The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any…
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.
Using Cointegration Tests, Granger‐Causality Tests, and OLS, this study empirically investigates the determinants of the rate of return on savings and loan assets over the 1965–1991 period. It is found that it is determined by the mortgage rate, the capital/asset ratio, the price of imported crude oil, the cost of deposits, and the ceiling on federal deposit insurance.
The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 sets out five categories of capital and mandates corrective action for banks. Each bank based on its capital amount fall in the certain…
The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 sets out five categories of capital and mandates corrective action for banks. Each bank based on its capital amount fall in the certain categories or states. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect of banking regulations and supervisory practices on capital state transition.
First, the authors investigate how much the practices influence banks' capital adequacy using a dynamic panel data method, the generalized method of moments. Then, to scrutinize the results of the first phase, the authors estimate the effect of practices on some characteristics of capital state transition such as transition intensity, transition probability and state sojourn time using multi-state models for panel data in 107 developing countries over the period 2000 to 2012.
The dynamic regression results show that capital guidelines, supervisory power and supervisory structure can have significantly positive effects on the capital adequacy state. Moreover, the multi-state Markov panel data model estimation results show that the significantly positive-effect practices can change the capital state transition intensity considerably; for example, they can transmit the critical-under-capitalized (the lowest) capital state of banks directly to a well or the adequate-capitalized (the highest) capital state without passing through middle states (under-capitalized and significantly-undercapitalized). Moreover, the results present some new evidence on transition probability and state sojourn time.
The main contribution of this paper, unlike the existing literature, is to consider the power of banking regulations and supervisory practices to improve the capital state using a multi-state Markov panel data model.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.
The authors' approach is based upon the quantification of hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies.
It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes over the past decade despite the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.
The data are based on survey responses and this requires that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well‐functioning banking systems.
The authors' data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers and researchers to examine cross‐country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.