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This paper aims to discuss a recently‐decided Seventh Circuit case in which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that National Presto Industries, Inc., a seller of household goods and munitions, was unlawfully operating as an investment company. The paper also aims to explain concisely the definition of investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act).

Using the Seventh Circuit's decision as an introduction, this paper summarizes the definition of investment company under the 1940 Act, highlights a statutory exclusion from the definition and a related SEC interpretation, reviews the judicial opinion and offers commentary on the court's decision.

The study finds that a typical investment company, such as a mutual fund, is nothing more than a pool of securities and cash. Most operating companies, such as manufacturers or service providers, look nothing like an investment company. Their assets consist of buildings, plants, inventory, computers and more. Yet, it is possible for an operating company to become an investment company. The definition under the 1940 Act provides a rather mechanical test for making this determination. The Seventh Circuit's decision concerned an operating company that the SEC believed satisfied the definition. In disagreeing with the SEC, the court seemed to focus on how a reasonable investor would perceive the company's business.

This paper provides a useful summary of how an operating company inadvertently could become an investment company. It should be valuable to officers and employees, particularly those who are engaged in cash management activities, of both public and private operating companies because it raises awareness of the ease with which an operating company can become an investment company and the availability of options to avoid such an outcome.

To inform readers of the challenges that fintech companies can have regarding investment company status, using two recent examples.

The article provides an introduction to the subject, discusses two examples of fintech companies that had investment company status challenges, and provides concluding remarks regarding each.

Navigating investment company status can be challenging for fintech companies, and in some cases, as was the case with the two companies discussed in the article, it may be necessary, or at least advisable, to seek to obtain an order from the SEC.

It is important for fintech companies to evaluate their investment company status in early stages and continue to monitor their status thereafter, particularly if they are considering a public offering.

Technical guidance from experienced investment company status lawyers.

This study aims to investigate the effect of the dynamics and potential of the board of directors on investment efficiency and the comparability of financial information in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The number of observations for this study includes 1,218 observations from companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2014–2020. The authors used econometric statistical methods such as multiple linear regression, the Chow and Hausman test and the Kendall correlation coefficient using Eviews software to conduct the research. To measure the board’s effectiveness, two variables are used, including board dynamics and potential.

The results showed a positive and significant relationship between dynamics, board potential and investment efficiency. Also, no significant relationship was observed between the board dynamics and the comparability of financial information. Finally, a positive and significant relationship exists between the board’s potential and the comparability of financial information.

The importance of this research is the use of board proxies, including the dynamics and potential of the board. In addition, other variables of board characteristics, such as size, independence, ownership and gender, and the relationship between these variables with investment efficiency and comparability of financial information, have been examined in this study.

The purpose of this paper is to identify possible reasons for insurance companies' scant interest in real estate as investment asset in Poland. The authors attempt to determine the impact of real estate investment on insurance companies' profitability.

After collecting the aggregated data about insurance companies' financial results for the period 2000‐2008 the authors analyzed the relationship between real estate investment and profitability indicators such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS). This approach reflected the shareholders' point‐of‐view. Subsequently, the same kind of analysis was carried out to investigate the impact of real estate investments on the insurance companies' return on technical activity (RTA) and return on investment activity (RIA). These indicators are meant to assess business performance from the point‐of‐view of insured persons.

The analysis revealed some negative correlations: real estate investments may reduce the profitability of insurance companies. If this is true, the unwillingness of insurance companies to purchase property would not be surprising. Yet, this conclusion should be accepted with caution.

Due to the short study period and changes in legal classification of investment categories, the available data were very imperfect and the study results may not be perceived as undisputable, hence, it is felt that further research is needed.

The paper is original, as previously no such research has been conducted in Poland.

Considering the standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), this study aims to examine whether the link between material sustainability and financial performance depends on the extent to which the company is oriented toward stakeholders.

To test the predictions, 13,942 firm-year observations from 43 different countries are used, covering the period from 2010 to 2019. Using a hand-mapping approach to match the indicators suggested by the SASB with those of the ASSET4, the authors realize that there are 170 material sustainability indicators among 466 indicators of the ASSET4. The authors use three different methods to verify if the materiality matters, including the alphas obtained from the Fama and French factor models, comparing the average abnormal returns of the portfolios and the bootstrapped Cramer technique.

The findings show that companies investing in material sustainability activities perform better than those investing in immaterial activities. Also, consistent with the theoretical foundations, the authors find that the effect of investing in material sustainability activities is more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries than that in shareholder-oriented countries. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.

Owing to COVID-19 in late 2019, data from 2020 to 2022 have not been used to obtain reliable results.

The results obtained in the current research provide valuable guidance for investors to make investments considering the degree of materiality of sustainability activities in different industries. It also helps managers to increase the company’s financial performance, make efficient decisions related to investment in sustainability activities and find investment strategies on the material sustainability issues in their industries.

This study provides a clearer understanding of investment in sustainability activities in different industries by separating material and immaterial sustainability activities in stakeholder and shareholder-oriented countries, and the results obtained can change the perspective of investors and company managers regarding investing in such activities in different countries. Investing in more materiality sustainability activities than the immateriality dimension can be new opportunities for companies to achieve predetermined goals, help retain and attract business partners or be a source of innovation for new product lines or services. Internal morale and employee engagement may increase while increasing productivity and firm performance. This discussion opens the way for future research.

This study provides insight into the effect of investing in material and immaterial sustainability activities in different industries on the company’s performance in shareholder and stakeholder-oriented countries.

This is an acceptable fact that firms put efforts to maximize shareholders wealth but there is growing demand that firms are also accountable to various stakeholders associated directly or indirectly with the firms' business activities. Investors now evaluate firm's performance not only from financial perspective but also consider environment, social, and governance (ESG) factors when taking investment decision. ESG is not visible in firm's annual financial reports but investors do not deny its significance when valuing firms. There are increasing interests in ESG by communities, professionals, and government bodies, and all are interested to keep it as part of firms' regular activity and have to relate it with firm performance and efficiency that affects firm value. Still, there are difficulties in integration of ESG factors into investment decision-making, but efforts are being put to overcome all the issues. Firms which consider ESG are in a good position to achieve their long-term financial goals as they are likely to attract capital, lower borrowing costs, mitigate risks, and maximize shareholders value.

This study empirically examines how firms manage real options over time in the context of the U.S. venture capital industry. It tracks the venture-capital funding histories of U.S. portfolio companies founded during 1989–1993, and their outcomes, until 2004. An examination of sequential investments suggests asymmetries in the management of successful and unsuccessful companies. Signals of a company's progress, such as the number of its patents, are significant predictors of VC investment practices in the case of successful companies, but not in the case of unsuccessful companies. In contrast, VC firm characteristics, such as experience in the company's industry, IPO experience, and geographic proximity, appear to explain variance in investment policies for unsuccessful companies, but not successful ones. This suggests that signals of progress are relatively easier to interpret when real options perform well over time, and investors can perhaps apply them equally effectively. In contrast, signals of failure are more ambiguous and complex; and firm-level differences are more pronounced in the management of unsuccessful options.

This research investigated the impact that environmental disasters have on the volume of socio-environmental disclosure and investments of Brazilian companies from 1997 to 2012. News on environmental disasters was collected through a search engine, the companies responsible for the disasters were identified, and the research technique of content analysis was used to analyze the research data, which included the sustainability reports, annual reports, and management reports of the companies responsible, and also of other enterprises belonging to the same economic sector, dating from two years before and two years after the accident. The sentences were categorized according to the methodology used by Deegan, Rankin, and Voght (2000). The Mann–Whitney test was used in order to set the level of socio-environmental disclosure and investment before the occurrence of the accident and then compare it to the level of disclosure and investment after the accident. As a result, it was shown that the companies reported a higher volume of socio-environmental disclosure in the two years after the occurrence of the accidents – with statistical significance of 2.9%. Statistically significant variations of 8.2% and 0.7% were found in the totals of contributions to society and in environmental investments, respectively. On the other hand, there was no statistically significant variation in the internal social indicators. The relevance of this research is the study of events to understand how environmental disasters can influence voluntary disclosure practices of Brazilian companies, through the lens of the legitimacy theory.

This study aims to examine the relationship between the presence of ex-auditor chief executive officers (CEOs) and ex-auditor chief financial officers (CFOs) with the company's investment efficiency decisions.

The authors use non-financial Indonesian listed firms, and the authors obtain 2,763 firm-year observations of ex-auditor CEOs and 2,708 firm-year observations of ex-auditor CFOs from 2010–2019.

The results show that ex-auditor CEOs tend to make efficient investment decisions, while ex-auditor CFOs do not. However, when a company has a CEO and a CFO who are both former auditors, there is a significantly stronger positive relationship with investment efficiency. These results indicate that working experience as an auditor can optimally facilitate the decision regarding investment level. Moreover, the results suggest that the CEO, as top management, has more influence in providing the company's final investment decisions, whereas the CFO plays a role in providing investment recommendations to the CEO. The results of this study are consistent with the use of alternative measurements and the robustness test of Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM).

The results of this study can contribute as material for consideration by company management in selecting company organs with an auditor background to secure efficient investment.

This study specifically examines the experience, values, and particular characteristics of top management with an auditor background on the company's strategic decisions. This study is also based on the phenomenon that the number of ex-auditor CEOs and CFOs in Indonesia tends to increase every year.

This paper has two purposes: to identify and explain the major forces that are causing the increasing need for operational reporting and intellectual capital (IC) reporting for European companies; and to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for operational and intellectual capital reporting if such reporting is to be meaningful for information users.

The approach for this paper has been to examine relevant papers, reports, guidelines, compendiums, annual reports, opinions, submissions and legislation.

Eight determining forces are identified that make the basis of the case for the provision of operating and IC information: the long‐standing global dominance and growth of the US economy; the emergence of business models other than the value chain (especially the emergence of network businesses); the changing nature of stock exchanges; the influence of different investment fund types (mutual, pension and hedge funds); the roles of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts; global and European investment index development; rating agency activity; and financial reporting and corporate governance regime development.

The eight forces are interdependent and immutable. Comprehensive operational and IC reporting are unavoidable. Accordingly, the authors propose that the necessary and sufficient conditions for adequate enterprise information reporting are: a legal requirement for mandatory operational and IC reporting and attendant regulatory framework(s) where the legal framework is based on the concept of neglect; key operating and IC resource status and activity performance definitions and metrics that reflect the enterprise's underlying business model(s); and (3) a mapping of the capitalized operational and IC investments that are by definition normally expensed to the financial report accounts.

The authors believe that no one has previously formally proposed a mandatory operational and IC reporting requirement; a legal reference frame of reference based on the legal concept of neglect; standard definitions for operational and IC performance metrics; a reference framework for information quality that is, inter alia, based on the consistency, comparability and comprehensiveness of reported metrics; and the requirement to map all capitalized IC resources back to the financial reports of the company.