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Social studies teachers often feel a tension between wanting to teach for democratic citizenship and the need to cover the multiple areas of required content. This paper examines the nature of this tension, critically examines democratic citizenship as a universally understood process, and suggests a guiding question to assist social studies teachers with how to remain focused on the purpose of their field while also teaching mandated curriculum. The implications of this guiding question for classroom practice are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.

The authors' approach is based upon the quantification of hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies.

It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes over the past decade despite the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The data are based on survey responses and this requires that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well‐functioning banking systems.

The authors' data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers and researchers to examine cross‐country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and then analyze the interdependency between bank and sovereign risk before, during and after the financial crisis.

The authors' approach is based upon an examination of 44 large banks headquartered in 13 countries; eight of these countries belong to the European Union, seven belong to the eurozone, and the remaining five belong to neither group. This provides a good comparison group of countries.

Evidence is found supporting the existence of significant bank and sovereign risk linkages. There are, however, different patterns in the relationships across countries and even across banks within the same country. Also, higher correlations between bank and sovereign risk are found in countries in which the ratio of the assets of banks relative to their home country's GDP is relatively high.

Based upon the empirical results, allowing banks to invest in sovereign debt without requiring them to hold any capital against the “true” risk of such debt increases the likelihood of insolvency. This means that interdependencies between bank and sovereign risk are extremely important when setting regulatory capital requirements and considering whether action is needed to limit any increase in the likelihood of contagion.

The paper provides a new examination of the interdependencies between individual bank risk and the sovereign risk of the countries in which they are headquartered, with special emphasis on the recent global financial and eurozone crises.

This paper combines an experimental design and an artifical neural network to investigate the behavior of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The evidence suggests that FOMC decision making has been influenced by the presidential administration, with particularly strong evidence that influence from the Kennedy‐Johnson administrations led to easier policy.

At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in sharp contrast with 2007–2009, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. Savings and Loan (S&L) remediation cost between 2 percent and 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the US Treasury. But the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro significance. What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. I estimate output losses for 1981–1984, 1991–1998, and 2007–2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929–1941. The losses associated with 2007–2009 have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage to the real economy, and continue efforts to identify in advance financial institutions which are systemically important (SIFI), and those which are not.

The global banking environment is experiencing significant change as regulatory and geographical barriers to competition are reduced. As these barriers are removed, greater integration of banking services is developing throughout the world affecting the performance and structure of banking institutions. This research examines the stock returns and volatility of stock returns for a sample of banks in the United States, Europe, Canada and Japan. The general focus is to identify factors influencing the return and risk and to examine cross‐country differences in these factors. The results suggest that while size does not affect return volatility for any of the categories of banks, it does affect returns for banks in Japan, the U.S. and other non‐universal banking systems. Likewise, the investment in fixed assets appears consistently to adversely affect returns. A number of differences are found across country borders and across type of institutions (i.e. universal versus non‐universal banks).

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the major provisions of the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by the US Congress and signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.

This does not offer any empirical analysis of the new law given that it has just been adopted. The paper does provide discussion of the major provisions with some commentary on the arguments for an against each provision.

The new law represents the most sweeping changes in financial regulation and supervision in the USA since the Great Depression. The role of the Federal Government is greatly expanded in almost all aspects of the financial sector of the economy and will affect consumers, investors, and managers of financial service firms. Many feel that the effect of the law will be to adversely affect the competitive environment while others feel the additional regulation is necessary to prevent another financial crisis.

As the provisions of this law become more clear, much research will be needed to assess the true economic impact of the law and whether it is indeed providing the additional safeguards against a financial crisis.

This review of the new law offers a concise discussion of the major provisions of the recently passed law. This review is of value to those seeking an introduction to the law and its provisions and implications.