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Purpose – Turkey has undergone a major market transformation during the recent decades. This chapter seeks to explore the role of religious politics in some Turkish informal workers' pro-capitalistic change of heart as a response to that transformation.

Methodology/approach – The study is based on participant observation and interviews in a squatter district in Istanbul, Sultanbeyli. This is a two-phase ethnography, consisting of first-hand observations first during 2000–2002, and then in 2006. The fieldnotes are supplemented by 90 interviews.

Findings – Islamic mobilization eases the transformation of habitus in a liberalizing society and the transition from the predominance of social capital to the predominance of economic capital. I contend that the sub-proletariat's dispositions depend on (urban as well as national) historical context and articulation to political and religious movements.

Originality/value of paper – I discuss Bourdieu's study of the transition from subsistence-driven economies to market economies. The chapter points out that Bourdieu's approach to the problem of transition is more satisfactory in comparison to modernization theory and resistance studies. However, I will show that the problems Bourdieu identifies in Kabylia and Béarn (such as “fatalism of despair”) are less salient in Istanbul because of a sociopolitical movement (Islamism) that garners consent among the sub-proletarians by using religion as a disciplining force.

How do heretical social movements build and negotiate their collective identities? This chapter tackles this question by examining the case of an emerging social movement, the left-wing Islamists in contemporary Turkey, that cuts across the durable divide between Turkey’s left and Islam. Drawing on four months of fieldwork in Turkey, I argue that, in addition to activating the typical “us versus them” dynamic of contentious politics, the left-wing Islamists also rely on blurring the social and symbolic boundaries that govern political divides in the course of building their collective identities. Their social boundary blurring includes facilitating otherwise unlikely face-to-face conversations and mutual ties between leftists and Islamists and spearheading alliances on common grounds including anti-imperialism and labor. Their symbolic boundary blurring includes performing a synthesis of Islamist and leftist repertoires of contention and reframing Islamic discourse with a strong emphasis on social justice and oppositional fervor. The case of Turkey’s left-wing Islamists illuminates the process of boundary blurring as a key dimension of collective identity and alliance formation across divides.

In this chapter, the authors investigate the correlation between social and economic indicators and Islamic finance, to see whether increasing Islamic banking will increase account penetration in Muslim majority countries. Inclusive financial services are beneficial to a country as a whole, especially for poorer individuals, giving them more access to investment and financing opportunities. Shari’ah law has guidelines for banking that Muslims must follow and many believe that commercial banks do not follow these guidelines. As many individuals cite religious reasons as their excuse for exclusion, there is potential to develop Islamic finance as a means of improving financial access in certain countries. The authors find that individuals from the countries in our study tend to be more religious and that there are potential economic and social benefits to an increase in Islamic banking in this region.

The paper examines recent debates on “Empire” and offers a feminist perspective. It asks: what are the gender dynamics of the new imperialism and its rival, Islamism? Drawing on world-system theory and feminist studies of international relations, this paper examines hegemonic masculinities in empire, war, and resistance; the cooptation of women's rights for neoliberal and expansionist purposes; the world-system's transition from U.S. hegemonic power to an alternative yet to be determined; and the role of global feminism in challenging Empire and shaping an alternative world.

The book chapter discusses the various leaders in postcolonial Egypt to understand their contributions to developing postcolonial Egypt. After the veiled independence, the first set of leaders in Egypt were surrogates of the imperial lords who had absolute power even when self-rule was granted. The true nationalists applied force to wrestle control from Britain and their surrogates. This started the institutionalization of force as a means for social change in Egypt. Almost all the rulers from 1952 to 2022 were either military or military personnel turned civilian. The ideological direction for Egypt was set after the 1952 coup that included Arabism, Africanism, and Islamism but excluded turning Egypt into an Islamic state. Some rulers attempted to circumvent this and turn Egypt into an Islamic state despite the nation's wish not to. They failed through the constant intervention of military personnel in governance. Egypt also suffered from a complete disconnect between the activities and successes of the ancient era and those of the colonial and postcolonial periods. The colonial lords truncated the progress made in the bygone era because it did not align with the motives for the occupation of Egypt. The postcolonial leaders had no link with the colonial because it was anti-Egyptian progress. Like all other African countries, all the criteria used in gauging the quality of governance and development showed that the performance of the postcolonial leaders was poor and left Egypt underdeveloped.

This paper aims to explore the significance of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia for wider questions of democratization, interrogating in particular the question of the relationship between religion and politics in the aftermath of the revolutionary event. The political landscape emerging after the 14th of January Tunisian Revolution has witnessed the emergence of a new political class competing in the country’s first free democratic elections on October 23. The moderate Islamist Ennahda Party emerged victorious and obtained the majority of seats in the National Constituent Assembly. These developments in the revolutionary aftermath re-opened questions over the future of “secular Tunisia” and re-ignited the political struggle between modernist and traditionalist visions of society. As a result, religious actors have increasingly been taking to the streets alongside the general population via participation in public protests, creation of new unions and associations, presence in the media, militancy in new or pre-existent political parties, etc. In this context, this research focuses on the way in which the 2011 uprisings impacted on democratization by seeking to explain how and why religious leaders are re-emerging as influential figures in the political landscape of post-revolutionary Tunisia.

Since the election of June 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran has witnessed a huge crisis with the outburst of street protests and demonstrations, challenging its validity. Indeed, it has been so intense that it has shaken the whole Islamic Republic for the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution. What has happened since the disputed election was an upheaval few had anticipated, an opening of Pandora's box, with millions daring to question the, Velayate Fagih, the most important constituent of the Islamic Republic. This postelection period has created a “revolutionary”’ potential that has so far been met with repressive force and violence on the part of the ruling elites leaving no leverage for compromise. Of course, in the 30 years since the revolution, the Islamic Republic's power structures have faced factionalism. These recent developments demonstrate how deeply rooted run the contradictions and differences between the various groups. This upheaval has thrown all sorts of questions into the air: could Iran remain as a Republic? Or would Iran turn into a God's Kingdom, ever more dictatorial in its approach? Or would the splits within the ruling elites continue to crack the fabric of the regime? Will there be a similar schism to that which took place during the Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century when a leading member of the clergy, Noori, was finally hanged in July 1909 for being openly against reform? Finally, what is the possibility of change beyond the Islamic Republic in Iran?

In 1993 and 1994 it was assumed that Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation would drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, in the period from 1994 to 1999, the peace process basically did not move forward. The first goal of this paper is to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian peace process stalled in this time period. The second goal of this paper is to suggest policies that could increase the likelihood of arriving at, and maintaining, a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the future. I argue that the failure of the peace process from 1994 to 1999 is related to the political rivalry between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, Hamas' lack of participation in the peace process, and the nature of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations. The interaction of these issues creates a highly unstable situation, resulting in periodical spells of Israeli-Palestinian violent conflict. I conclude a stable peace requires an independent Palestinian state with a capital in parts of East Jerusalem, a unified territory without Israeli extra-territorial enclaves, a fair share of natural resources, control over public policies, and an economy not integrated with that of Israel. The issue of Palestinian refugees must be resolved, but the return of refugees to Israel is not practical; a viable alternative is a financial settlement. In the short run, Israel should strengthen the Palestinian Authority by granting it tangible political gains. Hamas should be formally invited to participate in the peace process.

Iran neither produces the technology nor possesses the financial or the political capabilities that drive globalization. Yet in an interdependent world, with a political posture that is defiant of the hegemonic powers that are to a large extent in the driver seat of the bus of globalization, it has managed to survive. The political resiliency of the Islamic Republic since its inception in 1979 in face of formidable external threats, internal obstacles, and the challenges of a rapidly changing world in which it remains on the periphery, is a vexing question indeed. The regime has used the rhetoric and ideology of populism to remain defiant and shore up its “problematic” legitimacy.