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We make use of rich microdata from the Belgian MEqIn survey, which contains detailed information on individual consumption, public consumption inside households, and time use. We explain the observed household behavior by means of a collective model that integrates marriage market restrictions on intrahousehold allocation patterns. We adopt a revealed preference approach that abstains from any functional form assumptions on individual utility functions or intrahousehold decision processes. This allows us to (set) identify the sharing rule, which governs the intrahousehold sharing of time and money, and to quantify economies of scale within households. We use these results to conduct a robust individual welfare and inequality analysis, hereby highlighting the important role of detailed consumption and time use data.

The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the within-household distributional effects of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are essentially driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the distributional effects captured by the collective model would be significant only for reforms both radical and of extended scope.

We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on marriage decisions. Introducing the marriage market in the collective model allows us to independently estimate transfers from labor supplies and from marriage decisions. We estimate a semiparametric version of our model using 1980, 1990, and 2000 US Census data. Estimates of the model using marriage data are much more consistent with the theoretical predictions than estimates derived from labor supply.

The positive relationship between household poverty and child labor decisions need not to be generalised across different types of works and geographical regions. This chapter studies this relationship using the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey data. The study attempts to identify the influence of exogenous change in household consumption on child labor decisions by using consumer durable goods as an instrument. These findings show that child labor was most prevalent and intensive in domestic work, but significant negative relationships between household consumption and child labor supply are only found in unpaid market work. These findings support both poverty reduction and awareness campaigns as child labor eradication strategies. Promotion of non-labor intensive income sources also seems to be an attractive policy option.

Relationships have changed dramatically in the last 50 years. Fewer couples are marrying, more are cohabiting. Reasons for this shift include more attractive labor market opportunities for women and changing social norms, but the shift may have consequences of its own. A number of models predict that those cohabiting will specialize less than those marrying. Panel data on time use – particularly housework time – as well as on the degree of specialization in more narrowly defined household tasks from the 2001–2019 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey are used to test this prediction.

The time use data for men provides only limited supporting evidence for specialization. The results for women are much stronger. Women who marry without first cohabiting increase their reported housework time more than those who enter cohabitations (by 3.7 hours versus 1.2 hours). The latter generally make up a third of the difference if they do marry. Expanding the analysis to other uses of time yields some further evidence of specialization.

Survey responses on the degree of specialization are more informative. The raw data show substantial intrahousehold specialization and further analysis reveals that on average married couples specialize more than cohabiting couples. Adding couple-specific fixed effects reveals that specialization increases when cohabiting couples marry. Interestingly, there does not appear to be a substantial tradeoff between tasks; partners who report specializing more on one task are more likely to report specializing on other tasks as well. Given the important roles couples have in family formation and the labor market, it is important to understand this intrahousehold behavior.

Although preference for sons has been documented among parents in developing countries, it is an open question whether and to what extent intra-household resource allocation is influenced by family sex composition. This study investigates the effects of sex composition on intra-household resource allocation based on the collective household model of Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013). I extend their model to estimate the influences on a household member’s resource share by observing how budget shares of a private assignable good vary not only with total expenditure and family size, but also with family sex composition. Using data from the 2005 Iranian Household Income and Expenditure Survey, I find that family composition significantly affects intra-household resource allocation in Iranian rural areas. Specifically, rural parents assign 1.6–1.9 percentage points more resources toward their sons. These resources are essentially coming at the expense of mothers. In all-boy families, mothers get 2.8–3.6 percentage points fewer resources than they do in all-girl families. These effects are more pronounced among farmer families than nonfarmer families. However, I find no significant role for gender composition in intra-household resource allocation in urban areas.

The standard approach in measuring demand responses and consumer preferences assumes particular parametric models for the consumer preferences and demand functions, and subsequently fits these models to observed data. In principle, the estimated demand models can then be used (i) to test consistency of the data with the theory of consumer behavior, (ii) to infer consumer preferences, and (iii) to predict the consumer's response to, say, new prices following a policy reform. This chapter focuses on an alternative, nonparametric approach. More specifically, we review methods that tackle the earlier issues by merely starting from a minimal set of so-called revealed preference axioms. In contrast to the standard approach, this revealed preference approach avoids the use of parametric models for preferences or demand. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we introduce the basic concepts of the revealed preference approach to model consumer demand. Next, we consider issues like goodness-of-fit, power, and measurement error, which are important in the context of empirical applications. Finally, we review a number of interesting extensions of the revealed preference approach, which deal with characteristics models, habit-formation, and the collective model.

This paper advances the specification and estimation of econometric models of retirement and saving in two earner families. The complications introduced by the interaction of retirement decisions by husbands and wives have led researchers to adopt a number of simplifications. Our analysis relaxes these restrictions. The model includes three labor market states, full-time work, partial retirement, and full retirement; reverse flows from states of lesser to greater work; an extended choice set created when spouses make independent retirement decisions; heterogeneity in time preference; varying taste parameters for full-time and part-time work; and the possibility of changes in preferences after retirement.

The chapter estimates the cost of maintaining a child, at different ages, the cost of being single, and the cost of additional adults present in a family, with the aim of making comparable the income levels of different households. The study investigates the issue of econometric identification of equivalence scales within a demand system modified to include demographic characteristics consistently with economic theory. It shows that a robust estimation of equivalence scales must take into formal consideration the problem of econometric identification. The estimate also puts forward all-encompassing demographic specifications to identify costs due to differences in needs, household lifestyles, and economies of scale.