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Much attention has recently been directed toward the relationship between the performance of firms and compensation received by their respective CEOs. We assess this relationship for commercial banks, as regulatory and other industry‐specific conditions can cause the performance‐compensation linkage in the banking industry to differ from that of industrial firms. We find that the accumulated human capital of CEOs and the bank size are positively related to the total compensation (including salary, bonus, and stock options) levels of bank CEOs. We also find a positive significant relationship between bank accounting performance proxies and CEO compensation level for all time horizons. Finally, we find a positive significant relationship between market‐based performance proxy and bank compensation.

Executive compensation equations are estimated separately for three groups of firms, under the contention that the determinants of executive remuneration may depend upon the form of and degree of regulation in an industry. Empirical evidence obtained for three separate years lends support to that notion.

Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the productivity of individual managers. We find performance contingent contracts may result in a separating equilibrium in which high productivity managers accept contracts low productivity managers find unacceptable.

Does leadership style affect absenteeism in a company? The purpose of this paper is to contrast the effects of two leadership styles – transformational and passive avoidant – on absenteeism, both legitimate and illegitimate, as mediated by job satisfaction.

A self‐report questionnaire was completed by a sample of 120 employees of a national mail delivery company. Hierarchical regressions were used to analyze the data.

It was found that transformational leadership decreases illegitimate absenteeism, while passive avoidant leadership increases it. In regard to legitimate absenteeism, transformational leadership is shown to have no effect, while passive avoidant leadership is shown to be negatively related to it. Together, the findings regarding passive avoidant leaders suggest their subordinates tend to come to work when ill (presenteeism), but stay away from work when well (illegitimate absenteeism).

For managers trying to reduce the costs of absenteeism, this suggests that leadership style can make a difference. Managers who give subordinates very little attention, or attention only when they have done something wrong – the passive avoidant style – are likely to experience the higher costs of both absenteeism and presenteeism. Adopting the transformational style may help to reduce these costs.

The paper helps to extend the current work on leadership; it examines the passive avoidant style, which remains understudied to date; and it enriches our understanding of the relationship between leadership style and absenteeism as an outcome variable by moving beyond a uni‐dimensional conceptualization of absenteeism. Finally, it serves as a basis for future research by providing evidence for a somewhat counter‐intuitive finding that, under passive avoidant leaders, workers appear to come to work when sick, but stay away from work when well.

CEOs' compensation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Some criticised that CEOs' compensation is not responsive to their performance, because some CEOs still received the same or more compensation even if their companies incurred losses. Others complained that the compensation received by some of the CEOs was so astronomical that it can not be justified with any rational explanations. Many also maintained that some CEOs do not care about employees' wellbeing and shareholders' interest in the determination of their compensation in view of the facts that many workers received pay cuts or declining compensation in real terms and are laid off in the re‐structuring of organisations in order for firms to become more competitive domestically and worldwide.

Globalisation is generally defined as the “denationalisation of clusters of political, economic, and social activities” that destabilize the ability of the sovereign State to control activities on its territory, due to the rising need to find solutions for universal problems, like the pollution of the environment, on an international level. Globalisation is a complex, forceful legal and social process that take place within an integrated whole with out regard to geographical boundaries. Globalisation thus differs from international activities, which arise between and among States, and it differs from multinational activities that occur in more than one nation‐State. This does not mean that countries are not involved in the sociolegal dynamics that those transboundary process trigger. In a sense, the movements triggered by global processes promote greater economic interdependence among countries. Globalisation can be traced back to the depression preceding World War II and globalisation at that time included spreading of the capitalist economic system as a means of getting access to extended markets. The first step was to create sufficient export surplus to maintain full employment in the capitalist world and secondly establishing a globalized economy where the planet would be united in peace and wealth. The idea of interdependence among quite separate and distinct countries is a very important part of talks on globalisation and a significant side of today’s global political economy.

We examine whether Douglas and Santerre's (1990) substitutes hypothesis obtains for bank holding companies (BHCs); i.e. whether degree of ownership concentration and salary incentives are alternative methods of aligning BHC CEO incentives with those of shareholders. Also examined is the relation between CEO salary and bonus and CEO tenure. Using a sample of 95 BHC drawn from the 1990 Forbes magazine compensation survey, we regress CEO salary and bonus against ROE, stock return, two measures of ownership concentration, and a CEO tenure variable. Our results 1) support the substitutes hypothesis as applied to BHCs, and, 2) find a negative relation between CEO salary and bonus and CEO tenure.

Recently the topic of executive compensation has received considerable attention in the popular press as well as in the academia. It is argued that “… top executives would get paid handsomely for first class performance, and would lose out when they flopped.“ This study is an attempt to find out whether executive compensation is in fact related to firm performance. Specifically, this study investigates whether the determinants of executive compensation in firms with above average performance are different from those in firms with below average performance. The underlying hypothesis being that the executive compensation in the above average firms is related to performance variables.