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Institutional investors have increasingly gained importance since the early 1990s. The assets under management in these funds have increased threefold since 1990 to reach…
Institutional investors have increasingly gained importance since the early 1990s. The assets under management in these funds have increased threefold since 1990 to reach more than US$45 trillion in 2005, including over US$20 trillion in equity (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Further, the value of institutional investors' assets represents roughly 162.6% of the OECD gross domestic product in 2005 (Gonnard, Kim, & Ynesta, 2008). Given the magnitude of institutional investors' holdings relative to the world market capitalization, challenging questions on the economic role of these investors have been raised. One such question concerns their impact on the stability of stock markets. On the one hand, active strategies of buying and selling shares by these investors may contribute to moving stock prices away from their fundamental values. On the other hand, if all institutional investors react to the same information in a timely manner, they are in fact helping to increase market efficiency by speeding up the adjustment of prices to new fundamentals (for competing theories on the role of institutional investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). This view of institutional investors as “efficiency drivers” generated considerable debate for many years (see, e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; French & Roll, 1986).
Purpose – Run a comparative analysis between investments of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and mutual funds, focusing on firm-level, country-level, and institutional…
Purpose – Run a comparative analysis between investments of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and mutual funds, focusing on firm-level, country-level, and institutional variables.
Methodology/approach – We use a hand-collected sample of 1,845 acquisitions around the world over the last 25 years (251 for SWFs and 1,594 for mutual funds). We then run univariate parametric and nonparametric tests to assess the differences in the investments of both subsamples.
Findings – We review the literature on the determinants of SWFs' investment decisions. Our analysis adds to the scarce available literature on the investment decisions of SWFs and their comparison with other institutional investors. Our results show that, compared to mutual funds, SWFs indeed exhibit different preferences: for instance, SWFs prefer to acquire stakes in larger, less liquid companies which are financially distressed but which also have a higher level of growth opportunities. They also prefer less innovative firms with more concentrated ownership, which are located in less developed but geographically closer countries with whom they do not necessarily share cultural and religious backgrounds.
Social implications – Our results are important for practitioners and firms seeking to attract a given type of institutional investment. They also add insights to the debate on the “hidden” political objectives behind SWF investments in the Western world.
Originality/value of paper – This is the first attempt to empirically assess the differences in the investment choices of SWFs and mutual funds.
We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A…
We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in 19 countries outside North America. We find that the presence and power of MLS in these firms are negatively associated with abnormal returns and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns, suggesting that MLS mitigate agency problems in the target, and hence their acquisition is perceived as “a loss of good governance.” The negative association between MLS targets and returns is stronger in widely held firms suggesting that MLS indeed curb expropriation of minority shareholders. By contrast, when the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target is a family, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement, suggesting exacerbated agency problems in these firms that should benefit from the “acquisition of good governance.” Our evidence is robust to a battery of tests and to addressing potential endogeneity.
Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both…
Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both in the domestic and foreign markets, and their importance in promoting good corporate governance practices worldwide and facilitating increased financial integration.
Methodology/approach – Review and synthesize recent academic literature (1970–2011) on the process of international financial integration and the role of foreign institutional investors in the increasingly global financial markets.
Findings – Despite the concern that short-term flow of international capital can be destructive to the emerging and developing market economies, academic evidence on a destabilizing effect of foreign investment activity is limited. Institutional investors’ systematic preference for stocks of large, well-known, globally visible foreign firms can explain the presence of a home bias in international portfolio investment.
Research limitations – Given the breadth of the two literature streams, only representative studies (over 45 published works) are summarized.
Social implications – Regulators of emerging markets should first improve domestic institutions, governance, and macroeconomic fundamentals, and then deregulate domestic financial and capital markets to avoid economic and financial crises in the initial stages of liberalization reforms.
Originality/value of paper – A useful source of information for graduate students, academics, and practitioners on the importance of foreign institutional investors.
Purpose – Investigate the causes and consequences of foreign financial institutions' divestments in China's banking sector which is an example of cross-border transactions…
Purpose – Investigate the causes and consequences of foreign financial institutions' divestments in China's banking sector which is an example of cross-border transactions by institutional investors.
Methodology – Use a sample of 26 foreign financial institutions' strategic investments in Chinese banks. Ten of those investments are divested after the global financial crisis. We investigate determinants of the divestment, business cooperation after the divestment, and Chinese banks' stock price reactions to the divestment announcement.
Findings – The poor performance of foreign financial institutions, which is attributable to the global financial crisis, and the institutions' regulated low equity ownership are important causes of divestment (or whole divestment). In contrast, Chinese banks' poor performance does not cause foreign divestments. Foreign financial institutions that fully divest their equity stakes usually terminate their cooperative business, which was required by the strategic investment agreement. The Bank of China and the China Construction Bank, which experienced large H-share divestments, experienced large economic declines in A-share values.
Social implications – Foreign financial institutions' strategic investments created substantial shareholder value before the divestment. Banking sector developments that rely on foreign investments are vulnerable to economic downturns in developed countries.
Originality/value of paper – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first trial to analyze the impact of divestments on divested bank performance.