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This paper aims to establish the relation between corporate governance – as represented by investor protection at both the legal and firm levels – and stock market liquidity.

This paper avails of the unique features of Hong Kong- and China-based stocks that are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange so as to test whether differences between “common law” and “civil law” legal environments contribute to differences in stock liquidity. In addition, by constructing an internal corporate governance index score for each firm based on board size, board independence and information on the audit and remuneration committee, we document whether firms with better corporate governance scores have narrower spreads, greater depth and higher trading volumes.

Overall, results provide support for a linkage between corporate governance issues – as investor rights protection at both the environment and firm protection levels – and stock market liquidity.

This paper recognizes that investor protection constitutes a single component of the desirability of investing in a firm’s stock. Nevertheless, it does appear to constitute an important component of a stock’s attractiveness.

The practical implications are clear, namely, that good corporate governance of firms leads to their attractiveness as investment vehicles (for both the shorter and the longer terms).

The paper has clear social implications. In particular, the paper serves to highlight that prospects for enduring wealth creation are contingent on the safeguards accorded to the equity ownership of a firm’s stock.

The originality lies in taking advantage of the unique features of the Chinese and Hong Kong firms on the Hong Kong Exchange, so as to examine the contrasting influences of common law and civil law on stock liquidity. Thus, the authors allow for the effects of corporate governance across the two legal environments (China and Hong Kong) to be compared and contrasted while maintaining other influences unchanged across Chinese and Hong Kong shares.

Credit Default Swap (CDS) trading alters equilibrium interactive monitoring of external corporate monitors due to a possible change in private lenders' incentive to monitor client firms. This study explores how audit fees change in response to CDS trade initiation on client firms and how this effect is moderated by investor protection.

With 6,052 cross-country firm observations, the author conducts estimations in the systems dynamic general methods of moments framework.

The author documents that audit fees rise on average after CDS trade initiations with and/or without investor protection. Meanwhile, change in auditors' risk perception result in increased audit costs when CDS trade initiation and investor protection interact. The effect of CDS trading on audit fees remain after controlling for firm, audit, and auditor features are robust to different proxies of audit cost.

The need for firms in high investor protection jurisdictions to initiate CDS trade to implement policies in order to maximize their gains from investor protection activities to lessen the overall impact of any increased audit cost that may arise. Furthermore, CDS regulation may be strategically targeted to lessen the effect of increased audit costs on firms after initiation. This would ensure that the resulting increase in audit cost may not materially impact the cash or profitability position of such firms.

This study is distinct from previous ones by focusing on variation in private lenders incentive to monitor after CDS trade initiation after controlling for possible monitoring by short-term creditors. Given that monitoring is not costless for private lenders and CDS trading on their borrowers causes a change in this cost structure, the author documents how auditors react to such changes in incentive to monitor.

信用違約互換交易會改變外部監督機制的均衡互動監測，這是因為私人貸款者去監控客戶公司的激勵可能有所改變。本研究擬探究審計費用如何改變，以應對向客戶公司進行的信用違約互換交易啟動;研究亦探討投資者保障、如何緩和上述的影響。

我們透過6,052個穿越全國的企業觀察，進行了對系統動力廣義矩估計體系的估測。

無論投資者保障存在與否，信用違約互換交易啟動必帶來審計費用一般的平均升高，我們已把這關聯記錄下來。同時，當信用違約互換交易啟動和投資者保障兩者互相影響時，審計員的風險認知的改變，是會導致審計費用增加的。若拔除公司和審計的影響，信用違約互換交易對審計費用的影響會保持不變;而且，就各個不同的審計費用代理權而言，審計員特點是牢固的。

本研究的結果，確定了若公司屬高投資者保護管轄權的類別，則有需要去啟動信用違約互換交易來實施政策，其目的為能從投資者保障的行動中取得最大的收益，從而減弱審計費用的增加所帶來的全面影響。再者，信用違約互換的管理或許可戰略性地訂立目標，俾能減弱於啟動後，審計費用的上昇對公司帶來的影響;這或會確保審計費用的增加、不會對有關公司的貨幣頭寸或盈利狀況產生重大的影響。

本研究有別於從前的研究，因它的焦點在於短期債權人可能的監督的影響給拔除的情況下，在信用違約互換交易啟動後，以監督為目的私人貸款者激勵的變化。鑒於對私人貸款者來說，監督不是不需要成本的;而且，為他們的借貸者的信用違約互換交易會為這個成本結構帶來變化，我們記錄了審計員如何對以監督為目的的激勵的有關改變作出回應。

Given the importance of both research and development (R&D) investments and dividend policy in the growth of firms, this paper examines the moderating effects of investor protection and other country-level governance mechanisms on the relationship between R&D investments and dividend payments in the firms from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS countries).

This empirical study uses a sample of 22,073 firm year observations from the BRICS countries over a period of 2008–2020 and employs both ordinary least squared (OLS) and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation methods. The GMM estimation controls for unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity and reduces estimation bias.

The findings indicate that although R&D intensity is negatively related with the cash dividend payments, with the interaction of investor protection and other country-level mechanisms the relationship between R&D intensity and dividend payments becomes positive. The results further show that investor protection has stronger impact on the relationship between R&D intensity and firm cash dividend payments than other selected country-level governance factors.

The research findings should encourage the policy makers in BRICS countries to strengthen investor protection and enhance quality of their institutions to make a right balance between retaining their growth potential and maintaining the value of the firms.

This is the first study to provide evidence of the moderating effects of investor protection and other country-level governance mechanisms on the relationship between R&D investments and dividend payments using the data from BRICS countries.

Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection.

Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer.

The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator.

Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection.

This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, including judicial system efficiency as a moderator to investigate the joint effects of both explanatory variables. Although prior studies have considered judicial system efficiency by examining de jure investor protection, this study identifies another useful proxy and explores de facto legal protection.

Ordinary least square multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of judicial efficiency, which was measured using the disposition time (DT) and legal origin, as a moderator of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance for a sample of 565 non-financial companies listed in Italy, France, Germany and Spain in 2013.

This paper shows that de facto investor protection ensured by an efficient judicial system is relevant to the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. As a moderator variable, DT strengthens the intensity of this relationship in countries with low judicial efficiency, showing that ownership concentration leads to a better enhancement of firm performance and is, therefore, a more efficient governance mechanism in countries in which investor protection is weak.

The evidence presented expands the understanding of the link between firm performance and ownership structure. The institutional deficiencies suggest that internal governance mechanisms may substitute for external mechanisms in facilitating efficient governance. This study corroborates policymakers’ concerns regarding the efficiency of judicial systems and their role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. The results suggest a need for more efficient external mechanisms of investor protection to facilitate investment in equity capital. Moreover, this study shows that DT is a more accurate measure of investor protection than the traditional measure of de jure legal protection.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the market risk (stock price return and volatility, exchange rate) and on the exchange rate and Treasury Bill during the financial crisis. In order to better clarify the firms’ resistance to financial crises, the effect of exchange rate, Treasury Bill and the market risk are also considered.

The study uses a sample data of the SBF 120 on a panel of 99 French firms over the period between 2006 and 2015 divided into three sub-periods: the first sub-period, which covers the period between December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2009, was characterized by the outbreak of the subprime crisis. The second sub-period considers the sovereign debt crisis in Europe between December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2012. The last sub-period includes the post-crisis period (December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2015). The GARCH and BEKK models are used to capture the effect of volatility and conditional heteroskedasticity of both corporate governance and market risk.

The paper found that during the financial crisis (first sub-period, the sovereign crisis period), the high shareholders’ protection had a positive and significant impact on the stock market returns. Furthermore, the shareholders’ protection, the Treasury Bill, the institutional investors, the board’s size, had a negative and significant effect on the stock returns volatility. During the post-crisis period, the high protection and the board’s size had a negative and significant effect on the volatility of the stock returns.

This result implies that during the financial crisis, the high shareholders’ protection played a role in increases the stock market return and minimized the stock return volatility.

This study helps in improving the legal protection of investors and helps managers, shareholders and investors to evaluate their investments. This study also provides implications for policymakers and legal environment in order to evaluate the importance of the current corporate governance frameworks in place.

This result implies that the institutional investors, as the results suggest, should follow the shareholders’ protection in all the countries to make decisions about their investments since the high shareholders’ protection increases the firm’s stock returns and decreases the stock return volatility.

The mounting focus on environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in business has sparked substantial curiosity in understanding the nexus between ESG and the companies’ strategic decisions. This study aims to investigate the influence of firms’ ESG disclosure scores on their dividend payout. Furthermore, it examines the nuanced dynamics of this relationship by exploring the moderating role of the country’s investor protection regulations and regulatory enforcement.

This study uses pooled ordinary least square regression with year, industry and country effects. It analyzes a balanced panel data set of 192 non-financial firms drawn from the primary equity indices of BRICS nations. This study examined the data of six years spanning 2015–2020.

The findings discover a significantly positive relationship between ESG scores and dividend payout ratio, conveying that firms with higher ESG scores allocate more of their profits as dividends. Furthermore, the finding reveals that country-level robust investor protection and effective regulatory enforcement mechanisms undermine the positive association between ESG ratings and payouts of dividends, suggesting that the ESG disclosure of firms operating in a setting characterized by enhanced investor safeguards and stricter regulatory oversight will exert less influence on their dividend decisions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to concentrate on the ESG–dividend nexus in the BRICS countries. Furthermore, this study used each country’s investor protection index and regulatory enforcement scores to comprehend the influence of country-level legal frameworks in shaping the relationship between ESG and dividend decisions, thus adding value to the existing literature on corporate sustainability.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and, second, to determine the moderating role of investor protection quality on the ownership concentration-performance relationship from a dynamic perspective.

The study is based on secondary financial data of 236 Indian manufacturing firms obtained from CAPITALINE database, pertaining to a period of five years. This study uses ordinary least squares, fixed effects and two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques to arrive at results.

Results of the study confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and a significant positive effect of investor protection quality on firm performance. With regard to moderating role of investor protection quality on ownership concentration–performance relationship, results show that investor protection quality would significantly moderate the ownership concentration–performance relationship.

The study is a pioneer in proving that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between ownership concentration and firm performance in an emerging market in general and India in particular. This study extends the corporate governance literature by examining ownership concentration–performance relationship in a dynamic perspective and in an unexplored market.

After Ma Yingjeou's re‐election in 2012, Mainland China and Taiwan will continue cooperation in economic fields. The purpose of this paper is to undertake research on a bilateral investment agreement (BIA) between Mainland China and Taiwan.

The paper uses statistics to demonstrate the growing cross‐strait investment and incompetent contemporary investment protection mechanisms in Mainland China and Taiwan. The paper also compares laws in Mainland China and Taiwan and the investment protection agreements concluded by Mainland and Taiwan with other countries, respectively.

Based on the similarities of current laws and the investment protection agreements concluded by Mainland China and Taiwan with other countries, respectively, Mainland China and Taiwan can possibility agree upon major provisions of a BIA. Solutions are provided to both macro and micro challenges against a successful BIA.

It is hard to predict whether the BIA will promote political integration between Mainland China and Taiwan in the near future.

A BIA can boost investors' confidence.

This paper may serve as a humble reference for both the Mainland China and Taiwan government when negotiating the BIA.

Cross‐strait investment is an important and prosperous field in practice, but has not been fully explored in literature thus far. This Article aims to fill this gap.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether gender diversity on board and financial expertise on audit committee affect accounting conservatism in banking sector. Additionally, the authors focus on the effects of board characteristics on bank earnings quality and examine their effects on earnings persistence.

The authors use a large sample of 159 banks from nine different countries from the period 2004-2010. The authors study whether the differences in the timeliness of earnings to bad news and earnings quality across governance structures of banks are driven by differences across investor protection and bank regulation levels in banks.

The findings confirm the monitoring role of both female and financial experts, noting a positive effect of them on accounting conservatism and earnings quality in banks. According to the institutional characteristics, the results suggest the complementary role of banking regulation and investor protection levels in these effects, noting that in contexts of higher regulatory and greater investor protection environments, gender diversity and financial expertise on boards have more influence on the conservatism and earnings quality of banks.

The authors contribute to both the accounting quality literature and the corporate governance literature by identifying board characteristics that are associated with higher conservatism and quality of earnings in banks around the world. In addition, this study also contributes to the ethics literature by highlighting the benefits of gender diversity and financial expertise in upholding the integrity of financial reporting. Moreover, this paper adds to prior literature about board of directors and accounting quality by identifying additional complementary factors – bank regulation and investor protection – and by focusing on a specific industry, the banking industry.