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Purpose – The purpose of this conceptual chapter is to discuss the limitations of the network organization in multinational corporations (MNCs). Since many IB/IM publications concentrate on the advantages of this organizational form, the focus of the chapter is on identifying the limitations that MNCs need to be aware of when they use network organizations.

Methodology – The analysis is based on a sound review of the literature that refers to the network organization in general and its application in MNCs.

Findings – The chapter shows that MNCs present a context that can aggravate the problems of a network organization. Four types of problems are identified: (1) knowledge transfer between MNCs’ subunits, (2) trust-building and corporate culture within MNCs, (3) subsidiary development and subsidiary managers’ stress, and (4) additional problems of a more general nature.

Practical implications – As a result of these problems, it is expected that the formal, hierarchical structure will remain an important organizational instrument for MNCs. The chapter specifies in which ways the formal organizational structure can help to reduce the limitations of the network organization. Finally, the chapter argues that, among the formal organizational models, the matrix structure should be considered more intensively in the future.

Originality/value of chapter – Since existing discussion of the network organization in MNCs tends to ignore the limitations and downsides of this organizational form, the chapter contributes to a more balanced understanding of the network organization.

In the era of financial capitalism, how to manage and hold global corporations accountable has become too multifarious a topic for a solitary focus of one theme, to sufficiently outline the whole gamut and implications of their activities. Capitalism is characterized by several well-organized antinomies and contrasts, with reflections of critical dualities that bear a resemblance to the primeval paradoxes of Hellenic philosophy. The challenge of governance of capitalism to be effectual entails breaking out of the entrenched precincts of habitual academic silos. Various standpoints while reasonably informative falls short to explain fully the complex interlinkages between the concept of global governance and the state’s capacity to put into effect its will on corporate power.

Spotlighting on assessing the praxis of political economy at global and national level and the corporate reality, this chapter aims to provide a renewed thrust for the focused recalibration of global regulatory regime. In this chapter, the inquiries take the regulation as the main explanandum for elucidation of the shifting governance framework.

Adam Smith, it is generally acknowledged, founded the modern discipline of political economy with the study entitled An Inquiry into The Wealth of Nations (1776) which he built upon the ethical system he presumed to exist in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Ricardo took Smith's observations somewhat further with his publication of On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). When John Stuart Mill wrote his Principles of Political Economy in 1848, his considerations of economic processes were intimately connected with the political. By the time Marx published Das Kapital as a critique of political economy in 1867 the term was entrenched in both academic life and in common parlance and political circles. The study of economics was an integral part of the study of the state. Ironically, however, political economy was about to be upstaged by the development of economics as a separate and positivist discipline. William Stanley Jevons had published his “Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy” in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society in the previous year. This was much more widely read at the time than Das Kapital. By 1890, Alfred Marshall had published his Principles of Economics. The book began with these words: “Political economy or economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life.” The great tradition of seeing economics as an integral part of politics and vice versa was disappearing. However, though economists were anxious to convert that part of political economy known as economics and see it as a scientific discipline, the reality, that is the integrated nature of the state and the economy, remained. Simply because certain ideologues decided to separate politics from economics did not mean that the state in any sense disentangled itself from the economy or the economy from the state.