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The purpose of this paper is to examine two (accidental and inevitable) reasons why W.H. Beveridge, who in 1936/1937 had rejected all of the elements of Keynes’s General Theory, came to accept it enthusiastically in the 1940s.

The paper answers this question in three steps. First, it distinguishes apparently changeable factors in Beveridge’s views, from consistent ones. Second, it looks for factors of the latter type in his three goals for economics. Third, it compares his goals with those of Keynes.

Beveridge’s three goals overlapped with Keynes’s ideals for economics and economists, and this is not historically accidental: economics should be useful as a basis for verification by fresh observations (as an exact science); economic knowledge should be useful in business and policy-making processes (for new kinds of educated professions); and economic studies requires a wide range of related subjects (a liberal education).

This paper attempts to clarify the cognitive assumptions of the two economists. This clarification can contribute to understanding the process and reasons behind Beveridge’s acceptance of Keynesian economic theory and policies on a theoretical level.

This paper examines previously ignored reasons for Beveridge’s acceptance of Keynesian economics. Moreover, it suggests certain pre-analytic assumptions concerning the co-existence of social insurance and full employment policies. This perspective will be useful for historians of economics and the welfare state.

Introduction In addition to his economic analysis, a key component of Keynes's intellectual legacy is his methodology, derived from the fusion of social philosophy and vision with politics, public policy concerns and economic analysis, which he employed to offer a solution to the most fundamental and pressing problems of his time. In effect, such a methodology constitutes, in spite of Keynes's opposition to classical economics, a rediscovery, and adaptation of the one used by the classical school of political economy, which had been abandoned as a consequence of the onslaught of the “neo‐classical” revolution in the late 1800s with its strict focus on “scientific” or positive economics.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

Explores Keynes′s long‐term policy proposals as social reform. Using early unpublished philosophical papers of Keynes, the argument is that Keynes′s long‐term policy proposals focused on reconciling “being good” and “doing good”. The socialization of investment was meant to bring about this reconciliation.

Alvin Hansen and John Williams’ Fiscal Policy Seminar at Harvard University is widely regarded as a key mechanism for the spread of Keynesianism in the United States. An original and regular participant, Richard A. Musgrave was invited to prepare remarks for the fiftieth anniversary of the seminar in 1988. These were never published, though a copy was filed with Musgrave’s papers at Princeton University. Their reproduction here is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the last reminiscences of the original participants. Second, the remarks make an important contribution to our understanding of the Harvard School of macro-fiscal policy. Third, the remarks provide interesting insights into Musgrave’s views on national economic policymaking as well as the intersection between theory and practice. The reminiscence demonstrates the importance of the seminar in shifting Musgrave’s research focus and moving him to a more pragmatic approach to public finance.

This chapter documents an exchange between Leonard Savage, founder of the subjective probability approach to decision-making, and Karl Popper, advocate of the so-called propensity approach to probability, of which there is no knowledge in the literature on probability theory. Early in 1958, just after being informally tested by Daniel Ellsberg with a test of consistency in decision-making processes that originated the so-called Ellsberg Paradox, Savage was made aware that a similar argument had been put forward by Popper. Popper found it paradoxical that two apparently similar events should be attributed the same subjective probability even though evidence supporting judgment in one case was different than in the other case. On this ground, Popper rejected the subjective probability approach. Inspection of the Savage Papers archived at Yale University Library makes it possible to document Savage’s reaction to Popper, of which there is no evidence in his published writings. Savage wrote to Popper denying that his criticism had paradoxical content and a brief exchange followed. The chapter shows that while Savage was unconvinced by Popper’s argument he was not hostile to an axiomatically founded generalization of his theory.

A review article of Pasinetti and Schefold’s edition of the papers at a conference in Marseilles, 1997, on the impact of Keynes in the twentieth century. The book itself is in three parts – theory; Keynesianism in European countries; and institutional discussions of Keynesian policies. The essay concentrates on the issues raised in the first part by Pasinetti, Leijonhufvud and Skidelsky. Pasinetti uses his vital distinction between principle and theory to examine why the Keynesian revolution may not have succeeded. Leijonhufvud identifies Keynes as the last of the classics, contrasting his approach with those he calls the moderns. Skidelsky asks what policies Keynes would advocate today, had he remained ageless with us.

There is no shortage of literature concerning the life and times of J. M. Keynes. Distinguished examples over the past couple of decades are Peter Clarke's (1988) account of Keynes's battles with the Treasury in the 1920s and 1930s, a study by Moggridge (1992), and Skidelsky's (1983, 1992, 2000) monumental three-volume biography, reissued in a single, abridged version (2003).

The great stimulus to macroeconomic theory provided by Keynes is well recognised, but much less is said about his views on scientific methodology and his influence there. There is a widespread belief among economists that Keynes was an a priori thinker who dealt with “facts” and empirical material in a cavalier and high‐handed manner. We question the validity of this interpretation and give evidence to show that Keynes' methodology was not hostile to empiricism.

Keynes taught us in The General Theory that neither economic depressions nor fluctuations were inevitable. If nothing is done, these problems would continue. However, by the judicious employment of economic policies, these problems could be mitigated, if not totally remedied.