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Lai, Li, Conover, and Wu (2010) propose a four-factor financial distress model to explain stock returns in the U.S. and Japanese markets. We examine this model in the stock markets of Australia, and six Asian markets (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). We find broad empirical support for the four-factor financial distress risk asset-pricing model in those markets. The four-factor financial distress asset pricing model improves explanatory power beyond the Fama–French (1993) three-factor asset pricing model in six of the seven Asian-Pacific markets (12 of 14 portfolio groupings), while the Carhart (1997) momentum-based asset pricing model only improves explanatory power beyond the Fama–French model in three of the seven markets (4 of 14 portfolio groupings).

Option models have provided insight into the value of flexibility to switch from one state to another (such as switching a mine or refinery from operating to closed status). More complex flexible processes offer multiple possibilities for switching states. A fabrication facility, for example, may offer options to shift from the current status to any of several alternatives (reflecting reconfiguration of basic facilities to accommodate different operating processes with different outputs). New algorithms enable practical application of complex option pricing models to flexible facilities, improving analysts’ ability to draw sound conclusions about the effects of flexibility and innovativeness on share value. Such models also apply for options with information items as the underlying assets. Information organizations such as oil exploration and development companies may include options to shift from the current capability to any of several alternatives reflecting added abilities to handle new information sources or apply the organization’s talents in new ways. In the case of either physical or information processing, careful attention to estimating the matrix of correlations among the values of potential alternative states allows explicit integration of financial analysis and strategic analysis – especially the influence of substitutes and the anticipated reactions of competitors, suppliers, and potential new entrants.

Perhaps the most difficult objection raised by skeptics of the real options approach concerns the apparent lack of market transactions that would verify that real options have actual value. Although there are no organized exchanges with publicly disclosed prices, there are nevertheless several mechanisms for buying and selling real options. Observing these could offer important advantages in the quest for enhancing the role of real options in financial decision making:•demonstrate that real options can indeed add value•in some cases even gain a sense of the amount of value added by real options•offer expert appraisers methods for improved estimation of the value of a business when real options are part of the organizational capital

The most frequently used method for buying or selling real options occurs when a product that includes real options is sold to customers (often at a premium above the price of a comparable product that does not include real options). Real options that are part of the organizational capital of a business are part of the package in an acquisition (or minority equity position). In this chapter we examine several cases of such transactions.

Analysis of Information Options offers new tools for evaluating investments in research, mineral exploration, logistics, energy transmission, and other information operations. With Information Options, the underlying assets are information assets and the rules governing exercise are based on the realities of the information realm (infosphere). Information Options can be modeled as options to “purchase” information assets by paying the cost of the information operations involved. Information Options arise at several stages of value creation. The initial stage involves observation of physical phenomena with accompanying data capture. The next refinement is to organize the data into structured databases. Then bits of information are selected from storage and synthesized into an information product (such as a management report). Next, the information product is presented to the user via an efficient interface that does not require the user to be a field expert. Information Options are similar in concept to real options but substantially different in their details, since real options have physical objects as the underlying assets and the rules governing exercise are based on the realities of the physical world. Also, while exercising a financial option typically kills the option, Information Options may include multiple exercises. Information Options may involve high volatility or jump processes as well, further enhancing their value. This chapter extends several important real option applications into the information realm, including jump process models and models for valuing options to synthesize any of n information items into any of m output assets.

It is fundamental to good governance that corporate decision makers be well informed, have the knowledge-base necessary to use the information effectively, and share the same motivations as the owners. Further, managers must provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the company's positions. Regarding the first part of the problem, value-based incentive systems have been under development in order to aid in resolving conflicts of interest between owners who lack the specific information (or the background knowledge to utilize it) and the managers who act as their agents. Such systems often focus exclusively upon cash flows relative to resource investment; yet, share values are often substantially greater than the amount that could be explained by expected cash flows from existing operations. Indeed, in some firms the majority of share value may derive from growth opportunities or other real options that add flexibility or reduce risk. So, value-based incentive systems could be improved by explicitly rewarding actions that create or enhance the firm's real options. Further, satisfactory disclosure requires that accounting reports include adequate information about the firm's real options, with market-based mechanisms for defining the necessary information and calling it into the appropriate arena.

The premise of this discussion is that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business platform. This intended maximization occurs when the current value of the exercise instrument equals the current value of the underlying asset (so the option is at the money). It is also clear that when the time horizons of different arrangements tend to be consistent (as tends to happen in private equity arrangements) the attraction will be for higher volatility. The actions often criticized in the media are readily understandable in this context. For example, private equity partnerships are criticized for “borrowing heavily to buy companies, breaking them up, and selling off the pieces at huge profits.” Even before exiting, the private equity players separate the acquisitions into business units and asset pools. This changes an option on a portfolio into a portfolio of options, and we know from option pricing theory that the resulting position is worth more than the starting point.

Private equity partnerships also have been criticized for putting acquisitions into debt to receive dividends. Upon acquisition of a new business platform (perhaps composed of multiple business units) the private equity firm has paid a substantial premium for an option on a portfolio. After separating it into multiple options on different business units, the private equity firm might understandably want to sell assets that do not need to be owned (but could be leased instead), thereby reducing their equity investment and bringing the options closer to the money. Then additional borrowing (and withdrawal of dividends) again brings the options closer to the money.

In order to illustrate the nuances of private equity as real options, we include discussion of three recent cases, each illustrating one of the common paths followed in private equity.

We examine explicitly priced financial distress risk in post-1990 equity markets. We add a financial distress risk factor to Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, based on Griffin and Lemmon's (2002) findings that financial distress is not fully captured by the book-to-market factor. We test three-factor and four-factor capital asset pricing models using both annual buy-and-hold analysis and monthly time series analysis across portfolios adjusted for common book-to-market, size, and financial distress factors. We find empirical support for an Ohlson (1980) O-score-based financial distress risk four-factor asset pricing model in the U.S. and Japanese markets.

We examine the empirical relationship between direct equity agency costs measures and corporate governance control mechanisms to control equity agency costs. We measure the three direct agency cost proxies commonly used in the literature: the operating expense; asset turnover; and selling, general, and administrative (SGA) ratios. Internal corporate governance control mechanisms examined are inside ownership (IO), outside ownership concentration (OC), the size of the board of directors (BODs), and the composition of the BODs (proportion of nonexecutive (NE) directors and separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair). The external corporate governance control mechanism examined is the size of bank debt (short-term debt). Univariate and multivariate tests reveal that the only statistically significant relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and direct equity agency cost measures is the negative relationship between the proportion of IO and direct agency costs. The asset utilization ratio (asset turnover) ratio is the best proxy for direct equity agency costs and can be useful for event studies of announcement period excess returns.

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.