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The aim of this chapter is to explore the economic impact of the ICT sector in the Greek economy. In the first stage of this study, the ICT sector is identified as a composite agglomerate of various manufacturing and service industrial sectors of the economy, following its international definition introduced by OECD. Under this concept, we explore the main structural indicators of its business activity and quantify its impact in the Greek economy (in terms of production value, GDP, investment, and employment), utilizing the basic principles of Input-Output analysis. We further investigate the ICT sector’s linkages with other industries as a ‘route’ for technology and innovation diffusion in the Greek production system by approximating the ICT sector as the enabling force for the digital transformation of production in the face of Industry 4.0. The empirical results of this analysis are accompanied by a review of some key qualitative characteristics of the sector and elaborate on major challenges and relevant policy implications that arise.

The balanced scorecard (BSC) allows firms to place importance on both financial and nonfinancial performance measures in four perspectives for developing and implementing corporate strategy and performance evaluation. The BSC literature however provides minimal insight on how to set targets, how to weigh measures when evaluating managers and the firm, and how to resolve conflicts that arise in the BSC process. Researchers have attempted to fill these gaps using two contending approaches. In particular, Datar et al. (2001) uses an agency model to select the optimal set of weights and more recently Herath et al. (2009) develop a mathematical programming–based collaborative decision model to find the optimal (or approximately optimal) set of target and weights considering inputs from two parties. In this article, we apply the Herath et al. (2009) model to a detailed BSC example. We demonstrate how the collaborative BSC model can be implemented in Microsoft Excel by practitioners to minimize BSC conflicts. Finally, we discuss how the model facilitates alignment and a culture of open reporting (information sharing) around the BSC that is necessary for its effective implementation.

The aim of this chapter is to determine the relationship between labor productivity and economic development. In this context, the annual data of Turkey on a range of 1970–2017 are included in the study period. On the other hand, these data are tested with the help of Toda Yamamoto causality analysis. Thus, it will be possible to determine whether there is a strong relationship between the two variables. According to the obtained results of the analysis, it is defined that there is a causal relationship from labor productivity to economic growth in Turkey. Based on these results, it can be said that labor productivity should rise in order to increase economic development in Turkey. For this purpose, educational programs in Turkey can be revised with the help of a detailed study. In this process, cooperation with companies to understand the needs in the market plays a key role. Additionally, regulations should also be prepared related to the salaries of the employees. If it can be possible to prevent employees from receiving wages below a certain amount by placing a minimum legal limit on salaries, it will be possible to increase the motivation of the employees. This situation has a positive and significant contribution to the labor productivity.

Using data from the 2013 European Company Survey, this chapter operationalizes the representation gap as the desire for greater employee involvement in decision-making expressed by the representative of the leading employee representative body at the workplace. According to this measure, there is evidence of a substantial shortfall in employee involvement in the European Union, not dissimilar to that reported for the United States. The chapter proceeds to investigate how the size of this representation gap varies by type of representative structure, information provided by management, the resource base available to the representatives, and the status of trust between the parties. Perceived deficits are found to be smaller where workplace representation is via works councils rather than union bodies. Furthermore, the desire for greater involvement is reduced where information provided the employee representative on a range of establishment issues is judged satisfactory. A higher frequency of meetings with management also appears to mitigate the expressed desire for greater involvement. Each of these results is robust to estimation over different country clusters. However, unlike the other arguments, the conclusion that shortfalls in employee involvement representation are smaller under works councils than union bodies is nullified where trust in management is lacking.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.