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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.
When the initial library networks were established in the United States, they provided affordable, online automation services that were available from virtually no other…
When the initial library networks were established in the United States, they provided affordable, online automation services that were available from virtually no other source. The surge of automation experienced by American libraries for the past two decades has altered the historical relationships that characterize library cooperation. Local networks are being created and machine‐readable products previously available only from the networks are now being packaged on optical media and distributed to individual institutions. With these technological advances, the need for, services offered by, and financial viability of the networks have begun to undergo dramatic change. This is also a time of great opportunity for libraries and networks. There is on the horizon what may be the infrastructure for a national information network. The realization of this network will require close cooperation of librarians, who have embraced the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model for networking, and members of the academic and research community, which is still relying heavily on the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocols (TCP/IP) for communications purposes.
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to regulate the fare and route structures of the domestic airline industry. At that time, policy‐makers were…
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to regulate the fare and route structures of the domestic airline industry. At that time, policy‐makers were fearful that free market conditions in the airline industry would not foster the growth which was deemed to be optimal in the public interest. After forty years of industry development, however, the market structure of the airline industry does not provide justification for regulation. Furthermore, the regulation itself has created problems which are undesirable to both the industry and the public. On October 25, 1978, President Carter signed into law a bill that will gradually remove the regulatory restrictions under which interstate domestic airlines have operated since 1938. All regulatory control over the airlines will end by 1982, and the CAB will be abolished in 1985.
The paper's purpose is to describe the extent and type of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) in New Zealand, and to test for a relationship between “hidden…
The paper's purpose is to describe the extent and type of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) in New Zealand, and to test for a relationship between “hidden value” (difference between firm's market and book value), and its relationship to voluntary IC disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. The study aims to incorporate the effect of revaluations and growth expectations.
Content analysis of 70 publicly listed New Zealand firms, and database retrieval of independent variable data. Correlation and regression analysis is undertaken.
Only revaluing firms show a significant positive relationship between their levels of hidden value and their voluntary disclosure of IC and its components of external and internal structure. Explanatory power is increased when an interaction term involving hidden value and growth expectations is introduced.
Further developments in the growth expectation and market value measures are suggested. A need for qualitative interviews is identified in order to further develop theoretical explanation of the observed relationship.
This paper may help external users assess levels of IC in revaluing firms.
The study extends the work of Brennan by increasing the sample size, quantitatively recognising the impact of revaluations and growth expectations, providing a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings for the proposed relationships, and by utilising reliability testing in the content‐analysis process, several measures of hidden value and IC disclosure, and statistical testing.
This is a comprehensive list of books, some pamphlets, and a few sound recordings about or by Ronald (and Nancy) Reagan. Collections of photographs and cartoons as well as biographies, political commentary, speeches, quotations and even recipes are represented. Omitted are books in which there is only brief mention of him. The bibliography was compiled in connection with a major exhibit on Ronald Reagan at the Colorado State University Library. It is the author's intention to continue to collect Reagan materials.
Outlines the theory of public choice (i.e. the equilibrium of a formal political model based on functions: not politicians) and identifies some reasons why US politicians may actually vote for rent seeking (“pork barrel”) projects. Suggests that they include the need for election, campaign contributions and financial or non‐financial (ideological) personal gain; and considers the implications for political reforms such as term limits, rules on campaign finance etc. Discusses how the motives of individual politicians can be discovered and some additional applications of this idea.
This paper examines how voters' initiatives used in 24 states affect state budget balance. The author first uses a qualitative approach to investigate the extent to which…
This paper examines how voters' initiatives used in 24 states affect state budget balance. The author first uses a qualitative approach to investigate the extent to which ballot initiatives are used and identifies the initiatives that have had significant impacts on state revenues and expenditures. The review shows that the impact of initiatives differs from a state to state. The heavy initiative user states have experienced substantial impact on their budgets. Second, as their impact on state budget is particularly significant during economic downturn, a linear regression analysis is performed to examine the relationship between the use of initiatives and state budget balance measured in terms of the state budget gap as percentage of FY 2010 general fund. The regression analysis shows that the number of expenditure-induced initiatives have a statistically significant effect on state budget gap, while revenue-restrained measures (e.g. number of tax-limiting measures and the use of super majority or popular vote to approve tax increase) only marginally affect the FY 2010 budget gap.
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of price regulation in competitive market structures. The analysis is performed in a general equilibrium framework where…
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of price regulation in competitive market structures. The analysis is performed in a general equilibrium framework where individuals are producers of the goods they consume. These produced goods in the economy are designated as good A, good B, and q, which represents quality per unit of A. The first half of the paper is devoted to the competitive equilibrium and the effects of price regulation on product quality. The second half of the paper analyzes the welfare effects of price regulation when the economy consists of both non‐identical and identical consumers. It is shown that regulation may be a Pareto superior move in the absence of a market and price for quality.