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In the Dutch central government (following countries like New Zealand, Australia and the UK) a system of resource budgeting is being developed as a substitute for its present dual system of cash/commitment budgeting for core departments and accrual accounting for executive agencies. Advocates of this approach claim that resource budgeting will improve the allocation of government spending and increase efficiency in government production. A basic flaw of the reform proposals is the failure to acknowledge the hybridity of government activities and the need to accommodate these hybridities in the accounting system. We argue that the present dual system, with some minor revisions, will be superior to the proposed resource budgeting system.

This paper aims to address the possibilities for (performance‐based) control of externally autonomised (empowered) entities which operate at the level of local government in The Netherlands. The idea is that Dutch regulations do not cover controlling all institutional structures, which might result in unobserved risks for local governments.

Two basic methods are used: a literature study on the variety of institutional structures meant to design an overview. This is completed by a secondary research approach on the findings of 34 local audit offices that have studied the problem for their local government.

In The Netherlands, there is no all‐encompassing framework to cover control of autonomised entities at the local level. The most important problems to be solved are related to the specification of services to be delivered by local governments and the role conflict emerging from being owner/financial stakeholder in the organisation, on the one hand, and commissioner for the services of the organisation, on the other. This holds for almost all cases. The problem is even stronger in those cases where autonomised entities operate under a national framework for delivering services that have to fit in with local planning and control systems.

The analysis draws attention to the organisations not included in the standard regulatory framework of local governments; and contributes to the awareness of different roles of local government, being both commissioner and owner/financial stakeholder.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the special issue and outline its major themes and challenges, their relevance and the research opportunities the field presents.

The paper reviews prior literature and outline’s the need to analyse challenges for corporate governance and accountability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a precursor to introducing the contributions to this special issue.

Corporate governance, accounting and accountability of SOEs are crucial and growing topics in public management and other research disciplines. Public service provision and budget consolidation cannot be realized effectively and efficiently without powerful governance and management of SOEs. However there are significant corporate governance challenges and important empirical research gaps in comparison to other fields. Broader theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, accountability mechanisms and sector/context are identified and discussed and encouraged in future research.

This paper aims to stimulate interdisciplinary research on emerging issues affecting governance and accountability of SOEs considering their growing importance in the society and their changing nature.

Effective mechanisms and good practices may contribute to better performance of SOEs. Findings may help politicians, administrations, board members, auditors, consultants, scholars and the media striving for improvements around the world.

The paper condenses theoretical and empirical findings to highlight the relevance of this field and important research gaps. The special issue offers an empirical examination of interdisciplinary literature and innovative experiences of SOEs to strengthen public service motivation, board composition and roles, trust and control, transparency, public value and to enhance the ability to manage, steer and monitor contracts, performance and relationships.