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In 2006 the German-based electronics company Siemens faced widespread corruption and bribery allegations. Investigations of the German state attorney’s office disclosed an amount of more than 2.3 billion of suspicious payments to foreign governments (Schubert & Miller, 2008). It turned out that Siemens had bribed governmental officials in order to secure contracts and to obtain favorable conditions over more than three decades (Schmidt, 2009). Though Siemens had a clearly stated anticorruption policy this did not prevent the company from getting involved in one of the largest corporate scandals in German business history.

A deeper analysis of the scandal reveals at least four fundamental shortcomings which enabled the corrupt practices on all organizational levels. First, most of the managers saw no alternatives to secure their foreign business, especially in countries where bribery payment has been a widespread practice. Second, the managers had created misguided bonds of loyalty believing that personal engagement in the corruption scheme was part of their dedication to the company. Third, due to corporate routines and commonly accepted practices, most managers lacked a clear sense of reality seeing corruption as part of the regular business at Siemens. Fourth, poor governance structures and a lack of clear regulations for doing business in a corrupt environment made it easier for managers to bypass official regulations.

This chapter proposes a sociological reconstruction of the emergence of citizenship as a source of legitimacy for political institutions, and it focuses on examining the historical processes that first gave rise to this concept. It explains how citizenship has its origins in the transformation of feudal law, a process that culminated in patterns of military organization that characterized the rise of the early modern state in Europe. On this basis, it describes how the growth of constitutional democracy was integrally marked by the militarization of society and explains that military pressures have remained palpable in constitutional constructions of citizenship. In particular, it argues that, through the early growth of democracy, national citizenship practices were closely linked to global conflicts, and they tended to replicate such conflicts in national contexts. It concludes by showing how more recent processes of constitutional norm formation, based largely in international human rights law, have acted to soften the military dimensions of citizenship.

The academic literature within social psychology focuses on describing what leaders and groups do wrong rather than what they do right. We refer to this as the “negative psychology” of leaders and groups. This chapter reviews the negative and positive research perspectives on leadership and groups. We propose that scholarly research makes more references to the shortcomings of leaders and groups rather than their successes. We conjecture that the pressure by the academic community to produce compelling counterintuitive research findings fuels the tendency to concentrate on failures. In contrast, we suggest that popular articles and books more often focus on the positive achievement of leaders and groups because their audience, namely managers, are more interested in learning how to achieve positive results than to avoid negative outcomes. Finally, we suggest that scholarly research on the psychology of leaders and groups could benefit from understanding how to achieve and maintain positive outcomes, whereas popular press may better prevent organizational failure and ruin by understanding managers’ blunders and faults.

Disaster and calamity are extreme events that can be used to glean general lessons about how society works. I use the problem of panic to develop several ideas. Panic, we know from years of disaster research, is quite rare at least in the United States. I consider the implication of this for theories of social behavior and human nature. I also suggest the idea of “failing gracefully” as a systems-level notion that highlights the social context of behavior rather than individual panic. I reconsider findings concerning “altruistic” and “corrosive” communities. I critically evaluate the idea of “moral panic,” and end with a consideration of the rhetoric functions of “panic.”