. Gorbachev′s perestroika envisaged a fundamental structural and technological renovation of Soviet economy, reactivation of Soviet persons and attitudes, and overall redirection of the nation′s economic, political and social priorities. Analyses Gorbachev′s model of democratizing socialism with respect to underlying causes or origins, and institutions and policies initiated in the Gorbachev years.