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This paper aims to investigate the link between agency costs mitigation via three levels of rights protection (minority rights protection, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency issues) provides the propitious climate for financing investment opportunities around the world.

We use Bartlett’s three-group method to stratify countries based on how well they protect investors as measured by the scores provided in the Doing Business dataset developed by the world bank for 189 countries. We then test a variety of independent hypotheses that the alleviation of agency costs via three levels of protection (minority investors’ rights, contract enforcement, resolving insolvency issues) is associated with better access to credit via the banking system, better valuation of listed firms via the stock market and higher investment and growth.

Our findings support Agency Theory which explains why the absence of legal protection of external investors leads to stock markets and financial institutions failing to fulfill their role of financing the economy.

The policy implication from this study indicates that countries ought to (1) develop legislation that protects investors’ rights, (2) improve the quality of their judicial system in terms of enforcing the legislation and (3) build the framework for resolving disputes during insolvency as these are important ingredients for a developed financial system.

We use the World bank dataset and a new methodology to quantify the significance of the relationship between minority rights protection, ineffective enforcement, lack of bankruptcy laws and access to firm financing via the banking sector and the stock market. It provides new evidence that the quality of the judicial system in a country matter for firms’ ability to raise financing and enhance value creation.

本文旨在探討一個假設，該假設為透過三級別權利保障（保障少數群體的權利、執行合同、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減會為世界各地的金融性投資機會提供良好的氣侯。

我們以巴特利特（Bartlett）的三組法把國家分組，分組方法是基於該國家保障投資者的程度，而保障程度是以世界銀行為189個國家而制定的營商資料集內提供的評分來衡量的。我們把國家分組後，便就各樣的獨立假設進行測試。這些假設是：透過三級別保障（保障少數股權投資者的權利、合同的執行、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減是連繫於透過銀行系統而產生的更佳信貸途徑，透過股市的更佳上市公司估值及更高的投資和增長。

研究結果証實了代理理論，該理論說明為何當外來投資者沒有得到法律保障時，結果會導致股票市場和金融機構不能履行其為經濟提供資金的角色。

本研究具有政策方面的意義，因研究顯示了國家應該：（1）設立保障投資者權利的法律；（2）在執行法律方面，改善其司法系統的素質；（3）建立解決破產時爭議的體系。這些是應該做的，因它們是一個已發展的金融體制的重要元素。

本文強調了一個保障投資者權利的法律環境所需的三個特定要素：對少數股權投資者權利的保障、有效的執行、有效的破產法律及透過銀行部門和股票市場而取得公司融資。這提供新的證據, 證實這三級別權利保障對公司籌集資金及提高價值創造的能力而言至為重要。

Credit Default Swap (CDS) trading alters equilibrium interactive monitoring of external corporate monitors due to a possible change in private lenders' incentive to monitor client firms. This study explores how audit fees change in response to CDS trade initiation on client firms and how this effect is moderated by investor protection.

With 6,052 cross-country firm observations, the author conducts estimations in the systems dynamic general methods of moments framework.

The author documents that audit fees rise on average after CDS trade initiations with and/or without investor protection. Meanwhile, change in auditors' risk perception result in increased audit costs when CDS trade initiation and investor protection interact. The effect of CDS trading on audit fees remain after controlling for firm, audit, and auditor features are robust to different proxies of audit cost.

The need for firms in high investor protection jurisdictions to initiate CDS trade to implement policies in order to maximize their gains from investor protection activities to lessen the overall impact of any increased audit cost that may arise. Furthermore, CDS regulation may be strategically targeted to lessen the effect of increased audit costs on firms after initiation. This would ensure that the resulting increase in audit cost may not materially impact the cash or profitability position of such firms.

This study is distinct from previous ones by focusing on variation in private lenders incentive to monitor after CDS trade initiation after controlling for possible monitoring by short-term creditors. Given that monitoring is not costless for private lenders and CDS trading on their borrowers causes a change in this cost structure, the author documents how auditors react to such changes in incentive to monitor.

信用違約互換交易會改變外部監督機制的均衡互動監測，這是因為私人貸款者去監控客戶公司的激勵可能有所改變。本研究擬探究審計費用如何改變，以應對向客戶公司進行的信用違約互換交易啟動;研究亦探討投資者保障、如何緩和上述的影響。

我們透過6,052個穿越全國的企業觀察，進行了對系統動力廣義矩估計體系的估測。

無論投資者保障存在與否，信用違約互換交易啟動必帶來審計費用一般的平均升高，我們已把這關聯記錄下來。同時，當信用違約互換交易啟動和投資者保障兩者互相影響時，審計員的風險認知的改變，是會導致審計費用增加的。若拔除公司和審計的影響，信用違約互換交易對審計費用的影響會保持不變;而且，就各個不同的審計費用代理權而言，審計員特點是牢固的。

本研究的結果，確定了若公司屬高投資者保護管轄權的類別，則有需要去啟動信用違約互換交易來實施政策，其目的為能從投資者保障的行動中取得最大的收益，從而減弱審計費用的增加所帶來的全面影響。再者，信用違約互換的管理或許可戰略性地訂立目標，俾能減弱於啟動後，審計費用的上昇對公司帶來的影響;這或會確保審計費用的增加、不會對有關公司的貨幣頭寸或盈利狀況產生重大的影響。

本研究有別於從前的研究，因它的焦點在於短期債權人可能的監督的影響給拔除的情況下，在信用違約互換交易啟動後，以監督為目的私人貸款者激勵的變化。鑒於對私人貸款者來說，監督不是不需要成本的;而且，為他們的借貸者的信用違約互換交易會為這個成本結構帶來變化，我們記錄了審計員如何對以監督為目的的激勵的有關改變作出回應。

The aim of this research is to contribute to the existing literature about the entrepreneurial conditions in crowd-based contexts by describing how different European countries regulate equity crowdfunding market in order to incentive the investments and protect investors.

Based on a legal acts' analysis, we conduct a qualitative study comparing the crowdfunding regulation addressed to investors. In particular, we focus our analysis on the European countries with the highest concentration of crowdfunding platforms (i.e. the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain).

The results show that some countries, such as the UK, Germany and France, present an investor-oriented approach based on non-restrictive regulation, while other countries, such as Spain and Italy, have a restrictive approach that protects investors excessively and discourages them. In particular, the case study of France shows how the introduction of unrestricted regulation can produce positive effects on the volume of crowdfunding transactions.

The paper is addressed to investors, policymakers and intermediaries (platforms) to help the first in orienting themselves between the different crowdfunding regulations and the latter in aligning and orchestrating rules and norms.

This is the first study that analyses the role of investor-oriented regulations in the promotion of entrepreneurship through the identification of four key factors to monitor equity crowdfunding regulations.

With the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), financial institutions are faced with many investor protection provisions; this has a major impact on the day-to-day operations of private banks, which provide investment services to predominately retail or non-professional investors. The purpose of this paper is to determine how MiFID provisions regarding investor protection with respect to suitability are complied with in practice by private banks.

Based on interviews with 25 representatives of private banks from 10 different European Union (EU) member states, the researchers have determined how these provisions are fulfilled and associated risks mitigated. Mapping out the suitability requirements of MiFID and comparing them with how these have been operationalised, we arrive at the question of whether this leads to a level playing field and investor protection by different private banks.

Although MiFID is trying to achieve a level playing field between the EU member states, this study shows that this has not been achieved in all areas. Investor protection requirements from MiFID are interpreted and operationalised differently. Although these differences are sometimes small, sometimes they are larger and affect the way the investor is served and suitability determined.

This research provides a unique insight into the way private banks in Europe have implemented the MiFID II requirements and gives insight into best practices. For the future, this research can serve as a prelude to in-depth follow-up research on the implementation of EU provisions.

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent of alteration institutional characteristics, i.e. legal origin and corruption levels, may have on the signaling effects of auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on initial public offering (IPO) initial returns in OECD countries.

Cross-sectional data composed of 6,182 IPOs from 30 OECD countries are used for 2003-2012. Ordinary least square with multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that the legal framework and corruption level of a country alters the signaling effects of underwriters’ reputation, auditors’ reputation and ownership retention in an IPO environment. These three variables mitigate information asymmetry, signal firm value to potential investors and ultimately decrease IPO initial returns. This relationship is more significant in the civil law countries. Corruption levels negatively moderate the relationship in the common law and Scandinavian civil law countries but have no significance in the German and French civil law countries, indicating the importance of the signaling variables in these two civil law countries.

This study examines the extent of the alterations that the legal framework and the corruption levels cause to the signaling relationship between auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on IPO initial returns in selected OECD countries.

This paper aims to empirically verify the impact of the mandatory dividend law on the investment of publicly traded companies.

The sample includes 212,595 observations from publicly traded companies from 47 different countries over the period from 2000 to 2016. The authors estimated a regression model by panel data methods to show the impact of the mandatory dividend on firm’s investment, more specifically in their sensitivities of investment to cash flow and to growth opportunities. In addition, the average treatment effect on the treated was estimated through sample matching.

The results indicate that the mandatory dividend have a direct and indirect impact on corporate investment.

Legislators and economic agents can use the results of the present research to evaluate the continuity or implementation of this legal mechanism (mandatory dividend) to evaluate economic moments favorable to its use or to create different legal rules to smooth the impact of this mechanism on the investment of companies.

The paper discusses the rationale for a widespread reliance on Codes of Conduct (CoC) in European crowdfunding through the lenses of economic theories of self-regulation. By analysing the institutional design of CoCs in crowdfunding, the paper illustrates the differences in their regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement. It offers the first systematic overview of substantial rules of CoCs in crowdfunding.

A comparative case study of nine CoCs in Europe is used to illustrate differences in their institutional design and discern the economic purpose of the CoC.

The institutional design of different CoCs in Europe mainly supports voluntary theories of self-regulation. In particular, the theory of reputation commons has the most explanatory power. The substantial rules of CoC in different markets show the potential sources of market failure through the perspectives of platforms.

CoCs appear in various regulatory, cultural, and industry contexts of different countries. Some of the institutional design features of CoC might be a result of these characteristics.

Crowdfunding associations wishing to develop their own CoC may learn from a comparative overview of key provisions.

For governments in Europe, contemplating creating or revising bespoke crowdfunding regimes, the paper identifies areas where crowdfunding platforms perceive market failure.

This paper is the first systematic study of self-regulatory institutions in European crowdfunding. The paper employs a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-regulation in crowdfunding and provides a comparison of a regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement of different CoCs in Europe.

Both the academic literature and practitioners have long noted the need for an equity investment mechanism for worker-controlled firms that alleviates investor anxieties without undermining internal workplace democracy. The purpose of this paper is to outline one such possible mechanism.

The proposal locks together the interests of workers and external investors, via non-voting shares with dividends set by a pre-agreed value-added sharing formula. Each worker is paid a base wage, with the average across the firm being a pre-defined multiple of the national minimum wage. Any additional surplus is split into a number of equal “slices”, with each share receiving one slice as its dividend, and the average worker receiving a pre-agreed number of slices as a bonus.

Workers have an incentive to maximise their own incomes, and in so doing, will also automatically maximise the dividends received by investors, obviating the need for the shares to have normal voting rights. Working on this principle of aligned interests, the authors also discuss reinvestment, worker ownership of non-voting shares and possibilities for a secondary share market. The authors show how this proposal will be a significant step in aligning the interests of investors with owner-workers in a democratic, negotiated way that shares both risk and returns, thus making worker-controlled firms more attractive to equity investment.

In light of the recognised problem of underinvestment in worker-controlled firms and the risk of their degeneration, this paper will interest both academics and practitioners in employee ownership, co-operatives and various forms of workplace democracy.

In the European Union, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS IV) requires fund management companies to provide a Key Investor Information Document (UCITS KIID) for investors. This papers uses archival data from the Finnish mutual fund market to test how the regulation's information disclosure requirements concerning past performance, risk and fund fees are associated with mutual fund flows.

The study uses archival data on the mutual funds market in Finland to test how the regulation relating to retail investors' information requirements is associated with mutual fund flows.

Our findings suggest that the UCITS KIID predicts retail investors' fund flows. While past performance is associated with fund flows throughout the observation period, retail investors appear to have become more sensitive to fund fees and invest in less risky funds following the adoption of the UCITS IV period.

Information relating to fund fees and risk appears to be relevant to retail investors, which should be acknowledged in future iterations of short-form disclosure and in mutual fund marketing.

This paper is the first to assess the significance of KIID in actual market environment.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership structure on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions of Brazilian listed companies.

This paper is an applied and explanatory research based on secondary data. The sample is comprises non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2007. Considering that the dependent variable is binary, the authors estimate panel data logistic regression models. Considering the existence of conflicts of interest among those who have the decision-making power and the supplier of capital for M&A transactions, they draw upon the Agency Theory to develop the theoretical hypotheses.

The results show that, for a sample of Brazilian non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa (B3), from 1998 to 2007, Brazilian firms present, on average, a highly concentrated ownership structure and the major controlling shareholders are families or the State. These characteristics are negatively related to the likelihood of M&A transactions, as most of these controlling shareholders are reluctant to adopt mechanisms that reduce their control.

With regard to the limitations, this study considered only the M&A definitions as stated by the Bureau van Dijk database. In this sense, future studies may analyze the effects of ownership structure based on other M&A definitions and typologies. In addition, the study is limited to the period from 1998 to 2007, which is prior to the international financial crisis. Future studies may extend the analysis period to include the post-crisis period (2008) to check if there are differences in M&A strategies before and after the crisis.

From a managerial perspective, the results show that minority shareholders have little or no influence over an M&A decision, so they cannot decide on the use of resources for fast growth and access to new markets through M&A. Thus, the investment decision must take into account the nature and the quality of the controlling shareholder.

This study shows a significant and negative effect of ownership concentration on the likelihood of M&A transactions. In part, this result demonstrates the importance of understanding the behavior of controlling shareholders before inferring on other key aspects that the M&A literature tends to make fundamental in explaining M&A decisions in publicly traded companies, particularly, in an environment of low minority shareholder protection.

Previous studies have partly found that the M&A decision is motivated by individual advantages obtained from increasing the size of the firm, or from managerial hubris. The results show that these hypotheses do not hold in the Brazilian context. Moreover, the results indicate that M&A decisions are associated with the characteristics of the controlling shareholder, their level of ownership concentration and their typology, contributing to the agency debate on whether the incentive or the entrenchment effect prevails in the context of the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, particularly, in an institutional environment of low shareholder protection.