This paper develops an organizing framework for research on corporate political strategy. It reviews the literature and then identifies a number of open research questions and streams for potential investigation. The paper closes by developing a theory to explain why, when, and how a firm will pursue multi-forum political action as part of its nonmarket and integrated strategy.
We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the…
We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public-sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public-sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and work hard. To do so requires internal personnel policies that sort “slackers” from “zealots.” Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Even with well-designed personnel policies, an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition remains.
In this paper we consider a number of experiments to determine whether aspiring managers can solve non-market strategy problems. Utilizing a survey of nearly 300 MBA…
In this paper we consider a number of experiments to determine whether aspiring managers can solve non-market strategy problems. Utilizing a survey of nearly 300 MBA students, we show that with simple, single-stage problems, managers are very competent in reaching the optimal choice given their non-market environment. As problems become more complex, however, they have much greater difficulty in arriving at the optimal result. In this regard, analysts must use some caution when applying theories and evaluating empirical results concerning non-market behavior.