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Purpose: In reality, financial decisions are made under conditions of asymmetric information that results in either favorable or adverse selection. As far as financial decisions affect growth of the firm, the latter must also be affected by either favorable or adverse selection. Therefore, the core objective of this chapter is to examine the determinants of each financial decision and the effects on growth of the firm under conditions of information asymmetry.

Design/Methodology/Approach: This chapter uses data for the non-financial firms listed in S&P 500. The data cover quarterly periods from 1989 to 2014. The statistical tests include linearity, fixed, and random effects and normality. The generalized method of moments estimation method is employed in order to examine the relative significance and contribution of each financial decision on growth of the firm, respectively. Standard and proposed proxies of information asymmetry are discussed.

Findings: The results conclude that there is a variation in the impact of financial variables on growth of the firm at high and low levels of information asymmetry especially regarding investment and financing decisions. A similar picture emerges in the cases of firm size and industry effects. In addition, corporate dividen d policy has a similar effect on firm growth across all asymmetric levels. These findings prove that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the relationship between corporate financial decisions and growth of the firm. Finally, the results contribute to the vast literature on the estimation of information asymmetry by demonstrating that the classical and standard proxies for information asymmetry are not consistent in terms of the ability to differentiate between favorable or adverse selection (which corresponds to low and high level of information asymmetry).

Originality/Value: This chapter contributes to the related literature in two ways. First, this chapter offers updated empirical evidence on the way that financing, investment, and dividends decisions are made under conditions of favorable and adverse selection. Other related studies deal with each decision separately. Second, the study offers new proxies for measuring information asymmetry in order to reach robust estimates of the effects of financial decisions on growth of the firm under conditions of agency problems.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are arguably one of the CEOs greatest challenges, and there is a critical need to get these decisions right. It is clear that no single theory is adequate to describe or inform how M&A are evaluated in uncertain conditions, but there are several that offer partial explanations or at least contribute toward our understanding of how managers can deal with the uncertain environment and assess the likely risks associated with M&A. The literature suggests how relevant theories might be aggregated to make sense of strategic investment decision and investment appraisal techniques in an organizational context and considers the implications for further research in this important area of M&A. This chapter focuses on strategic investment appraisal, and draws together a variety of theoretical perspectives, especially from the field of psychology, which may be unfamiliar to both scholars in and practitioners.

This study examines the effects of narcissism and bonus-based incentive plans on managerial decision-making performance. Using an experiment, the authors first examine decision choices under two levels of an incentive threshold (high and low). Narcissism is measured using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). Typically, the NPI is used as a single monolithic construct in analyses; however, in this study, the authors subdivide it in two ways to gain more nuanced information about its impact on decision making. First, the authors split the NPI into three levels – high, medium, and low (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015), and then decompose it into its adaptive and maladaptive components (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, 2011) to examine how these subdivisions affect performance. Results show that the different levels of incentive thresholds affect performance among narcissistic individuals. Results indicate that individuals higher in narcissism and higher in levels of adaptive and maladaptive narcissism outperform their low-trait counterparts in a lower-threshold environment, but not in a high threshold environment.

Mergers and acquisitions strategies are not risk-free, potential problems in achieving success include integration difficulties, inadequate evaluation of target, inability to achieve synergy, and complexity. Such strategies can fail for many reasons including inadequate evaluation of targets or inadequate pre-decision control mechanisms. Mergers and acquisitions are reviewed in this chapter as strategic investment decision-making perspective. Established financial analyses remain important in appraising investment choices, despite their limiting assumptions and their recognised shortcomings in capturing strategic project dimensions. However, managers balance these economic analyses with less-structured, strategic analyses underpinned by informed judgement. The fact that empirical studies reveal a continued reliance on judgement by investment decision-makers does not mean that rational economic analysis is a futile exercise. What studies of practice do seem to suggest is that the theory and practice of strategic investment decision-making need to take into account both economically rational and intuitive decision processes. Reflecting on the research evidence, we conclude that strategic investment appraisal will be best supported by approaches that (i) couple sound economic analysis with the development of managerial judgement and (ii) take account of the broader decision-making context within which both economic and strategic analyses are used.

This is an acceptable fact that firms put efforts to maximize shareholders wealth but there is growing demand that firms are also accountable to various stakeholders associated directly or indirectly with the firms' business activities. Investors now evaluate firm's performance not only from financial perspective but also consider environment, social, and governance (ESG) factors when taking investment decision. ESG is not visible in firm's annual financial reports but investors do not deny its significance when valuing firms. There are increasing interests in ESG by communities, professionals, and government bodies, and all are interested to keep it as part of firms' regular activity and have to relate it with firm performance and efficiency that affects firm value. Still, there are difficulties in integration of ESG factors into investment decision-making, but efforts are being put to overcome all the issues. Firms which consider ESG are in a good position to achieve their long-term financial goals as they are likely to attract capital, lower borrowing costs, mitigate risks, and maximize shareholders value.

This study examines whether the source from which nonprofessional investors obtain corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure influences their investment-related judgments and decisions and whether that influence depends on the company's financial performance. In an experiment, we find an asymmetrical effect of information source that varies with financial performance. In particular, information source affects investors' management credibility judgments when the firm announces unfavorable earnings result but not when the announced result is favorable. The mediation analysis reveals that investors' management credibility judgments mediate the joint effect of information source and financial performance on investors' investment decisions. Our findings highlight that the effectiveness of CSR communication can be complicated and that investors are sensitive to other factors that exist in the communication setting, such as the context in which CSR is disclosed (contextual factor) and information source of CSR disclosures (attributional factor).

Capital budgeting decisions frequently go awry. We investigate whether the party gathering the data utilizes persuasive communications when presenting the information to a superior. Specifically, we analyze whether the information is framed differently depending on his or her opinion. Since prior research has shown that differential framing of the same information affects decisions this may be one contributor to capital budgeting failures. We found that participants did frame the information differently depending on whether they chose to accept or reject the project. Our control group, no decision required, was materially different from the reject group but not materially different from the accept group.

This study uses an experimental approach to examine how the perceptions and decisions of prospective nonprofessional investors are influenced by risk disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). The between-subjects experiment used 157 MBA students as nonprofessional investors. The participants were given a firm's financial statements. In addition, the experimental group received the section on risk in the MD&A, whereas the control group did not receive any part of the MD&A. The participants were then asked to make several investment assessments and a final investment decision. The results show that the information included in the risk section of the MD&A has a significant negative effect on perceptions of the firm's future performance, a significant positive influence on perceptions of the stock's risk, and a marginally significant negative effect on the investment decision. The effect on the investment decision is mediated by respondents' perceptions of the firm's future performance and stock risk. By providing evidence on the effect of risk disclosures on nonprofessional investors' investment decision-making process, this study can help professional bodies and national market regulators understand how some market participants react to risk information provided under their regulations. In fact, the results indicate that there is little to be gained by firms voluntarily providing these risk disclosures. This would seem to support the fact that disclosure of risk information needs to be mandated by market regulators.