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ASRS maintenance reports from 1996 through 2000 (n = 937) were subjected to posterior probability analysis to determine the probability of causal factors leading to a specific maintenance‐related event. Unintentional release of an unairworthy aircraft into revenue service was found to be the most frequent maintenance‐related event (40 per cent). The top three maintenance errors leading to such an event were improper documentation (33 per cent), improper installation (27 per cent), and sign‐off of work not performed (13 per cent). The probabilities of certain causal factors responsible for each of the maintenance errors were as follows: (a) For documentation errors – lack of awareness (22 per cent), poor procedures (15 per cent), and lack of training (4 per cent); (b) For improper installation – complacency (21 per cent), lack of awareness (21 per cent), and poor procedures (15 per cent); and (c) For sign‐off of work not performed – maintenance management (27 per cent), complacency (21 per cent), and poor procedures (14 per cent).

This two part paper represents an attempt to enumerate and analyse recent instances of work system design experiments in terms of the outcome measures sought or reported in those studies. ‘Work system design experiments’ is intended to include only experiments dealing with sets of interrelated jobs, as opposed to those experiments solely manipulating either jobs which are dealt with individually, or changes in such things as work environment, or management climate. The literature comprising experiments in work system design contains a wide range of general end results variables, but, however, suffers from the associated fact that these numerous outcome measures are frequently poorly conceived or operationalized, and are not easily compared with one another from study to study.

Office automation as it is being introduced today aims “to automate office procedures”, as I.B.M. points out, not “merely to mechanize tasks”. It refers to the use of computer technology to process and transmit information, combining word and data processing. Automation also involves linking together today's many modern devices into “integrated office systems”. Because new technology is being developed to computerize the very flow of work in the office, its potential impact is qualitatively different from previous office equipment which “mechanized” or “automated” routine tasks.

The decades‐old paradox of great software promise and its disappointing practice in organizations has been recently increased by the appearance of “enterprise‐wide” systems (often called “enterprise resource planning” or ERP). Obtaining effective user involvement has been problematic in the past and it promises to become worse in the future with larger, more comprehensive software applications. Business process re‐engineering (BPR) adds to this significant problem by exhorting managers to undertake massive change ‐ including new information systems ‐ using autocratic methods. The confluence of management interest in organization change and in new technology has excited the global industrial community, but it has also disappointed in delivering on its promise. Sociotechnical systems (STS) design combines user‐involvement in design with structural change and the effective use of technology. The present paper explores the successful application of STS, with its local participation in organization design, to a centralized and autocratic application of BPR and SAP enterprise‐wide software.

For me, the human side of work is the most important aspect in any consideration of jobs and organizations. Hospital organizations, for example, are made up of people, their jobs are, of course, done by people, and the results of that work are for people — whether they be direct recipients such as patients, or customers; or whether they be the indirect recipients such as the community, or the employees themselves. The dilemma is highlighted by asking, why do we so often separate the effects of work on the humans involved in its production, from the effects on humans as recipients of its end result? I will posit that if work is consciously designed as a meaningful activity for the people involved in its production, then chances are good that its product will also better suit its human users. That is, there is a systemic relationship between the quality of working life and the quality of the product of that work. In so saying however we must likewise acknowledge the importance of the technical requirements of the work — for having meaning to the people involved is not enough. Work that is meaningfully arranged, both for the humans involved in its execution and for its technical requirements, typically results in a higher quality product and, not infrequently, in greater productivity as well. In our experience results are frequently accompanied by lowered absenteeism and turnover and greater feelings of satisfaction with the work activity. Work system design, or socio‐technical system design, is a powerful approach to this human side of work — work that is meaningful in both that human sense, as well as the technical sense.

In this, the second part of a two‐part paper (Part I, Personnel Review, Summer 1977, pp 21–34) a survey of instances of work system design (WSD) experiments will be continued. As described in the Introduction to Part I, cases chosen for inclusion report the economic and human results of actual physical or structural innovations in a set or series of human tasks which, taken together, form some meaningful technical whole. The term ‘experiment’ is used in both Part I and II to refer loosely to change or manipulation of actual work activities, and not necessarily to well controlled laboratory experiments. In fact, most cases reported here are ‘natural’ and very few are carefully controlled.

This paper aims to explore an alternative approach to regulation for addressing governance problems relating to director and executive remuneration in publicly listed firms. The author investigates the development of hybrid regulatory framework, composed of state regulation and self-regulation, for remuneration governance in Australia.

The synthesis of constructs borrowed from agency and institutional theories and its contextual analysis examines the effectiveness of formal (state regulation) and informal (self-regulation) institutions for the development of a hybrid of regulation. Thereafter, the author examines the impact of hybrid regulation on remuneration disclosure behavior in Australia.

The author finds that improvement in disclosure is primarily driven by the establishment of remuneration committees and separate role of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairperson but weakened by the presence of CEO at remuneration committee and presence of remuneration consultant.

Global crises have called for greater transparency and protection of investors through state regulation alone. However, corporate governance, being a social practice that is shaped by diverse interests, calls for a holistic approach. A useful contribution of this study is that through an in-depth examination into the stages and actors of the government interventions involving the balancing of tension between conflicting forces, it provides insights for developing an effective regulatory hybrid which has greater acceptance for corporate governance. In conclusion, it implies the significance of priming the social arena through active engagement of diverse market forces prior to introducing state regulation.

In this study, we investigate whether higher institutional ownership is related to better internal controls and whether better internal control is associated with a higher quality of transparency.

The paper's aim is to investigate the stock option disclosures of directors and the five most highly remunerated officers in the directors' report of Australian companies for the years 2000 and 2002 and the choice to position these disclosures in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to the directors' report.

The study examines the compliance with mandatory disclosures for stock options for companies in the top 400 and also ascertains if there is consistent compliance across all required categories, including sensitive disclosures.

Although compliance is high for most of the required stock option disclosures, 43 of the 153 firms in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of the options issued. Another 27 of the companies disclosed a “Nil” value for the value of options issued. Most of the companies disclosed the information in the directors' report, with larger companies and companies in the finance industry more likely to disclose in the notes to the financial statements, where the information is less visible.

The results indicate that companies were secretive about the most sensitive of the required disclosures, the amount (value) of the options issued. Regulators and researchers need to be cautious in conducting compliance studies as although companies appear to be transparent in their disclosures about stock options for directors, closer examination reveals secrecy about sensitive components of the required disclosures.