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This paper aims to explain the fundraising and valuation processes of startups and discuss the conflicts of interest between entrepreneurs, venture capital (VC) firms and stakeholders in the context of startup corporate governance. Further, this paper uses the examples of WeWork and Zenefits to explain how a failure of stakeholders to demand an external audit from an independent accounting firm in early stages of funding led to an opportunity for fraud.

The methodology used is a literature review and analysis of startup valuation combined with the Fraud Triangle Theory. This paper also provides a discussion of WeWork and Zenefits, both highly visible examples of startup fraud, and explores an increased role for independent external auditors in fraud risk mitigation on behalf of stakeholders prior to an initial public offering (IPO).

This paper documents a number of fraud risks posed by the “fake it till you make it” ethos and investor behavior and pricing in the world of entrepreneurial finance and VC, which could be mitigated by a greater awareness of startup stakeholders of the value of an external audit performed by an independent accounting firm prior to an IPO.

An implication of this paper is that regulators should consider greater oversight of the startup financing process and potentially take steps to facilitate greater independence of participants in the IPO process.

Given the potential conflicts of interest between VC firms, investment banks and startup founders, the investors at the time of an IPO may be exposed to the risk that the shares of the IPO firms are overvalued at offering.

This study demonstrates how startup practices can be extended to the Fraud Triangle and issue a call to action for the accounting profession to take a greater role in protecting the public from startup fraud. This study then offers recommendations for regulators and standards entities.

There are few academic papers in the financial crime literature that link the valuation and culture of startup firms with fraud risk. This study provides a concise explanation of the process of valuation for startups and highlights the considerations for stakeholders in assessing fraud risk. In addition, this study documents an emerging role for auditors as stewards of proper valuation for pre-IPO firms.

The purpose of this paper is to study and describe several biases in investment decision-making through the review of research articles in the area of behavioral finance. It also includes some of the analytical and foundational work and how this has progressed over the years to make behavioral finance an established and specific area of study. The study includes behavioral patterns of individual investors, institutional investors and financial advisors.

The research papers are analyzed on the basis of searching the keywords related to behavioral finance on various published journals, conference proceedings, working papers and some other published books. These papers are collected over a period of year’s right from the time when the most introductory paper was published (1979) that contributed this area a basic foundation till the most recent papers (2016). These articles are segregated into biases wise, year-wise, country-wise and author wise. All research tools that have been used by authors related to primary and secondary data have also been included into our table.

A new era of understanding of human emotions, behavior and sentiments has been started which was earlier dominated by the study of financial markets. Moreover, this area is not only attracting the, attention of academicians but also of the various corporates, financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs thus adding to its importance. The study is more inclined toward the study of individual and institutional investors and financial advisors’ investors but the behavior of intermediaries through which some of them invest should be focused upon, narrowing down population into various variables, targeting the expanding economies to reap some unexplained theories. This study has identified 17 different types of biases and also summarized in the form of tables.

The study is based on some of the most recent findings to have a quick overview of the latest work carried out in this area. So far very few extensive review papers have been published to highlight the research work in the area of behavioral finance. This study will be helpful for new researches in this field and to identify the areas where possible work can be done.

Practical implication of the research is that companies, policymakers and issuers of securities can watch out of investors’ interest before issuing securities into the market.

Under the Social Implication, investors can recognize several behavioral biases, take sound investment decisions and can also minimize their risk.

The essence of this paper is the identification of 17 types of biases and the literature related to them. The study is based on both, the literature on investment decisions and the biases in investment decision-making. Such study is less prevalent in the developing country like India. This paper does not only focus on the basic principles of behavioral finance but also explain some emerging concepts and theories of behavioral finance. Thus, the paper generates interest in the readers to find the solutions to minimize the effect of biases in decision-making.

The purpose of this paper is to study if actively managed exchange-traded funds (AMETFs) and actively managed mutual funds (AMMFs) are complements or substitutes. It also tests if there are tax or liquidity clientele effects.

The study investigates the relation between individual AMMF flows and aggregate AMETF flows as well as individual AMETF flows and aggregate AMMF flows. A 2013 tax change is used to analyze if a tax clientele effect exists between the AMETF and AMMF markets. The authors use differences in investor groups for institutional vs retail fund share classes to test for liquidity clientele effects.

The authors find that equity and mixed AMETFs and AMMFs are substitutes, although not perfect substitutes. Taxation-related differences between the two products create a clientele effect for fixed income and mixed funds where tax-sensitive investors are more likely to substitute AMETFs for AMMFs surrounding tax increases. There is weak evidence that institutional investors may prefer AMETFs more than retail investors because of their enhanced liquidity.

This is the first study to investigate the flow relation between AMETFs and AMMFs. The fast-paced growth of the AMETF area coupled with the substitutability between the two products and tax advantages of AMETFs has the capability to gain significant market share from AMMFs in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how an understanding of the alignment of goals of customers, employees and investors can aid in the partner selection process. The paper explains the opportunities and challenges offered by a keen examination of a restrained stakeholder view of the firm. It also explains the relational challenges of partner selection together with the interactive effects of these variables.

The design uses secondary data focused on customers, employees and investors’ goals and their alignment with sustainable development goals (SDGs). Consumer behaviour data on issues related to SDGs, research on employee’s work motivation and the goals of investors, both institutional and individual, are investigated.

To develop effective public–private partnerships (PPPs), the goals and behaviours of both parties must be recognised, considered and addressed. The goals and priorities of these entities are not always well aligned with SDG goals. In selecting partners, non-government organisations will benefit from recognising the differing goals of stakeholders and common ground for actions.

The model examines only three stakeholder groups: consumers, investors and employees.

A selection process based on a solid understanding of key stakeholders can offer the necessary information to target partners that are more likely to succeed in implementing strategies geared towards the SDGs.

While PPPs have the potential to be successful, to achieve significant gains in advancing the SDG agenda, there must be “buy-in” from relevant stakeholders associated with the partnerships.

The paper addresses some issues seldom addressed in SDG PPP writing.

Value‐based management theories have fallen short in practice, especially when it comes to investor strategy.

Value‐based management theories have fallen short in practice, especially when it comes to investor strategy.

Big Bang, the deregulation of the London Stock Exchange in October of 1986, was accompanied by changed industry structure, altered regulatory environment, and new trading practices. In particular, trading was automated, and the floor of the Exchange was rapidly abandoned. Such massive discontinuities have produced opportunities in other industries. Although they may prove temporary, opportunities are arising to seek competitive advantage in London. Given the information‐intensive nature of securities trading, and the great differences in resources and experience with technology enjoyed by different firms, many of these advantages will entail the use of information technology.

The turbulent decade of the 1980s completely restructured the financial system of the 1990s. Deregulation and rising competition led to record numbers of failures among depository institutions in the U.S., especially savings and loan associations. These failures have caused tremendous taxpayer losses, which are estimated at around $200 billion in present value terms. Financial markets became increasingly volatile, with increased price movements in bond, stock, and currency markets. These events triggered both public and private sector responses, including increased regulatory standards for safety and soundness and financial innovation. Additionally, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, now known as the New Independent States (NIS), as well as the trend toward trading blocks, including the continuing process of European unification and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, have greatly increased the demand for growth capital in a global sense.

Takes a random sample of 156 respondents from municipal and rural police forces in Canada to examine the relationship between various factors concerning their careers. Finds that a significant number of officers perceive their career orientation to have changed over time. Presents findings on social activists, enforcers, careerists, specialists and self investors. Differs from previous research linking career orientation to personality type by seeing career orientation as changing with time, stages of career and circumstances. Remarks that policing needs to be technically sophisticated, cost‐effective, community‐based and sensitive to the realities of a multicultural society. Recommends that police departments consider the career orientation of recruits and establish a reward structure suited to the varied career types

The purpose of this paper is to examine investors’ propensity to litigate when harmful events occur subsequent to accounting choices. Consistent with Culpable Control Theory, the authors find that investors are more likely to pursue litigation against management when managers are perceived to have more financial reporting flexibility, such as when they apply imprecise, principles-based accounting guidance. Investors are more likely to pursue litigation when they find management more responsible for harmful events, and they find management more responsible for those events when they perceive management to have more reporting flexibility. To provide additional insight, the authors investigate how the relationship between reporting flexibility and assessed manager responsibility is mediated by investors’ perceptions of management’s self-interested behavior. The authors consider monetary and non-monetary motivations for litigation against management such as recouping financial losses and punishing management. The results suggest that recouping financial losses is not the sole motivation for litigation. The authors provide evidence that punishing management is an important non-monetary component of the litigation decision. The results contribute to the limited literature on investor litigation decisions and inform the debate surrounding the potential effects of more principles-based accounting standards.

The authors test the hypotheses using an experiment with a 2×1 between-subjects design in which the authors manipulate reporting flexibility at two levels by varying the precision of accounting guidance and measure all other variables of interest. Participants are 82 part-time executive MBA program students at a major public university in the USA. Most participants work full-time (94 percent), own or have owned stocks either directly or through retirement plans (84 percent), indicate general investment knowledge (97 percent), and report high levels of familiarity with corporate financial statements, including balance sheets and income statements (92 percent). Thus, the authors conclude that these executive MBA students are reasonable surrogates for investors.

Consistent with the predictions, perceived management reporting flexibility affects investors’ propensity to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events such as investor losses, employee job losses, and economic losses suffered by a community mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. As predicted, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. This result suggests that the litigation decision is driven at least in part by corporate governance goals such as the desire for retribution or punishment of management. The second experiment provides additional support for the theory that the desire to punish management is an important component of investors’ litigation decisions.

The research makes important contributions to the literature on investor litigation and to the ongoing debate regarding principles- vs rules-based accounting standards. While some archival research addresses the conditions under which securities litigation occurs, little empirical research has directly addressed the investor decision to litigate. The paper provides additional evidence to address the question of why investors litigate. By doing so, the authors add to the debate on the desirability of shifting from more rules-based to more principles-based accounting standards.

The theory tested in this study could be used to design mechanisms to mitigate the differential propensity for investors to litigate under differing accounting regimes. As standard setters discuss a move to more principles-based standards in the USA, some observers have expressed concern that investor litigation will increase. The theory suggests that if the standard-setting body can control perceptions of management reporting flexibility such that investors believe principles-based standards provide no more flexibility than rules-based standards, they can limit an increase in the amount of investor litigation.

The authors contribute to theory by providing evidence regarding why investors desire to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. Furthermore, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. Those findings provide theoretical contributions to the literature.