Search results1 – 2 of 2
In 2002, variable annuities were introduced in South Korea and have shown enormous success since then. They are life-insurance products with investment guarantees…
In 2002, variable annuities were introduced in South Korea and have shown enormous success since then. They are life-insurance products with investment guarantees. Variable annuities allow policyholders to allocate premiums into a wide range of investment vehicles such as stocks, bonds, money market instruments, or some combinations of them. Due to the investment guarantee which is called guaranteed living benefits (GLBs), the benefit is always the greater of (1) the account value of the policyholder investment and (2) the guaranteed amount. Life insurance companies set aside reserves for the guarantees in the general account. Just as the account value depends on the performance of investments, VA lapses also rely on the performance of investments. For example, policyholders will not terminate the contracts when account value is way lower than the guaranteed amount. Considering that lapses determine the total benefit of VAs that a insurance company should pay, calculating risk margin for lapse is a key issue in the VA business. In this study, risk margin for VA lapses is estimated with Wang transform suggested by Wang (2000, 2002).
Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded…
Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded and unsecured and have long maturities, and thus provide managerial incentives to pursue strategies to avoid the overall firm risk. This study investigates the effect of managerial inside debt compensation relative to equity-based compensation on a firm's dividend payout policy. We find that a inside debt holdings are positively associated with various measures of a firm's dividend payout policy. Additionally, we find empirical evidence in firms with inside debt holdings that the inverse relationship between high default risk measured by KZ index and dividend payout weakens as the portion of inside debt relative to equity-based compensation rises. This finding indicates that the needs for the firm to restrain dividend payouts to equity holders is reduced as the executive's debt-to-equity compensation ratio becomes larger. Overall, the results suggests the mitigating effect of executives' inside debt holdings on the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders can lead to generous payout policy.