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Seth D. Baum, Stuart Armstrong, Timoteus Ekenstedt, Olle Häggström, Robin Hanson, Karin Kuhlemann, Matthijs M. Maas, James D. Miller, Markus Salmela, Anders Sandberg, Kaj Sotala, Phil Torres, Alexey Turchin and Roman V. Yampolskiy
This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be…
This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist.
This paper focuses on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant future; catastrophe trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to human civilization; technological transformation trajectories, in which radical technological breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course; and astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos.
Status quo trajectories appear unlikely to persist into the distant future, especially in light of long-term astronomical processes. Several catastrophe, technological transformation and astronomical trajectories appear possible.
Some current actions may be able to affect the long-term trajectory. Whether these actions should be pursued depends on a mix of empirical and ethical factors. For some ethical frameworks, these actions may be especially important to pursue.
The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.
A cognitive view of implementing strategic innovation sees individual learning of senior managers became organizational only when Operating Logic shifted to Innovating…
A cognitive view of implementing strategic innovation sees individual learning of senior managers became organizational only when Operating Logic shifted to Innovating Logic at the operating level, which required recognition at the operating level that change was needed. Organization learning concepts extend the account, while simpler explanations of entry threat and changing division management collapse organizational cognition to top-management, directing attention away from proactive strategic innovation. The cognitive view emphasizes broader cognitive resources and participation to enable organizational learning by doing.
The purpose of this paper is to show that distinguishing between gross and net tax shields arising from interest deductions is important to firm valuation. The distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation of tax shields for the famous Miller’s (1977) model with corporate and personal taxes. However, for the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the authors show that the valuation of tax shields can be materially affected. Implications to the cost of equity and optimal capital structure are discussed.
This paper proposed a simple tax shield clarification that distinguishes between gross and net tax shields. Net tax shields equal gross tax shields minus personal taxes on debt. When an after-tax riskless rate is used to discount shareholders’ tax shields, this distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation results of the Miller’s model. However, when the after-tax unlevered equity rate is used to discount tax shields under the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the difference between gross and net tax shields can materially affect valuation results. According to the traditional ME model, both gross tax shields and debt interest tax payments (i.e. net tax shields) are discounted at the after-tax unlevered equity rate. By contrast, the proposed revised ME model discounts gross tax shields at the unlevered equity rate but personal taxes on debt income at the riskless rate (like debt payments). Because personal taxes on debt are nontrivial, traditional ME valuation results can noticeably differ from the revised ME model to the extent that after-tax unlevered equity and debt rates differ from one another.
For comparative purposes, the authors provide numerical examples of the traditional and revised ME models. The following constant tax rates and market discount rates are assumed: Tc=0.30, Tpb=0.20, Tps=0.10, r=0.06, and ρ=0.10. Table I compares these two models’ valuation results. Maximum firm value for the traditional ME model is 7.89 compared to 7.00 for the revised ME model. At a 50 percent leverage ratio, equity value is reduced from 3.71 to 3.49, respectively. Importantly, the traditional ME model suggests that firm value linearly increases with leverage and implies an all-debt capital structure, whereas firm value stays relatively constant as leverage increases in the revised ME model. These capital structure differences arise due to discounting debt tax payments with the unlevered equity rate (riskless rate) in the traditional ME (revised ME) model. Figure 1 graphically summarizes these results by comparing the traditional ME model (thin lines) to the revised ME model (bold lines).
Textbook treatments of leverage gains to firms or projects with corporate and personal taxes should be amended to take into account this previously unrecognized tradeoff. Also, empirical analyses of capital structure are recommended on the sensitivity of leverage ratios to the gross-tax-gain/debt-personal taxes tradeoff.
Financial managers need to understand how to value interest tax shields on debt in making capital structure decisions, computing the cost of capital, and valuing the firm.
The valuation of interest tax shields in finance is a long-standing controversy. Nobel prize winners Modigliani and Miller (MM) wrote numerous papers on this subject and gained fame from their ideas in this area. However, application of their ideas has changed over time due to the Miles and Ezzell’s (ME) model of firm valuation. The present paper adapts the pathbreaking ideas of MM to the valuation framework of ME. Students and practitioners in finance can benefit by the valuation results in the paper.
No previous studies have recognized the valuation issues resolved in the paper on the application of the popular and contemporary ME model of firm valuation to the MM valuation concepts. The new arguments in the paper are easy to understand and readily applied to firm valuation.
Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination…
Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.
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Justice rules are standards that serve as criteria for formulating fairness judgments. Though justice rules play a role in the organizational justice literature, they have…
Justice rules are standards that serve as criteria for formulating fairness judgments. Though justice rules play a role in the organizational justice literature, they have seldom been the subject of analysis in their own right. To address this limitation, we first consider three meta-theoretical dualities that are highlighted by justice rules – the distinction between justice versus fairness, indirect versus direct measurement, and normative versus descriptive paradigms. Second, we review existing justice rules and organize them into four types of justice: distributive (e.g., equity, equality), procedural (e.g., voice, consistent treatment), interpersonal (e.g., politeness, respectfulness), and informational (e.g., candor, timeliness). We also emphasize emergent rules that have not received sufficient research attention. Third, we consider various computation models purporting to explain how justice rules are assessed and aggregated to form fairness judgments. Fourth and last, we conclude by reviewing research that enriches our understanding of justice rules by showing how they are cognitively processed. We observe that there are a number of influences on fairness judgments, and situations exist in which individuals do not systematically consider justice rules.