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Stewardship theory is an emergent approach for explaining leadership behavior, challenging the assumptions of agency theory and its dominance in corporate governance literature. This study revisits the agency and stewardship theories by seeking to answer whether chief executive officers (CEOs) in China are committed stewards or opportunistic agents.

Based on 5,165 observations of 1,036 listed companies in China over the period 2005–2010, the results suggest that the corporate governance mechanisms developed from the agency theory in the West are not necessarily applicable in the Chinese context.

This study supports the stewardship theory in its findings that empowering CEOs through the practice of CEO duality and longer CEO tenure have a positive effect on firm value in China. Additionally, the positive relationships between CEO duality, CEO tenure and firm value are strengthened by the number of executive directors on the board, and weakened by the number of independent directors on the board.

One size does not fit all. Leadership behaviors in China do not follow the agency assumptions inherent in Western practices, rather they favor the conditions of positive leadership expressed by the stewardship theory. Assuming that the motivations of managers in emerging markets such as China are similar to those in the West may lead to a poor fit between governance policies and the institutional context.

As one of the few studies to connect the theoretical debate between the agency and stewardship theories, this study presents new evidence to support the stewardship theory, thereby strengthening its theoretical importance and relevance in corporate governance literature.

This paper examines the relation between governance (as measured by board and audit committee characteristics) and accounting quality (as measured by abnormal accruals) in a setting where there is no a priori reason to suspect systematic management of earnings. Using data from Singapore and Malaysia, we find both board size and audit committee independence are related to lower abnormal working capital accruals. Furthermore, the relation between audit committee independence and higher quality accounting exists only when the abnormal accruals are income increasing. This suggests that audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals. The results also indicate that audit committees are effective only when all members are independent directors.

Innovations in takeover financing, less restrictive regulatory requirements, and a general desire to enhance market position have led to a substantial increase in corporate takeover and restructuring activity. In response target firm managers have become increasingly active in devising defensive strategies and tactics designed to ward off hostile bidders. It is well‐ documented, however, that large wealth gains accrue to target firm shareholders in mergers and acquisitions. Thus the emergence of such terms as “shark repellents”, “poison pills”, and “greenmail”, raises the question of whose best interests are really being served by antitakeover measures.

Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether proxy statement performance graph disclosures are influenced by the firm's governance structure and management concerns about relative performance.

Logistic regression is used to test whether the level of performance graph disclosure decreases with lower relative performance and higher insider director membership on the compensation committee of the board. Also, Z and t‐statistics test whether bias in the selected peer group benchmark is related to insider membership on the committee.

The empirical results suggest that reporting discretion was exercised for management's benefit. The amount of explicit disclosure on cumulative returns in the performance graph decreases as relative performance declines and decreases when insider directors serve on the compensation committee. Moreover, the presence of insider directors on the compensation committee is associated with a biased choice of peer group benchmark return.

The sample for the study consists of 141 large firms. Future research could examine a larger group of firms that vary in size or other disclosures.

These findings support recent actions taken to improve corporate governance. Further public policy steps could be taken. For example, the SEC could require firms to include an explanation for appointing insiders to the compensation committee.

The results are consistent with managers using discretion over information disclosures and suggest that compensation committees with insider members play a less active role in providing information that is helpful to shareholders.

This study attempts to determine whether the level and volatility of interest rates affect the equity returns of commercial banks. Short‐term, intermediate‐term, and long‐term interest rates are used. Volatility is defined as the conditional variance of respective interest rates and is generated by using the ARCH estimation procedure. Two sets of models are estimated. The basic models attempt to determine the effect of contemporaneous and lagged interest rate volatility on bank equity returns, while the extended models incorporate additional contemporaneous macroeconomic variables. Contemporaneous interest rate volatility has little explanatory power, while lagged volatilities do possess some explanatory power, with the lag length varying depending on the interest rate series used and the time period examined. The results from the extended model suggest that the long‐term interest rate affects bank equity returns more adversely than the short‐term or the intermediate‐term interest rates. The findings establish the relevance of incorporating macroeconomic variables and their volatilities in models determining bank equity returns.

Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity.

This paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was imposed from outside the firm. By using an exogenous measure, the analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect.

The results show that a more active takeover market leads to lower board gender diversity. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in a decline in board gender diversity by 10.01%. Moreover, stronger takeover market susceptibility also brings about larger board size and less board independence, corroborating the substitution effect. Additional analysis confirms the results, including propensity score matching, generalized method of moments dynamic panel data analysis and instrumental variable analysis.

The study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on board gender diversity. Unlike most of the previous research in this area, which suffers from endogeneity, this paper uses a novel measure of takeover vulnerability that is probably exogenous. The results are thus much more likely to demonstrate causality.

This paper aims to examine how selected governance indicators impact on performance measures of outreach and profitability in microfinance institutions (MFIs).

The paper adopts a quantitative approach based on both primary and secondary data from conveniently sampled 52 microfinance institutions. A panel data technique is employed as the key analytical framework.

It is shown that governance plays a critical role in the performance of MFIs and that the independence of the board and a clear separation of the positions of a CEO and board chairperson have a positive correlation with both performance measures.

It would have been appropriate to have a larger number of MFIs for the study. This limitation however does not compromise on the validity of the conclusions based on the findings of the study.

In the context of multi‐dimensional and sometimes conflicting objectives facing MFIs, a clear balancing act of social objectives and institutional sustainability to ensure effective performance of MFIs is recommended.

Studies on governance and its relationship with firm behaviour is limited especially in Sub‐Saharan Africa. Its application in the microfinance sector with its peculiar characteristics is the added value of this paper.

Since the publication of The Modem Corporation and Private Property, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, economists have written extensively on the proposition that ownership and control have been separated in the large corporations. Additionally, the effects of this separation on the conduct of corporate enterprise have been the subject of many investigations. The present standing of financial economists on this issue is formalized by Jensen and Meckling. They consider the managers as the agents of firm's stockholders and conclude that a certain amount of agency costs is unavoidable. These costs, they argue, emanate from pecuniary as well as non‐ pecuniary expenditures by the managers to maximize their own utilities that will be detrimental to the firm's stockholders.

The number of mergers in the U.S.A. increased from 2,339 in 1983 to 3,701 in 1987—an increase of 58.23 per cent. Over the same time period the value of mergers increased from $51.89 billion to $167.48 billion—an increase of 323 per cent. Merger activities of this magnitude can be expected to attract a great deal of attention, and they have.