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Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

This paper aims to study whether the adoption of an entry mode that fits the social trust level contributes to the improvement of foreign subsidiary performance.

The authors used the Probit model, linear regression, strategic fit approach and instrumental variable regression. The sample was made up of 11,095 observations of Chinese multinational enterprises' foreign subsidiaries in 54 countries from 2005 to 2020.

The results suggest that a host country with a high level of social trust results in fewer difficulties for enterprises in gaining legitimacy, thus foreign subsidiaries are more likely to select the wholly owned entry mode. The results also show that the effect is contingent on the formal institutions of host countries. The results of the mechanism test suggest that social trust influences subsidiaries' entry mode choice by reducing information asymmetry, costs and uncertainty risks. This study further finds that selecting a fit entry mode based on social trust level substantially increases foreign subsidiary performance and this effect is more significant when multinational enterprises (MNEs) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

The main limitation of this paper is its only focus on foreign subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs, which may limit the generalizability of research findings.

This paper responds to the call for conducting more research on informal institutions. Findings highlight the critical role of informal institutions in helping foreign subsidiaries in gaining legitimacy in host countries and the essentialness of selecting a fit entry mode based on the informal institutions of host countries for the development of foreign subsidiaries.

The framework of this paper is financial mathematics and, more specifically, the control of data fraud and manipulation with their subsequent economic effects, namely, in financial markets. The purpose of this paper is to calculate the global loss or gain, which supposes, for the borrower, a change of the interest rate while the contracted loan is in force or, in another case, the loan has finished.

The methodology used in this work has been, in the first place, a review of the existing literature on the topic of manipulability and abusiveness of the loan interest rates applied by banks; in the second place, the introduction of a mathematical-financial analysis to calculate the interests paid in excess; and, finally, the compilation of several sentences issued on the application of the so-called mortgage loan reference index (MLRI) to mortgage loans in Spain.

There are three main contributions in this paper. First, the calculation of the interests paid in excess in the amortization of mortgage loans referenced to an overvalued interest rate. Second, an empirical application shows the amount to be refunded to a Spanish consumer when amortizing his/her mortgage loan referenced to the MLRI instead of the Euro InterBank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). Third, consideration has been made to the effects and the possible solutions to the legal problems arising from this type of contract.

This research is a useful tool capable of implementing the financial calculation needed to find out overpaid interests in mortgage loans and to execute the sentences dealing with this topic. However, a limitation of this study is the lack of enough sentences on mortgage loans referenced to the MLRI to get some additional information about the number of borrowers affected by these legal sentences and the amount refunded by the financial institutions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that deviations in the payment of interests have been calculated when amortizing a mortgage.