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In January 2008, in the midst of the subprime-mortgage crisis, Warren Buffett is looking for good investment opportunities for his almost $50 billion in cash. As usual, he has been patient and careful in identifying the right opportunities; however, the amount of cash in his company has grown considerably, and with so much cash sitting idle, returns could suffer. This case can be used to pursue several objectives: (1) to showcase Warren Buffett's leadership in the financial markets; (2) to understand his principles and the principles of value investing more broadly; (3) to understand Warren Buffett as both a thinker and a leader in the world of investing and as an agent of stability in a world of capital markets characterized by continuous change; (4) to discuss Buffett's investment decisions (Swiss Re, Burlington Northern, the funding of his own new bond-insurance business, BHAC) and the timing of those decisions in the midst of the subprime crisis and in an environment of increasing energy demand; (5) to discuss his decision not to invest in banks in the current environment as well as his largest investment, the philanthropic Gates Foundation; and (6) to understand some of the new market forces, such as sovereign funds, as providers of capital.

This case covers the scandal that occurred in 2008 at Société Générale when one trader, Jérôme Kerviel, lost the prominent French bank nearly €5 billion through his unauthorized trading. The case describes Kerviel’s schemes as well as SocGen’s internal monitoring and reporting processes, organizational structures, and culture so that students reading the case can identify and discuss the shortcomings of the firm’s risk management practices. The case and epilogue also describe the French government’s and Finance Minister Christine Lagarde’s reactions to the scandal (e.g., imposition of a €4 million fine and increased regulations), prompting students to consider the role of government in overseeing that healthy risk management practices are followed in key industries (such as banking) that are highly entwined with entire economies. Finally, the case encourages students—during class discussion—to critically consider whether it is truly possible for one rogue trader to act alone, which elements in a work environment enable or even encourage risky behavior, and who should be held accountable when such scandals occur. Interestingly, this case highlights a story that is not unique. Prior to Kerviel’s transgressions were the similar scandals of Nick Leeson at Barings Bank and Toshihide Iguchi at Daiwa Bank, yet history has repeated itself. This case gives students a vivid example of the dangers of internal, self-inflicted risk on organizations, and it opens a discussion on how to avoid it.

After completing this case, students will be able to:

• Identify shortcomings in a firm’s risk management practices (i.e., processes, systems, structures)

• Evaluate the role and interests of governments as well as peer firms in overseeing healthy risk management practices in an industry

• Understand the dangers of self-inflicted risk and consider the elements in an organization (e.g., leadership, compensation structure, incentives, recruiting) that impact its risk environment

Identify shortcomings in a firm’s risk management practices (i.e., processes, systems, structures)

Evaluate the role and interests of governments as well as peer firms in overseeing healthy risk management practices in an industry

Understand the dangers of self-inflicted risk and consider the elements in an organization (e.g., leadership, compensation structure, incentives, recruiting) that impact its risk environment

On April 4, 2007, Don Imus, one of the company&s most popular talk show personalities made comments on the air regarding the Rutgers women&s basketball team. According to the transcription from Media Matters for America, Imus said, “ That&s some nappy-headed hos there. I&m gonna tell you that now, man, that&s some … woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, so, like … kinda like … I don&t know.” At first, the comments did not seem out of the ordinary for one of radio&s “shock jocks.” However, as the public reaction grew, the situation changed considerably. Under pressure from the public, Moonves reluctantly suspended Imus. But it was too little too late. By the end of the day on April 11, analysts estimated that $2.5 million in advertising revenue was lost. On April 12, Moonves terminated Don Imus& contract.

After Moonves fired Imus, there was still a lot to consider. He really wanted a way for the company to meet the demands of the company&s stakeholders. In addition, he wanted to avoid any more distractions from the firm&s normal day-to-day operations.