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The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating effect of the board of directors on the strategic decisions made by family firms, and to understand the board attributes that can alleviate the aversion of family-owned firms toward mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The study uses a sample of several firms listed in India from 2006 to 2019 with 19,813 firm-year observations. The empirical tests have been performed using logistic and negative binomial regressions. The study also tests for endogeneity with the help of Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effects model.

The study shows that board characteristics like smaller board-size, presence of outside directors, lower intensity of board activity, presence of busier board members and separation of board chair and CEO positions alleviate the inhibition of family firms toward M&A.

The findings imply that investors and policymakers can encourage family firms to have smaller boards, more independent directors, passive boards and CEO nonduality to reduce their aversion toward risky activities. Family-owned firms could consider a board comprising members with multiple directorships who can bring wider knowledge and expertise which can reduce the perceived threat to socioemotional wealth (SEW) and alleviate their aversion toward M&A.

Ownership concentration in family firms posits a unique challenge in terms of their aversion toward M&A. This study is one of the few that highlight the relevance of the monitoring and advisory role of the board in alleviating this aversion in an emerging market like India.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between three corporate governance (CG) idiosyncrasies, namely audit committee characteristics, external audit quality (AQ), board diversity and firm performance (FP) in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations.

The study used a sample of 200 listed nonfinancial firms in the SAARC nations from 2012 to 2021. The System Generalized Method of Moment model was applied to the data consisting of 2000 firm-year observations. The Generalized Estimating Equation population-averaged model was also employed for added robustness. The study employed Tobin's Q as the measure of FP.

The findings revealed that amongst the CG variables tested, external AQ exhibited a significantly positive relationship with Tobin's Q. Significant negative influences on FP have been demonstrated by the variables of audit committee meeting and board's independence. Furthermore, gender diversity, CEO duality, audit committee strength and independence failed to record any significant association.

This study is one of the first to investigate the association between CG idiosyncrasies and FP in the SAARC nations. The study findings have important implications for policymakers and regulators in the region.

The present study's goal is to analyze the impact of audit quality (AQ) on earnings quality (EQ) using different audit attributes. The study shows empirical evidence from India, considered an emerging market.

The sample selected represents the 376 non-financial firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). With a 20-year time frame, the authors used the absolute value of discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2002) (DA) as a proxy for EM, which is inversely related to EQ. The authors analyzed data using OLS, fixed effect (FE), 2SLS and Panel-IV estimators.

The authors found that most audit attributes positively affect EQ. In the Indian context, joint auditor (JA), auditor size (A_SIZE), auditor fee (A_FEE) and auditor tenure (A_TENURE) have a negative association with EM indicating high EQ. In contrast, auditor rotation (A_ROTATON) positively affects EM confirming low EQ.

The present study uses Big-4 and its member firms as a proxy of auditor size (A_SIZE); instead, other bases may be taken for it, like the dominant audit firms in a particular industry in sample data, etc. The authors have started audit tenure from the base year, i.e. 2001, which may ignore the association of auditor and auditee just before 2001.

The study findings would enhance policymakers' willingness to prepare appropriate regulations regarding JAs and auditor rotation, which might improve financial market efficiency and reduce financial fraud among Indian corporates.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to incorporate “Joint Auditor” (JA) as a proxy for audit quality in the Indian context, which might significantly contribute to the literature.

This paper examines whether the adoption of Japan’s Stewardship Code by institutional investors influences their preference for investee companies' governance quality. The Code, introduced by the Financial Services Agency in 2014, promotes constructive engagement between institutional investors and investee companies. Engagement with investees should improve institutional investors' ability to assess governance quality across their portfolios. The paper examines if this results in a positive relationship between the levels of Code-compliant institutional shareholding and investee governance quality.

The association between Code-compliant institutional shareholding levels and a governance quality score is examined for Nikkei 500 companies.

A positive association is observed between shareholdings by Code-compliant institutional investors and investee governance, with board independence playing a key role. Analysis shows that the association between institutional shareholding and governance is stronger for the Code-compliant shareholding than for overall institutional shareholdings. In addition, no significant relationship is found between the levels of shareholding by non-Code-compliant institutional investors and the governance quality score of investee companies. Taken together, the results suggest that Code adoption strengthens institutional investors' preference for high-quality investee governance.

Despite the introduction of stewardship regulation worldwide, there is a scarcity of empirical research that examines its operation. The study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights into how compliance with stewardship regulation influences institutional investor decision-making.

The authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.

Using a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.

The authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.

The study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.

The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.

The results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.

Institutional investors are major shareholders in publicly traded firms and play crucial roles in the financial and governance aspects of these firms. Despite their importance, little is known about their role in internal auditing. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the relationship between institutional investors’ ownership and investment in the internal audit function (IAF).

The study uses ordinary least squares regressions with two-way cluster-robust standard errors (firm and year) to estimate the relationship between institutional investors’ ownership and investment in IAF for Malaysian listed firms between 2009 and 2020.

The findings show that companies with higher levels of institutional ownership invest more in IAF, suggesting that institutional investors can effectively monitor managers due to their large holdings. Moreover, both transient and dedicated institutional investors are more likely to invest in IAF.

The results highlight the importance of institutional investors as a significant determinant of investment in IAF, which can aid regulators and managers in understanding the institutional investors’ role in governing and optimizing the efficient use of a firm’s resources. The findings also provide insight into institutional investors’ behavior regarding monitoring systems, which may inspire regulators and policymakers to consider increasing institutional investors’ participation to enhance governance structures.

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role of clawback provisions.

This study uses a data set of 18,492 US firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019. Financial reporting quality is proxied with accruals-based and real activities earnings management measures, and with financial statement irregularities, measured by applying Benford’s law to financial statement line items. A number of sensitivity tests are conducted including the use of an instrumental variable.

The results provide evidence that financial statement irregularities are more prevalent when CEOs are older, and they suggest a complex relation between CEO age and real activities earnings management. The results also suggest that the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality is moderated by the presence of clawback provisions which became mandatory for US-listed firms in October 2022.

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to consider the effect of CEO age on financial statement irregularities and earnings management. This study has important implications for stakeholders evaluating the determinants of financial reporting quality, for boards of directors considering CEO age limitations and for policymakers considering mandating clawback provisions, which recently occurred in the USA.