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The purpose of this paper is to introduce an earnings management dimension to compute pre-manipulated accounting performance (free of discretionary accruals) to determine whether family-controlled firms perform better than non-family-controlled firms.

The authors used Jones’ model (1991) to obtain a pre-manipulated performance measure for a sample of Chilean firms. The authors then regressed the pre-manipulated measures of accounting performance as dependent variables against the family nature of the largest shareholder using the Blundell and Bond generalized method of moments estimator.

The authors found that the pre-manipulated performance of family-controlled firms is superior to that of non-family-controlled firms. The authors also show that the presence of institutional investors in the firm’s ownership structure has a positive influence on the performance of family companies. The results suggest that earnings management behavior is not sufficient to explain the better performance of family-controlled firms that has been reported in the literature.

The authors provide new evidence regarding the real superior performance of family business. These results provide some degree of confidence to investors since family firms provide good quality earnings measures of financial performance.

este estudio pretende determinar si las diferencias en performance entre empresas familiares y no familiares puede ser explicada por la existencia de manipulación contable de los retornos.

usamos el método de Jones (1991) para obtener una medida de retorno contable no manipulado para una muestra de empresas chilenas, y luego estimamos una regresión de tipo panel donde la medida de retorno sin manipular es la variable dependiente, la naturaleza familiar o no de la empresa es la variable independiente y una serie de variables de control. Debido a la posible endogeneidad entre retorno y tipo de empresa, usamos la técnica de Blundell y Bond (Método Generalizado de los Momentos).

encontramos que aun usando retornos libre de manipulación contable, las empresas familiares muestran un mejor desempeño que aquellas no familiares. Además, se observa que la presencia de inversionistas institucionales (AFPs) en la estructura de control de la firma, tiene un efecto positivo sobre el desempeño de las empresas familiares.

se presenta nueva evidencia que ratifica el mejor desempeño financiero de las empresas familiares. Además, mostramos, a diferencia de estudio previos, que la presencia de inversionistas institucionales explica parte del mejor desempeño financiero de dichas empresas. Lo anterior permite a inversionistas estar seguros que el mejor retorno de empresas familiares no se debe a la manipulación contable de las utilidades.

We study the relationship between underwriter prestige, family control, and IPO underpricing in an international setting. Data are collected for 5,789 firms that went public across twenty‐five countries between 1995 and 2002. We find that non‐penny‐stock and non‐U.S. IPOs from countries where firms are predominately family‐controlled benefit from associations with well‐known investment bankers; i.e., these firms are less underpriced than similar firms from countries with a low level of family control. At the same time, our findings support prior evidence that suggests that underwriter prestige is positively related to underpricing in the U.S. IPO market. Family‐controlled firms should consider the findings of this study, which identifies factors that are associated with more successful IPO outcomes.

Combining ownership and management might lead concentrated shareholders, such as families, to wealth expropriation. The lack of external monitors and disciplinary agents potentially permits them to pursue this path. Thus, monitoring activity is one of the major drawbacks in family controlled firms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated analysis of the governance roles of various block‐holders, institutional investors and corporate boards in firm performance in the context of publicly‐listed family‐controlled firms.

Using a multi‐industry data set of 208 firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE), this study employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) to address the issue of endogeneity on panel data over the period 200‐2006.

The results show that family firms have better accounting performance than non‐family firms. So, active family involvement in management positions seems to reduce managerial opportunism. However, higher accounting performance does not translate into an increase in valuation levels, and thus might not accrue to minority shareholders. Additionally, the results also show an alignment incentive between a coalition of large shareholders (two families) and firm value.

This study provides empirical evidence consistent with a block‐holder coalition framework that sustains an incentive alignment effect of the coalition of large shareholders (two families) and the firm value. Additionally, the results also support evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can extract private benefits.

This study contributes to understanding that the family firm performance depends on the efficiency of various governance mechanisms. Thus, it offers insights to policy makers to verify board appointment mechanisms used by family firms. Since external board members might be vetted and approved by the family or other dominant block‐holders, what is the extent of their independence from the dominant owners?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between available slack and firm performance in Italian family-controlled public firms (FCPFs) from 2006 to 2010. In addition the authors analyze the moderating effects of specific board structure variables on the relationship between slack resources and firms’ performance.

A pooled cross-section of family and non-family publicly traded firms was drawn from COMPUSTAT global and matched with corporate governance and family firm variables hand-collected from companies’ standard profiles from Italy's primary stock exchange, Borsa Italiana. The hypotheses were tested using the feasible generalized least square method in order to analyze the data from 583 firms-observations, controlling for self-selection bias and reverse causality.

The study shows that FCPFs with available slack experience less than proportionate increases in performance, suggesting a concave curvilinear slack-performance relationship. However, the slack-performance relationship is contingent on board independence and board size: greater board independence and larger boards in FCPFs relate to higher performance when the firm lacks or has too much slack available. The findings suggest that a balanced approach of oversight and stewardship helps families to make better resources allocation, to the benefit of outside shareholders as well.

The slack measure was restricted to available slack. Future studies can expand this research inquiry with other forms of slack, including potential and recoverable slack. The sample included only publicly traded family and non-family firms, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings to other types of family enterprises. Lastly, the results only attend to the slack-performance relationship by controlling whether the firm's performance is below or above the industry average.

Policy makers and non-family stakeholders may rely on the findings better understand the factors that can alter the family's propensity for risks and its related strategic decisions in the Italian context. Procedures to fully monitor family management's decision making or, at the other extreme, to give the family free reign are likely to disadvantage families, their business, and their outside stakeholders.

The study reconciles the debate on the role of slack on firms’ performance by proposing a curvilinear relationship. The study is one of only a handful of research inquiries centrally addressing the role of slack in family-owned businesses, and the only analysis focussed on Italian FCPFs.

This paper aims to investigate auditor choice in those Italian non-listed firms adopting the “traditional” model of corporate governance. In Italy, non-listed firms can choose between two types of auditor: the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), that is the statutory auditors, or an “external” auditor. At the same time, a BSA conducts the administrative auditing for all companies with equity exceeding €120,000.

The paper estimates a logistic regression model of firm auditor choice between an external auditor and the BSA, which incorporates variables proxying for both agency conflict and organizational complexity effects.

The results show that of the potential agency factors, only board independence drives auditor choice, whereas organizational complexity and risk factors including firm size, investment in inventories, subsidiary status and complexity drive auditor choice. These results may be explained in the administrative audit role of the BSA, which monitors both day-by-day firm operations and the financial statements preparation “project”. Stakeholders as a result are reassured that, in general, their interests are protected. Finally, it was found that legal form and voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards compliance exert an impact on auditor choice.

The paper provides support for an internal yet independent auditing body such as the Italian BSA as a wider model for corporate governance in European non-listed firms (OECD, 2004 and 2015). The BSA as an administrative and financial auditing body made up solely of independent highly qualified professionals can work within the firm on an operational basis, and in so doing can increase stakeholder protection.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on financial reporting quality (FRQ) within family firms (FFs), assessing whether longevity can determine a different propensity to earning management (EM) behaviors.

The sample, composed by Italian and Brazilian listed family (and non-family) firms, is segregated into old and young. For each subsample, unsigned discretionary accruals are calculated, using two different EM models. A linear regression model is then proposed, together with some robustness tests, to confirm the research hypothesis.

The outcome is that, within FFs, the entrenchment effect seems to be diminishing with the company’s age, up to become lower than the alignment effect. With some caveat, research also demonstrates that old FFs are more propense to supply higher FRQ than any other subsample group.

The authors demonstrated that, in terms of EM decision process, FFs become virtuous just with time. More research is needed to evaluate the impact of the share and management control separately and to analyze different generation segmentation.

This paper could help non-family stakeholders, as it shows that different company types (family vs non-family), at a different stage of the life-cycle (young vs old) have a different attitude toward FRQ. On the other hand, family owners could exploit the longevity as a value driver.

This paper suggests that agency theory and socio-emotional theory are complementary in explaining the family control role in earnings management decisions. The study also contributes to the debate of FF homogeneity and on risk behavior in FFs, often portrayed as having a patient capital.

The purpose of this paper is to identify if the open Brazilian companies that have family control manage their accounting results in a negative way, and if this influence is in a positive sense of pushing the results down, that is, worsening their present profits due to future results.

The empirical investigation is developed using as a sample 123 Brazilian companies listed on BM&FBovespa, totaling 1.353 observations for a period of 11 years (2000‐2010). Data analysis is conducted by means of regression with panel data, method of ordinary least squares (OLS), and random effects.

First, it was found that family‐type companies show lower profits compared to profits earned by non‐family companies. Nevertheless, it was observed that family businesses have negative discretionary accruals higher than those submitted by non‐family firms, and that family control has a positive influence on this type of earnings management.

The article provides an extension to earlier work focused on the relationship between family ownership and earnings management results.

The paper provides a more critical look at family property, especially as regards the quality of their accounting information.

The study not only investigates whether family control is positively related to discretionary accruals of Brazilian companies; it also checks the influence of family property on the production of negative accruals – “take a bath”.

This research aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using the Indonesian context. The most common ownership structure is concentrated in the hand of family owners except in the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Family owners hold more than half of the companies in Indonesia (Carney & Child, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000). Family firms play an important role in Indonesia. Another important characteristic that emerges is the rise of government- and foreign-controlled firms in Indonesia. Thus, this research also divides ownership concentration into family firms, government-controlled and foreign-controlled firms.

Samples of this research consist of dividend announcements during 2006-2012 in Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research excluded financial data because these have characteristics that are different non-financial sectors’ characteristics. The final sample of this research consists of a 710 firm-year observation.

The result of this research shows that ownerships have a positive effect on dividend payout. This research divides the sample into family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms (GOEs) and foreign-controlled firms. This research shows that government- and foreign-controlled firms have a positive impact on dividend payout. However, family firms have a negative effect on the dividend payout. Family firms pay lower dividends because they prefer to control it themselves. Family firms earn benefit from those resources, but at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, family firms engage in expropriation to minority shareholders.

This study focuses on ownership structure of Indonesian listed firm. This study does not analyze the impact of other corporate governance mechanism such as board structure on dividend decisions. The owner of the companies (family, government and foreign firm) has an opportunity to put their member as part of board members. However, this study does not analyze the impact of board structure on dividend decisions.

This study provides evidence that ownership concentration positively affects dividend payout. However, there is a different effect of ownership structure (family-controlled firms, GOEs and foreign-controlled firm). Government- and foreign-controlled have a positive effect; however, family-controlled firm have a negative effect on dividend payout. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the importance of ownership structure on dividend decision.

This chapter takes a socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to explain the adoption of human resource (HR) practices in family-controlled firms. Previous studies on human resource management (HRM) in family firms have focused only on a small range of HR practices and have rarely utilized strong conceptual frameworks. As a result, these studies have overlooked important factors that contribute to the distinctiveness of HRM in these organizations. Based on ample evidence that shows family businesses' preference for non-economically motivated objectives collectively labeled as SEW, we propose that the presence of SEW influences HR practices in family firms.

Consequently, we reexamine existing empirical evidence of the determinants of HRM in family-controlled firms under the SEW approach. We also reinterpret existing theoretical models of family-controlled firms and their implications for HRM under the SEW umbrella. Our final goal is to establish an integrated framework through a set of sound propositions on HRM in family businesses. By integrating the literature, we aim to fill theoretical gaps in our understanding of the determinants of HR practices in the family business context and direct future research in this area.