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This conceptual paper focuses on a common observation in the implementation stage of reward-based crowdfunding (RBC) – entrepreneurs' failures and delays in delivery of rewards to investors, which, in turn, may be perceived as violations of reward delivery obligations.

Drawing on entrepreneurial personality theory and psychological contract theory, this paper develops propositions and identifies factors related to both entrepreneurs (overconfidence and narcissism) and factors related to investors (types of motivators and psychological contracts) that may explain the perceived violations of reward delivery obligations. Implications for theory and practice are also discussed.

The theoretical analysis, by wielding two independently developed literatures, has demonstrated that it is important to investigate factors that are related to both investors and entrepreneurs in understanding issues and challenges at different stages of the RBC model. The authors believe that the current analysis provides an integrated understanding and a solid foundation for researchers to further examine these issues by empirically testing these propositions.

The authors examined two previously understudied psychological factors in the context of RBC – entrepreneurial traits, mainly overconfidence and narcissism, and the type of psychological contracts formed between investors and entrepreneurs, both of which, according to McKenny et al. (2017), need greater attention from researchers studying crowdfunding.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and clarify “irrationality” problem through the maritime industry practices and leading incentives behind common investors.

This paper includes a review of broader business and economics literature; review of shipping business practices and detection of institutional pathways and misleading mechanisms behind the irrational preferences; investigation of data (for some arguments); and introduction of a theoretical approach.

There are several industry practices and norms well established and followed by decision makers, which may cause and initiate illogical and irrational (long-run) preferences. Short-termism is an erroneous habit of common shipping investors, which is embedded and forced through traditional financial math (i.e. discounted cash flow), financial system (e.g. initial public offerings with high-frequency transactions, interest rate governance and asset valuation mechanism) or flawed contracting tradition (i.e. commission bias).

Both shipping business and financial institutions need to redesign their working mechanisms, evaluation systems, risk detection and assessment procedures. As discussed in Section 4.7, commission-based (float) services must be converted to regular flat rate payments with long-term contracts to protect investors from rational choices of intermediaries in the short-run which encourages investor’s irrationality. Having a long-term service contract will also improve sustainability of intermediaries and lower their business risk (win-win).

The impact of this paper is two-fold. First, it raises critical questions about professional decay and drawbacks of some traditional instruments in the shipping business. For the first time, this paper emphasises on various challenges which deteriorate credibility of the industry and causes ill-defined investments. Some arguments have extreme priority for strengthening the foundations of the industry. Second, this paper establishes a new stream of scholarly research highlighting weaknesses of conventional economic approach and demand for outsourcing other schools of economics (e.g. institutional and behavioural) into the shipping business.

Many entrepreneurs want to reach high to the heavens to achieve unlimited success. These hardworking, often underappreciated, venturers often crave fame and fortune as they strive to create their personal business legacy. One strategic path many have wandered down is that of the Initial Public Offering (IPO), whereby shares of the company are sold to the public. The IPO has many strong attractions. Large amounts of capital can be brought into the company.The company's stock can be used as currency to acquire other companies. Early investors realize a good ROI. Employees can perceive real value in their stock options. Customers, banks, vendors, and other stakeholders pay more respect to the company. Is this truly the entrepreneurʼs nirvana? Or is it a case of “Be careful of what you wish for because it may really come true?” Read on.

Most entrepreneurs are continually concerned about their finances. Their companies perhaps not yet profitable, they may have a fear of “running out of dry powder.” These entrepreneurs often have fallen in love with their company's technologies, products, and potential markets, but they require more resources. Invariably these emerging ventures shroud their fear of the grueling capital raising marathon by presenting voluminous business plans to potential investors. They often flaunt their “optimized business models.”” Investors, however, typically want to know why the potential investment is such a good deal. The entrepreneur often wants guidance regarding what to say to whom in a changing financing environment.

In this article, our “Practitioner's Corner” associate editor Joe Levangie collaborates with a long-time colleague Paul Broude to address how businesses should “make their capital-raising initiatives happen.” Levangie, a venture advisor and entrepreneur, first worked with Broude, a business and securities attorney, in 1985 when they went to London to pursue financing for an American startup. They successfully survived all-night drafting sessions, late-night clubbing by the company founder, and even skeet shooting and barbequing at the investment banker's country house to achieve the first “Greenfield” flotation by an American company on the Unlisted Securities Market of the London Stock Exchange. To ascertain how the entrepreneur can determine what financing options exist in today's investing climate, read on.

The theory presented suggests that underwriters are both advisors and independent agents in the issuerʼs attempt to send “signals” of quality to investors by making pre-IPO organizational changes. These pre-IPO gambits are intended to increase IPO proceeds, and preemptively address potential investor concerns that would deter them from subscribing. These organizational changes initially can financially benefit founders, early investors and underwriters. But they can also have a longterm impact that some issuers, especially founders, would prefer to avoid. Utilizing signaling and resource-based power, we find that underwriter power is significantly associated with making pre-IPO gambits and lower levels of underpricing.

This study explores the variance in investor responses to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of firms, as influenced by information sources and investor types.

This study applies a short-term event study and cross-sectional analysis with unique CSR datasets obtained from newspaper articles and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.

Investor reactions are significantly shaped by their sources of information. Individual investors are found to predominantly respond to accessible news announcements, whereas institutional investors show heightened sensitivity to adverse news from both scrutinized sources. Foreign investors, mirroring institutional investors' patterns, uniquely react positively to index additions.

Investors’ assessment of CSR activities varies due to the differing sources of information obtained; further, it is affected by the type of investor.

The findings guide public relation managers in strategizing CSR communication toward diverse investor types. This includes recommending targeted approaches for Japanese individual investors through newspapers and TV, exercising caution in disseminating adverse news to Japanese institutions, and promoting and justifying CSR actions to foreign investors. It underscores the need for a strategic investor relations frameworks that considers accessibility, literacy, and investors' interests.

This study examines the relationship between sources of information for CSR activities and investors’ responses, an area under-represented in the literature. The author uses CSR announcement data, collected from newspapers to make the results more accurate and relevant.

Despite its devastating nature, the COVID-19 pandemic has also catalyzed a substantial surge in the adoption and integration of technological tools within economies, exerting a profound influence on the dissemination of information among participants in stock markets. Consequently, this present study delves into the ramifications of post-pandemic dynamics on stock market behavior. It also examines the relationship between investors' sentiments, underlying behavioral drivers and their collective impact on global stock markets.

Drawing upon data spanning from 2012 to 2023 and encompassing major world indices classified by Morgan Stanley Capital International’s (MSCI) market and regional taxonomy, this study employs a threshold regression model. This model effectively distinguishes the thresholds within these influential factors. To evaluate the statistical significance of variances across these thresholds, a Wald coefficient analysis was applied.

The empirical results highlighted the substantive role that investors' sentiments and behavioral determinants play in shaping the predictability of returns on a global scale. However, their influence on developed economies and the continents of America appears comparatively lower compared with the Asia–Pacific markets. Similarly, the regions characterized by a more pronounced influence of behavioral factors seem to reduce their reliance on these factors in the post-pandemic landscape and vice versa. Interestingly, the post COVID-19 technological advancements also appear to exert a lesser impact on developed nations.

This study pioneers the investigation of these contextual dissimilarities, thereby charting new avenues for subsequent research studies. These insights shed valuable light on the contextualized nexus between technology, societal dynamics, behavioral biases and their collective impact on stock markets. Furthermore, the study's revelations offer a unique vantage point for addressing market inefficiencies by pinpointing the pivotal factors driving such behavioral patterns.

In this paper, we analyze the trading patterns of investors around the bubble events selected for stocks traded in Korean Stock Market from 1999 to 2013, whose holding period returns exceed 200% for 250 trading days prior to the event and then drop subsequently below -50% thereafter for the next 250 trading days. We examine whether individual investors, commonly known as noise traders, drive the bubbles, and whether institutional investors and foreign investors, known as informed traders, take an arbitrage position to shrink the pricing errors or ride the bubbles to maximize their profits. We also examine whether individual investors suffer losses due to their disposition effect even after the bubble bursts.

Major findings of this paper are as follows : First, we find that individual investors are actually shown to drive the bubbles in our full sample, whereas the burst of the bubbles are largely driven by institutional investors and foreign investors. In particular, it is shown for large-cap stocks that foreign investors take the lead in raising the price at an early stage of the bubbles and then institutional investors follow them until the bubble peak point. Second, for mid-cap and large-cap stocks, institutional investors are found to ride the bubbles from about 75 days prior to the bubble peak point, when foreign investors reverse their trades and start selling to realize profits. Such bubble riding behavior of institutional investors is consistent with the synchronization risk model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003), where it is optimal for informed traders to ride the bubbles until all of informed traders start selling at the bubble peak point. Third, individual investors are found to suffer losses as they keep buying the bubble stocks even after the bubble bursts due to their disposition effect.

In this paper, we analyze the effect of investor attention level on expected return in the Korean stock market by investor type. We find that the risk-adjusted excess returns in the next period are significantly higher when the institutional and foreign investor’s attention is high. In other words, investment strategies that buy stocks in higher attention groups and sell those in lower attention groups provide significant excess returns. This result is in contrast to the argument that the market operates more competitively and moves more efficiently as the number of investors increases due to the increased investor attention. Next, we examine how the degree of attention of institutional, individual, and foreign investors affects each other. The analysis reveals that the attention of individual investors affects the attention of institutional investors in the next period, and vice versa. In addition, as a result of group analysis according to the size of company and stock price, we find that the investor's attention affects the market differently depending on the type of investors and stock price level.

Using the next-day and next-week returns of stocks in the Korean market, we examine the association of option volume ratios – i.e. the option-to-stock (O/S) ratio, which is the total volume of put options and call options scaled by total underlying equity volume, and the put-call (P/C) ratio, which is the put volume scaled by total put and call volume – with future returns. We find that O/S ratios are positively related to future returns, but P/C ratios have no significant association with returns. We calculate individual, institutional, and foreign investors’ option ratios to determine which ratios are significantly related to future returns and find that, for all investors, higher O/S ratios predict higher future returns. The predictability of P/C depends on the investors: institutional and individual investors’ P/C ratios are not related to returns, but foreign P/C predicts negative next-day returns. For net-buying O/S ratios, institutional net-buying put-to-stock ratios consistently predict negative future returns. Institutions’ buying and selling put ratios also predict returns. In short, institutional put-to-share ratios predict future returns when we use various option ratios, but individual option ratios do not.